

FOREWORD

The Integration Foundation started a monitoring of integration processes in 1999 to explore the changes in ethnic relations and the related opinions of the two language communities and their reflections in the media during the implementation of the state program "Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007".

Two research groups were formed as a result of an open competition. The public opinion survey was conducted by the sociologists and political scientists of Tallinn Pedagogical University, the Institute of International and Social Studies and the Open Society Institute under the co-ordination of Professor Jüri Kruusvall. The media research was carried out by the students of sociology and media of the University of Tartu under the supervision of Triin Vihalemm, Ph.D., a lecturer of the Department of Journalism and Media.

This publication presents the results of both the survey and the media research (predominantly printed press) of the integration processes conducted in 1999.

Age (years)	Estonian	Non-Estonian
15-24	21,7 %	21,9 %
25-34	16,5 %	15,9 %
35-44	18,2 %	16,6 %
45-54	15,3 %	16,8 %
55-64	16,2 %	15,3 %
65-74	12,2 %	13,6 %
All	100,0 %	100,0 %

Sex	Estonian	Non-Estonian
Male	48,9 %	45,9 %
Female	51,1 %	54,1 %
All	100,0 %	100,0 %

Education	Estonian	Non-Estonian
Basic	36,3 %	33,4 %
Secondary	47,4 %	52,2 %
Higher	16,3 %	14,5 %
All	100,0 %	100,0 %

Nationality	Estonian	Non-Estonian
Estonian	100,0 %	
Russian		83,6 %
Ukranian		7,2 %
Belorussian		4,0 %
Jewish		0,4 %
Finnish		0,9 %
Other		2,6 %
Difficult to say		1,2 %

The purpose of the integration monitoring is to follow for at least three years the most important shifts in the relationship between Estonians and non-Estonians from the perspective of the goals set by the integration strategy (see state program "Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007"). The general aim of this program is to increase the stability

and cohesion of the society, to promote the common identity of the nations but also at the same time to help to preserve each cultures' uniqueness.

The final goal of the integration process in Estonia is envisioned as an open multicultural society where the members of different nationalities are identifying themselves with the Estonian state, and sharing a common cultural and linguistic space based on the Estonian language, as well as on common democratic values and tolerance towards the cultural differences. The ethnic differences of Estonians and non-Estonians are recognised as an important developmental source for the Estonian society as well as an input into the interethnic communication and cultural development.

In the envisioned multicultural Estonian society all ethnic groups should share the will for mutual understanding and recognition, a readiness for dialogue on the matters concerning Estonian society as well as world affairs.

The implementation of the state program occurs in three principal directions: the communicative, legal-political and socio-economic.

The linguistic-communicative integration has set the goal of increasing mutual tolerance and openness through creating a common informational space in the spheres of education, media, cultural activity and everyday communication. On the one hand, this is based on the sufficient knowledge of Estonian language, interest in Estonian culture and the activities to yield and present own culture by the non-Estonians, on the other hand it requires from the Estonians tolerance and interest for the cultures, languages and the world-views of non-Estonians as well as the wish to make Estonian culture, attitudes and behaviour understandable and sympathetic to others.

The legal-political integration aims at strengthening the sense of identification and loyalty towards the Estonian State in order to enable non-Estonians to feel themselves active members of the society. An important aspect of this is the acquiring Estonian citizenship, but also being more actively involved in politics as well as adding to the developing of the new civil society.

The third main sphere of integration politics is related to the socio-economic rights and possibilities of non-Estonians, aiming at the growth of social security, competitive skills and career possibilities of all the inhabitant of Estonia without regard to their ethnic background.

The implementation of integration politics requires the co-operation of the government institutions as well as non-governmental organisations. It has active support from the international organisations (UNDP, PHARE) and the foreign partners of Estonia (especially the Nordic countries, Great Britain and USA).

Integration politics as a conscious and intentional strategy initiated by the state is based on the goals essential for the Estonian state: to transform Estonia into a stabile, democratic and competitive society that guarantees the security and possibilities for self-realisation for its subjects. But the integration politics can be successful only as far as it is supported by the interest and everyday relationships of the members of the society, the spontaneously developing social and cultural processes and the public opinion shaped by the media. The programs, projects or claims by functionaries of the state cannot be the only indicators of the process. To judge it we have to listen to its target: the people.

Via the monitoring of integration processes, asking the opinion of people and analysing the materials published in the Estonian and Russian press, we are provided with an overview of the attitudes of people with different ethnic and social backgrounds towards other people, how they perceive the situation of different nationalities in Estonia, what are their expectations in this issue, as well as the similarities or differences in their opinions, expectations, wishes and beliefs. We can also conclude how the state initiated integration process is perceived by the people and the media space created by the journalists.

Research conducted in previous years has shown that the abrupt shifts during the last 50 years in the national composition of the Estonian population have resulted in splitting the country into two parts with different views and outlooks: the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking community. These communities divided by language lived separate lives for decades, both had their own imaginary Estonia that did not coincide with the other. The integration politics pursues bringing these two visions of Estonia closer to each other, fusing them into one. The results of the 1999 integration monitoring published in this brochure should help to judge how far the society is from this goal and if the changes are in the right direction.

Marju Lauristin
Member of the Board of the Integration Foundation

TOLERANCE OF ESTONIANS AND NON-ESTONIANS

Iris Pettai

1. A MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT OF TOLERANCE

Tolerance is an essential dimension when analyzing development of a given society – the more enhanced and democratic the society, the wider its tolerance margin in respect of dissidents, different cultures and ways of life. Tolerance is the indicator of the reserves of the community, moving towards the society governed by the assumption that being unorthodox and dissenting is to be perceived as an asset, pregnant with new stimuli, rather than an anathema to be vigorously denounced. Communities giving to the minorities an equal position and equal opportunities to get along in life are more stable and permeated by healthier social climate than those who effectively keep the minorities out of the mainstream, relegating them to the backwater, a place isolated intellectually and economically.

Development of tolerance in Estonia can be treated, conditionally, as a five-phase process.

Figure 1 Development of tolerance in Estonia

ESTONIANS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desire that aliens should leave Estonia Desire to build up the State of Estonia, and to administer it on one's own Strong distrust to aliens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Putting up with the idea that the aliens are here to stay Token and aloof contacts only with aliens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desire to be more indulgent, to make some concessions in the citizenship policy Desire to integrate aliens Desire to start a dialog 'Estonians – aliens' (= we are ready to consider the aliens' problems) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Understanding that for Estonia to develop, the aliens' potential is to be harnessed Understanding that all barriers should be removed, blocking the development of aliens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Understanding that the role assumed by Estonians has been too dominating Understanding that aliens must shoulder the responsibility for development of the Estonian society, just like Estonians
PHASES	I REJECTION, NEGATION Reciprocating mistrust, conflict prone interethnic relations	II PASSIVE TOLERANCE Neutral and indifferent attitude	III INTERNALIZED TOLERATION Understanding and acknowledgement	IV ACTIVE TOLERATION Reciprocating value attachment (respect and esteem)	V UNITY (FEELING 'BY US AND FOR US')
NON-ESTONIANS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unwillingness to accommodate to Estonian way of life and the Estonian society Desire to live separated in one's own world 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desire to learn Estonian Formal desire to integrate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internalized desire to integrate Knowledge about and interest in developments in Estonia Loyalty, readiness to comply with the requirements posed to citizens of Estonia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formation of Estonia-centered world outlook High estimate to Estonians' values and aspirations Respect to the State of Estonia and Estonians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responsibility for Estonia and the well-being of Estonians Attempt to make one's best for prosperity of Estonia

Phase I – rejection and negation, based on reciprocal distrust, mistrust and collision in interethnic relations. The rejection phase carried on until the mid-90s. From the Estonians' standpoint, the rejection phase manifested their cherished dream of having the non-Estonians leave Estonia and make for the historical fatherland. It was an unveiled hint to them to leave the Estonians alone, let them build up their State. Estonians supported the implementation of a rigorous and strict citizenship policy regarding the non-Estonians, landing the majority of those not speaking Estonian in the status where they were deprived of Estonian citizenship. Non-Estonians filled the rejection phase by blatant disregard to requirements of the State of Estonia, and manifest desire to carry on living as of old, in their secluded world.

Phase II – passive toleration as sign of a burgeoning tolerance, much like the attitude prevalent in the occupation period. Rather, it recalled the toleration, sometimes tantamount to superiority. In that phase, there still was rather a long way to go between those two sectors of community. In external comportment this meant the engagement, keeping within confines of the civility, however never going beyond bare necessity. There seemed to be no longer any threat emanating from one's opposing number, however conspicuously notable was the disinterestedness, and the lack of need to delve into the problems of one's neighbor of a different stock. The will to live a separate life was reigning supreme, in view of the pronounced mistrust of both parties. For Estonians that phase heralded appeasement, meaning that they had put up with the permanent stay in Estonia of non-Estonians. The majority of Estonians reached that phase in mid-90s. That stance of Estonians was effectively bolstered by surveys on interethnic relations held in that period, revealing that 90% of non-Estonians were regarding Estonia as their home, nurturing no desire to call it quits and leave here.* From the standpoint of non-Estonians the passive toleration implied the desire to stay in Estonia, however adjusting to Estonian ways only formally (= to learn Estonian and to acquire the Estonian citizenship). The phase of passive toleration was a seemingly peaceful and stable way of co-existence. The environment was continuously stable, the peaceful co-existence continued. Should the environment, by any chance have been kicked out of balance, the threat of ethnic conflicts, crises and collisions would be there to stay.

Phase III – internalized toleration is a qualitatively new phase, underpinned by growth of mutual understanding and empathy. A vital prerequisite therefor is the availability of adequate and sufficient information about other ethnic groups, and primarily the interest to obtain that information. The other ethnic groups will then become more open and their behavior will become more foreseeable. When mutual contact is established, the parties will become less vulnerable, less prone to hold at arms length and set up barriers. In case of Estonians the internalized toleration will manifest itself in the desire to integrate the non-Estonians. Instead of the formerly negative or indifferent attitude, one will make an effort to visualize the situation through non-Estonian eyes, to understand them, to analyze their problems, sometimes even sympathizing with them. Non-Estonians will exhibit, in phase III a noticeable increase of interest towards the developments and events in Estonia. The formal and superficial desire to integrate will become more meaningful, because the scales have fallen from their eyes and they will perceive the State they live in and the demands that State is imposing on them. One will make a conscious effort to abide by the rules; the loyalty to the State of Estonia and the all-out readiness to comply with requirements demanded of the Estonian citizen will be becoming a voluntary act of good faith. The phase of internalized toleration will be conducive for stable interethnic relations. Differences of opinion will never aggravate to clashes and confrontation, 'constructive engagement' being the catchword. Growth of mutual trust will lay down prerequisites for cooperation in several areas of life.

-
- Attitude of North-East Estonian urban population to Estonian reforms and social policy. Promoter of the survey: Market Research Group, Tartu University. November. 1995. Tallinn. p. 20.

The fertile ground of understanding and empathy may ensure quite logically the mutual respect and esteem, leading to active toleration, i.e. – phase IV. Active toleration will imply the recognition and acknowledgement, basing on the mutual value attachment. For *E s t o n i a n s* the attachment of value to non-Estonians will mean the comprehension that non-Estonians are less of a problem than a vital resource and potential for Estonia, which can only be effectively harnessed provided the barriers, mounted on the strength of negative stereotypes are dismantled. For *n o n – E s t o n i a n s* phase IV will mean both the formation in them of Estonia-centered world outlook and the embracing by them of values, and trends of development of the State of Estonia. Estonia-centered world outlook however can not take root, should the non-Estonians lack a regular and adequate overview of trends and developments in Estonia. The phase of active toleration will reinforce and give stability to interethnic relations, becoming a guaranty of the security of the State and the public safety.

Phase V – the phase of unity and feeling of fellowship and mutual help. Estonian society will not be cleaved on the ethnic basis, negative stereotypes will have vanished, in evidence will be conditions for equal participation and involvement of all people in the development of Estonian society and the State of Estonia. Prevalent among *E s t o n i a n s* will be the conception that responsibility for the development of the Estonian society is vested equally in Estonians and non-Estonians, i.e. the concept of ethnic nation state will be replaced by the concept of political nation state. *N o n - E s t o n i a n s* will have evolved into actors and ground breakers of development of Estonia. Active involvement implicitly will generate enhanced responsibility for the fate of Estonia, and the desire to make the most of oneself in the Estonian society.

2. ECLIPSE OF THE PHASE OF PASSIVE AND NEUTRAL ATTITUDE

At the beginning 90s the interethnic relations in Estonia were rife with conflict. In 1993, the survey carried out by market research group of Tartu University provided evidence that 2/3 of Estonians and 3/4 of non-Estonians estimated the interethnic relations as aggravated. Besides crime, unemployment, poverty, disparity of distribution, the issue of interethnic relations was a thorn in the flesh of the Estonian society. By 2000, the pestering ethnic problems were becoming less emphatic. To value-estimate the degree of toleration in respect of other nations, the said monitoring made use of the following parameters:

- **Level of conflict proneness.** How frequent are conflicts, rows and controversies on ethnic grounds? How aggressive are those conflicts? Do they lead to bodily clashes?
- **Apprehensions.** What apprehensions are perceived, in connection with people of different ethnic origin? How safe and reliable is the next nationality?
- **Reserve and distance, aloofness.** How often do the people of different nationality make contact and communicate among themselves? How many friends and acquaintances are there among the next nationality? How many ethnically mixed collectives, mixed marriages etc.?
- **Mutual assistance.** The incidence of assistance and support to the fellow man in need?
- **Readiness for tolerance.** The margin of readiness on part of different ethnic men to engage in common activities, to get something done in actual life? What are the situations

where distance is maintained? What are the situations where aloofness cracks and reserve vanishes?

- **Reciprocal expectations.** What sort of behavior and action does one nation demand of the other?

* **Level of conflict proneness.**

Under the findings of the monitoring, only 7% of Estonians and non-Estonians (or their household and connections) have personally been involved in conflicts or strife on ethnic grounds. Conflicts have been limited to dissension and discords, never reaching the stage of bodily violence and rough handling. Still, confrontation on ethnic grounds has not been uprooted in Estonia. More than one third of Estonians and nearly half of non-Estonians have come to witness not infrequently the events pregnant with conflict on ethnic grounds (cf. Table).

TABLE 1

Have you come across, in past two years, of any conflicts between Estonians and non-Estonians, of cases of hostile attitude to Estonians and non-Estonians (responses to rankings – yes, frequently + yes, sometimes)?

(in %)

	Estonians	Non-Estonians		
		Citizen of Estonia	Stateless	Citizen of Russia
In public places (in street, at shops, in marketplace etc.)	39	46	45	50
In press, TV, radio	39	26	27	23
In governmental institutions, with civil servants and officials	11	28	27	34
In the perimeter of your home – house, courtyard, street	21	16	9	5
At your workplace	8	9	6	5

For Estonians, fraught and complex relationships are likely to occur in public places (street, store, market) and media. For non-Estonians charged with conflicts or hostile attacks are public places, governmental institutions and media. Conflicts and hostility are less frequent at one's job or in the vicinity of one's home. The recognized incidence of conflicts shall not be overestimated, though. Few having respective personal experience, the assessment of the onlooker is to be rated as the intellectual or emotional attitude, implying that there just are some isolated cases of negative approach and of manner of carrying oneself, not signaling all-pervasive mutual rejection and negation.

- **Apprehensions.**

The apprehensions as reciprocated mutually by Estonians and non-Estonians are rather pointed, the specific apprehensions however being different. For an Estonian man, the non-Estonian is the epitome of apprehensions of three types:

I Threat to the very existence of the Estonian nationality.

Under data of the survey, the presence of Russians rings alarm to nearly two third of the Estonians, as jeopardizing the existence of the nation of Estonians. It thence transpires that this threat is a major inhibitor blocking the integration of society.

TABLE 2

*Do you perceive Russians living in Estonia as a threat to survival of the Estonian nation?**
(in %)

	Estonians
An inordinately large threat	14
A certain threat	49
No danger in those parts	22
I can not make up my mind	15

* Results of monitoring of Institute of Open Estonia Society 1999. Omnibus volume: Integration landscape – from indifference to unity of purpose. Tallinn, 2000. p. 95.

II Threat from increased incidence of crime, drug abuse and engagement in sexual practices for money.

For nearly half of Estonians, the living in Estonia of other ethnic groups means the heightened rate of drug addiction and prostitution.* Conversely, the non-Estonians fail to see the connection between themselves and the above vices.

TABLE 3

Does the living in Estonia of other nations have a condonable effect on...
(Responses to ranking “strongly condones”
in %)

	Estonians	Non-Estonians		
		Citizen of Estonia	Stateless	Citizen of Russia
Rampant drug addiction	57	15	7	7
Widening crime	53	12	8	6
Growing prostitution	42	6	4	4

III Mistrust.

Estonians are suspicious of loyalty of non-Estonians. Only 4% of Estonians are fully agreed, 32% tending to agree that non-Estonians are loyal to the State of Estonia. Fears of non-Estonians is associated with their apprehensions lest they be discriminated against and be secured permanently the place of underdog in Estonia. Under data of the 1999 monitoring nearly half of non-Estonians feel being rejected and as the second-best, inferior, subordinate people.* *

TABLE 4

Is there discrimination in Estonia of people of some ethnic backgrounds?
(Responses to rankings
frequently + not infrequently in %)

	Estonians	Non-Estonians		
		Citizen of Estonia	Stateless	Citizen of Russia
Yes	6	26	45	45
No	63	24	15	12
I can't make up my mind	11	15	8	12

Upon estimate of 37% of non-Estonians and only 6% Estonians people of some specific ethnic background are being discriminated against in Estonia. 91% of Estonians and 57% of non-Estonians lack the personal experience of having been discriminated. Higher apprehensions to be discriminated against are displayed by citizens of Russia and stateless non-Estonians, the same being less pointed with citizens of Estonia.

* Cf. also Jüri Kruusvall. Trust and Distrust in Interethnic Relations. Volume: Russian Minority and Challenges for Estonia. Tallinn, 1998. pp. 36-40.

** Iris Pettai. Ivi Proos. Integration as a new deal between two ethnic groups. Database supplied with comments. Tallinn, 1999. p. 22.

* Distance

41% of Estonians and nearly half of non-Estonians have contacts and they engage in communication. Communication is more active at work, however also with friends and acquaintances. Quite a few Estonians and non-Estonians are next door neighbors. One out of five Estonians has connections among non-Estonians, of non-Estonians every sixth man has connections among Estonians. One out of six Estonians has business and cooperation partners among non-Estonians. With non-Estonians, this ratio is lower: only every tenth of non-Estonians having an associate among Estonians. Comparison with the 10-year-old estimate on communication suggests that Estonians maintain lesser contacts with non-Estonians, currently, particularly on job. Non-Estonians communicate with Estonians more often than 10 years ago; they have seemingly more friends and acquaintances, more shop mates, partners and chums at school.

TABLE 5
Are there any non-Estonians ...

	Estonians		Non-Estonians	
	Presently	10 years ago	Presently	10 years ago
among your neighbors	41	44	59	51
among your friends, close acquaintances	41	46	48	41
among your close associates on job and mates at school and training events	36	59	50	44

(in %)

among your other connections and relatives	19	19	16	15
among your business and cooperation partners	17	26	11	7
in your family	9	12	14	13
Nope	29	15	16	23

- **Mutual help.**

38% of Estonians are responding that non-Estonians have been of help in the course of their lives, or have done something good to their families. Of non-Estonians, 48% have made recourse to Estonians for assistance. The incidence of mutual help and assistance is higher in daily life and on job. Not infrequent are cases of moral and financial support.

TABLE 6

Assistance enjoyed

(in % of respondents, having obtained help)

	Estonians	Non-Estonians
in daily routine	29	29
job related	16	22
financial	15	10
moral	15	7
all-round	9	16

- **Readiness for toleration.**

Readiness for toleration was assessed in four communication situations:

- mixed working collective
- residence in a common block of tenements (block of tenement houses)
- residence in a common town, county
- life in an ethnically mixed family

There was the question of whether the respondent would agree to work/live together with many people of different nationality. By the same technique the toleration was assessed also in 1997.*

To appreciate the toleration threshold, a scale was construed:

- extremely high toleration threshold (over 75% of respondents being ready to work or live together with their opposite number)
- high toleration threshold (readiness displayed in 50 – 74% of respondents)
- average toleration threshold (readiness displayed in 33 – 49% of respondents)
- low toleration threshold (readiness displayed in less than 33% of respondents)

Presented in the Table are the data for Estonians and non-Estonians enjoying various types of citizenship status.

TABLE 7

Readiness for toleration of Estonians and non-Estonians.

	Estonians	Total non-Estonians	Citizens of Estonia	Stateless	Citizens of Russia
extremely high toleration threshold (readiness displayed in over 75%)	-	-	Mixed working collective (79%) Tenement house, block (77%)	-	-
high toleration threshold (readiness displayed in 50 – 75%)	Mixed working collective (56%)	Mixed working collective (68%) Tenement house, block (68%) Town, county (63%)	Town, county (71%)	Mixed working collective (63%) Tenement house, block (54%) Town, county (68%)	Mixed working collective (56%) Tenement house, block (54%) Town, county (53%)
average toleration threshold (readiness displayed in 33 – 49%)	Tenement house, block (38%) Town, county (36%)	Ethnically mixed family (41%)	Ethnically mixed family (53%)	-	Ethnically mixed family (35%)
low toleration threshold (readiness displayed in less than 33%)	Ethnically mixed family (28%)	-	-	Ethnically mixed family (31%)	-

* Inter-University research program VERA of Ministry of Education of the Republic of Estonia & the public-opinion survey company Saar Poll, the survey on interethnic problems. November 1997.

The openness is the highest towards working and studying in an ethnically mixed collective (over half of Estonians and non-Estonians). There is less tolerance to living in an ethnically mixed family (in particular with Estonians). Non-Estonians are rather more open in that respect than Estonians - 2/3 of them are ready to live in a common tenement house, town, village etc. Citizens of Estonia display a particularly wide margin of tolerance – 3/4 of them are ready to work in a mixed collective or in close adjacency, half of them ready to settle down in an ethnically mixed family. Stateless non-Estonians, too have a relatively wide tolerance margin. Not so the citizens of Russia! Among both Estonians and non-Estonians younger and middle age bracket displays more openness.

- **Mutual expectations.**

The expectations of the dominant share of Estonians to non-Estonians are related to acquisition by the latter of the Estonian language. The third part of Estonians considers it very important that non-Estonian youth should enroll in the Estonian-language schools, to increase the mutual margin of tolerance. For one fifth, the cooperation readiness of Estonians is of paramount importance. Estonians do not turn a favorable eye towards the option of non-Estonians getting actively involved in politics, participating in common cultural life and enhancing their competitive posture in labor market (only 5 - 8% of Estonians think that important). Neither do Estonians support assimilation of non-Estonians (this idea only finds advocates among 12% of Estonians). Of priority to non-Estonians is the improvement of relations with Estonians (wider tolerance margin, promotion of cooperation). Too, non-Estonians are significantly more interested in enhancement of their competitive posture, in active involvement in politics and cultural life. What they accept the least is the assimilation.

TABLE 8

There is much talk currently about involvement of non-Estonians into Estonian society, meaning integration. Which among the following processes, in this connection rank the highest on the scale of priorities for you, which are important and which of lesser importance?

(Response to ranking very important in %)

	Estonians	Non-Estonians		
		Citizens of Estonia	Stateless	Citizens of Russia
Majority of non-Estonians are mastering Estonian	62	32	17	19
Mutual toleration of Estonians and non-Estonians is increasing	35	47	39	47
Non-Estonian youth are enrolling in schools with Estonian as language of instruction.	33	22	20	34
Readiness of Estonians to engage in cooperation with non-Estonians is making headway	22	41	35	45
Gap between the lifestyles of Estonians and non-Estonians is shrinking	12	14	11	19
Competitive power of non-Estonians in Estonia is growing	8	30	29	38
Participation of non-Estonians in Estonia's cultural life is increasing	7	22	19	32
Participation of non-Estonians in politics is increasing	5	28	22	34

Summary

The results of the monitoring support the surmise that the stage of ethnic conflicts was conclusively passed in Estonia by mid-90s. Only 12% of Estonians and 7% of non-Estonians think that conflicts between Estonians and non-Estonians may prove perilous to security and stability of the State of Estonia. The stage of passive and neutral forbearance, of patience and self-control, of deliberately keeping distance and of reluctance to lend an ear to sympathetically listen to what one's neighbor is saying, is the covered ground, for the best part. Deplorably though, the reciprocating apprehensions and distrust are much too entrenched as yet.

In case of non-Estonians the problem boils down to the simple fact that caught in the informational and ideological sphere of influence of Russia, many of them are Russia-oriented in their world outlook. Majority of non-Estonians has a poor command of Estonian, hence they are handicapped and unable to participate, on an equal footing, in politics, common cultural life etc. The bare wish and readiness to engage in common activities with Estonians will fall short of what is actually called for. Estonians, on their part are not especially forthcoming because of their apprehensions and lack of enthusiasm in the face of tightening competition in labor market and political arena, should non-Estonians make it and come to the fore. It can be safely asserted that citizens of Estonia coming from non-Estonians (less than one third of non-Estonians) have attained the phase of active toleration, as to their way of thinking and value estimates. Of Estonians, approximately one third belongs to that enlightened minority, perceiving in non-Estonians partners and a valuable resource to ensure development of Estonia.

If asked whether Estonia can boast of enough tolerance, the answer is both 'yes' and 'no'. It is enough to prevent interethnic conflicts and headlong confrontation. It is still too little to form a society operating on the premises of effective cooperation. Ethnic stereotypes and barriers are remaining relatively staunch.

EDUCATION AND ASPIRATION FOR EDUCATION

Marje Pavelson

1. Educational level and efficacy of education in labor market

Under the data of Estonian labor survey (ETU `99), working age people in the age bracket 15-74 number as follows. Level I education (primary or basic school) – 26%. Level II education (general secondary education, vocational or secondary specialized education after the basic school) – 51 %. Level III education – 23% (including those people with higher education 14%). Comparison of educational levels of Estonians and non-Estonians reveals that the gap between them is closing, with non-Estonians having the lesser share of persons with Level I education (basic education or lower) than Estonians. 26% of non-Estonians and 22% of Estonians have Level III education, the share of people with higher education being equal, to all practical purposes. (Cf. Table 1)

Table 1

Structure of education of Estonians and non-Estonians of the age bracket 15-74

Level of Education	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Level I education and lower (primary or basic education)	27	25
Level II education (general secondary, vocational and secondary specialized education, after basic school)	51	49
Level III education (secondary specialized education after secondary school, and higher education)	22	26
incl. – secondary specialized education	7	12
- higher education	15	14

Source: Estonian Statistical Office. Labor force, 1999, pp. 96-97

When comparing the changes in education during the past five years, covered by respective surveys, one will notice that non-Estonians have a lead on Estonians, in respect of the rate of acquiring the secondary and higher education. In 1995, the relatively large share of Level III education in non-Estonians could be explained away by the significant number of those (first and foremost female non-Estonians) possessing the secondary specialized education, however by now the percentage of people with higher education has also increased. Simultaneously, in both groups the share of the contingent with primary to basic education has increased: in 1995 that group accounted for 22% of Estonians, in 1999 however for 27%. In 1999, 25% of non-Estonians had from primary to basic education (in 1995 - 16%). This suggests that the number of persons with basic education is on the increase, in both ethnic groups, basically on account of the young people, who will not take up gymnasium, after the basic school, or who just drop out of school.

Notwithstanding the fact that higher education is still in vogue among Estonians, the share of Estonians with the university degree dropped, in the past five years, by one per cent, rising by the same amount among non-Estonians. The more so, the number of people with secondary specialized education, acquired after the secondary school (the remaining part of Level II education) is 7% among Estonians, and 12 % among non-Estonians.

Should the said trend continue, it is before long that the educational level (as per structure of schools graduated) of non-Estonians will beat that of Estonians. Apparently Estonians are more oriented to academic education (university), non-Estonians rather opting for professional higher schools (colleges) and vocational higher schools (junior colleges). Therefore the latter direction of education, too needs to be taken greater care of in Estonia, to offer new opportunities to all ethnic groups. In particular, vocational schools, presently being the self-contained training facilities without outlet, should be reformed so as to enable the young people to continue education in the subject they want to major in. That new scheme of vocational school will be a real winner, both for Estonians and non-Estonians.

It is to be noted, in particular that the middle level vocation school should provide uninterrupted and ongoing instruction in Estonian. In the opposite case, there is no guarantee the non-Estonians can stand their own ground in the labor market, or continue education in the vocational higher school (with instruction in Estonian). This is not the case currently. This is proved by the low employment rate of vocational school graduates, high incidence of their recruitment in shadow and black economies, and the limited options available to both ethnic groups to continue education in their chosen field (cf. M. Pavelson. Vocational education as the starter for career. Tallinn, 1999).

The comparing of the opportunities of people of various educational backgrounds in the labor market reveals significant differences between Estonians and non-Estonians. Under the data of Estonian Labor Survey ETU '99, unemployment among Estonians is noticeably high for individuals of low level of education. About half of that group are either those who are still undergoing training (young people) or those not seeking work (inactive for a number of other reasons). The unemployment rate of that group is up to 19%, being the worst for Estonians. The unemployment rate of low-education non-Estonians is high, too (23%). However, in the overall unemployment structure the share of that education group is only 15%, implying that unemployment is a risk run also by groups of higher levels of education, including those having Level III education. As a matter of fact, the employment rate of Estonians having post-secondary-school professional education is significantly higher (80%) than that of non-Estonians (69%), the unemployment rate of the latter being three times as high as that of Estonians. Under the data of the Estonian Labor Survey ETU'99 the employment rate of Estonians with higher education is 83%, that of non-Estonians with higher education 72%, the unemployment rates being respectively 2.5% and 10%.

Studying and communication in the Estonian-language environment, and active language instruction even prior to the secondary school is a mandatory prerequisite for non-Estonians with professional education to qualify for a competitive posture in labor market.

2. Education and occupation

Non-Estonians consider education as being of a lesser value, to enable one to compete in labor market, than Estonians do. However the strong orientation of Estonians to academic (and the humanitarian) education may turn out impracticable in the future, because it is highly improbable for a need to be created for such great numbers of people currently trained in social sciences and the Humanities. The present situation, with the demand for workers uncovered by local labor and with the profession of an attendant or caterer being rather a temporary occupation for young Estonians, pending the (academic) training in higher school, is clearly abnormal, in the framework of the development of Estonian economy. Hence, the pragmatic orientation to vocation and profession embraced by non-Estonians is useful to Estonia, and the necessity to elaborate the vocational higher education indisputable.

The data of this survey too corroborate the above conjectures. When considering the educational structures of different professional groups, one can not help noticing the lower educational level of “blue collar” Estonians, as compared to non-Estonians employed as laborers. Neither is the situation much different among experts and managers. Curiously, this is particularly notable among top executives, where Estonians dominate, as compared to non-Estonians. However, in this area the Estonians with substandard education outnumber their non-Estonians counterparts. Non-Estonians holding the offices of top experts and managers are, more often than not with higher education (cf. Table 2).

Table 2
Educational structure of professional groups of Estonians and non-Estonians effectively employed (%)

Professional group	Estonians			Non-Estonians			
	Basic	Secondary	Higher education	Basic	Secondary	Higher education	
- unskilled worker, laborer	44	52	4	47	45	8	
- skilled worker	39	60	1	16	77	7	
- attendant, caterer	20	74	6	20	73	7	
- clerk	8	75	17	-	60	40	
- middle level expert	6	83	11	12	71	17	
- expert (without subordinates)	3	35	62	-	39	61	
- expert (with subordinates)	9	39	52	-	35	65	
- manager of institution or unit	7	45	48	-	44	56	
Total:		20	57	23	16	62	22

Table 2 reveals that among non-Estonian workers and attendants (caterers) there are more educated personnel than among Estonians recruited to do the similar jobs. In particular, it catches the eye that quite a few people with higher education are employed in office work, and that among skilled and non-skilled workers and laborers the share of highly educated people is not insignificant. The low satisfaction-with-work indicators with non-Estonian skilled workers suggest that it might be their superior educational level, which does not let them feel content with their jobs. In the offices of “white collar” professions, too there is a manifest discrepancy in levels of education, as compared to Estonians, in particular in offices of top experts and managers. Making an allowance for the crucial role of education, in the success of integration, the reform in education boils down, in the first place to creating the competencies, necessary for work. The responsibility for that need not be shifted to the retraining and in-service training (Competence Centers). The field of training; what, when and where something was studied; what is the work record of the non-Estonians like – will turn out of decisive importance for the opportunities of employment offered to middle aged job applicants. In case of younger people, it is necessary to get some training to enable one to altogether compete for better jobs. The current situation in labor market shows that many young educated non-Estonians fail to obtain employment, meeting their education, many of them forced to make do with lower posts, to secure for themselves work and sustenance.

3. Demand for education and changes therein

Demand for education may be assessed in multiple ways. One of the conceivable approximations is to assess the share of learners in the aggregate under survey. In the majority of cases, the realization of aspiration for education depends on the individual’s age and his earlier acquired education, as well as on attitudes to acquisition of the education, primarily related to the family’s attitude to education. Underlying the reproduction of the existent education structure is the phenomenon all too common that the forebears with higher education strive to give the same to their progeny. Both Estonians and non-Estonians are keen to have their offspring well educated, their pattern of reproduction of education clearly differing. When comparing the current education structure of Estonians and non-Estonians, the data of this survey too also suggests the above lead of non-Estonians on Estonians, due to the growing share of those having acquired Level III education. Non-Estonians citizens of Estonia have displayed much alacrity to seek higher education. They represent a relatively young contingent and outrun the Estonians by 5%, in the group of higher education (cf. Table 2).

Table 3
Educational structure of groups of different citizenship (%)

Nationality/citizenship	Basic education	Secondary education	Higher education
- Est. citizens Estonians	36	47	16
- Est. citizens non-Estonians	34	45	21
- stateless non-Estonians	35	58	8
- citizens of Russia	29	57	14

The individuals with basic education distribute more or less equally over all groups (besides the citizens of Russia). Among the citizens of Estonia there are more of those having the higher education, at that occurrence among citizens of Estonia non-Estonians. The learners break down more or less equally in Estonian and non-Estonian families. Nearly half the families have learners engaged in training of different form. Non-Estonians however number fewer in basic schools (because the children of that age are more scarce in Russian families, than they are in Estonian families), however they are more in vocational schools (besides basic school).

When comparing the breakdown of learners among types of school, it turns out that there are more Estonians studying in basic schools and universities, and conversely, more non-Estonians in vocational schools and secondary-specialized educational institutions. Survey of non-Estonians carried out within the project Vera in 1997 revealed a strong motivation to vocational instruction and professional training (the phenomenon all the more clearly suggested by this survey). Like Estonians, the non-Estonians have set as their target attaining the higher education; unlike Estonians, they target at professional (vocational) higher education, not the university education. Wherever are the higher schools providing such education? Whatever are the opportunities of non-Estonians to matriculate, especially if their command of Estonian is not good enough? These are awkward questions to the educational establishment in Estonia.

Table 4
Preferable educational levels (for children) depending on citizenship of the respondent (%)

Nationality/citizenship	vocational or secondary	vocational specialized	professional higher education	university education
- Estonians, citizens of Estonia	14	22	26	33
- non-Estonians, citizens of Estonia	8	18	37	25
- stateless non-Estonians	11	33	33	11
- citizens of Russia	4	25	27	9

The 1999 survey carried out in professional higher schools* , formally including several private higher schools providing instruction in Russian, suggests that by far not all of those schools provide the education awaited in the Estonian labor market. Neither is there an opportunity, in majority of the fields of instruction, to continue the vocational secondary education acquired within the curriculum of the respective higher education. To compound the situation with providing the appropriate education, the districts flung farther from Tallinn lack respective higher schools (curricula). There is also the question of financial straits the families in those districts experience, also blocking the way of children to higher education. Therefore, unlike with Estonians, the choice of school by non-Estonians often depends on location of the school and the means of parents.

It needs to be mentioned, too that the aspirants of higher education have a relatively different orientation also in the open education market. Estonians think that Estonia is the

place to obtain higher education (49%) or that the place is immaterial or irrelevant (47%). The citizens of Russia would prefer to acquire higher education in Russia (24%). Non-Estonians, citizens of Estonia would opt for other places abroad (23%). Non-Estonians are more likely to accord excessive significance to the place the education is provided. Only one third of them are indifferent to that factor. Like Estonians, they consider the USA as the most attractive place to acquire higher education. Unlike Estonians they are ready to put up also with Great Britain (mainly non-Estonians citizens of Estonia and stateless persons). Nordic countries have no appeal to either of the groups.

It remains conjectural, how many are those who are capable to put this strategy into practice, in view of the low finances and scanty information available to the families. Nevertheless, preference accorded to foreign higher education sets one wondering whether it is at all possible to realize the present and perspective aspirations for education of non-Estonians in Estonia? There are far too many of the teeming higher schools in Estonia, not interested in young Russians. Nor can they provide the education on the requisite level.

* Cf. MTÜ LUI Professional higher schools in open education system of Estonia. Tallinn, 2000

UNDERSTANDING INTEGRATION IN ESTONIAN SOCIETY

JÜRI KRUSVALL

In order to evaluate the integration process up to the present day and plan the future integration it is necessary to know how people understand the integration processes and what are their attitudes towards integration. Questions related to this were divided into four parts in the survey: firstly, we tried to find out which processes in society are important and which are less important to people in connection with the integration; secondly, we studied how successful do people consider the integration in Estonian society; thirdly, we asked a number of questions concerning ethnic relations from the respondents with which they had to either agree or disagree; fourthly, we asked people to evaluate to what extent the presence of non-Estonians affects various processes concerning both the internal and foreign relations of Estonia. In general, we were interested to what extent is state support currently necessary for integration in Estonian society.

1. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IN THE INTEGRATION

In order to study the understanding of integration, 16 sub-processes in the Estonian society were differentiated in the questionnaire, and the respondents were asked to indicate how important they consider these processes to be.

In Figure 1, these sub-processes are arranged according to the average importance the respondents gave them: the most important integration factors (mean value over 2.4 points, over 90% of Estonians consider it to be important) for Estonians are the aliens' mastery of the Estonian language (A), and non-Estonians' loyalty towards the Estonian state (C). The second most important group of processes (over 80% of Estonians consider it to be important) includes the growth of mutual tolerance between Estonians and aliens (P), which is based on Estonians' readiness to cooperate with non-Estonians (I) and the aliens' self-definition as part of the Estonian people and state (O). Alien youth studying in Estonian language schools (H) and the majority of non-Estonians acquiring Estonian citizenship (B) also belong to this category of importance. And finally there is a development of a clear state integration policy (J) that should help bring about all these important sub-processes.


The third most important group of sub-processes, which includes the processes that are somewhat less significant in integration, is made up, according to Estonians' responses, of various cultural processes, such as the decreasing of the differences between Estonians' and non-Estonians' behaviour and way of life (L), non-Estonians' participation in Estonian cultural life (F) and the state's promotion of culture in the aliens' languages (G). Relatively less important for Estonians are the rise in non-Estonians' competitiveness in the labour market and in entrepreneurship (D), and the changing of laws and regulations concerning non-Estonians (M), including applying European Union norms in order to protect ethnic minorities (E). Estonians associate

integration least of all with non-Estonians' more active participation in Estonia's political life (E) (only half of the Estonian respondents consider this to be important) and with the rise of non-Estonians' proportion among Riigikogu members and employees of government institutions (K) (less than one third of Estonians consider this to be important).

Figure 1

Mean evaluation to the importance of integration processes.

(scale 3=very important, 1=not very important)



What is positive about these results is that, besides the already fixed requirement of the knowledge of the Estonian language, non-Estonians' loyalty towards the Estonian state has also emerged as an equally important factor of integration, which indicates that Estonians are starting to believe in the possibility of a state identity common for the whole of Estonia's population. This tendency is supported by the fact that Estonians themselves emphasise mutual tolerance and readiness for co-operation as important factors of integration.

Most Estonians consider both non-Estonians' assimilation and the emergence of a multicultural society in Estonia as results of the integration process. Estonians associate the rise in non-Estonians' competitiveness with integration, but do so mainly in the fields of economy and labour market. This is not supported in politics and in the sphere of governance. Changes in laws and in the application of Western norms that accompany integration are acceptable to Estonians but they would prefer to be in charge of these changes instead of letting aliens take a more active role in politics.

Non-Estonians render most integration-related processes more important than Estonians. According to their assessment, these processes can be divided into two groups. Aliens consider the rise in mutual tolerance with Estonians (P) to be the most important (mean value 2.4 points, 40-50% consider this to be very important), because this would enable them to feel as a part of the Estonian state and nation (O). This presumes, according to aliens, Estonians' readiness for co-operation (I) as well as a clear state integration policy (J) that would be expressed, above all, in the changing of the laws that concern non-Estonians (M) proceeding from the norms of the European Union (N).


Furthermore, non-Estonians evaluate integration through various processes that enable individual and collective self-realisation (mean value 2.2 to 2.4 points, about one third of the aliens consider this to be very important), such as obtaining Estonian citizenship (B), a rise in competitiveness in business and the labour market (D), acquiring possibilities to participate in politics (E,K), developing the culture in the aliens' native language (G). According to non-Estonians, these processes help increase the loyalty towards the state (C). Processes with an assimilative impact are of third-degree importance to aliens (mean value below 2.2 points, less than a quarter of aliens consider this to be very important). These processes are: the diminishing of the differences between Estonians' and aliens' lifestyle or behaviour (L), the mastering of Estonian by the majority of aliens (A), alien youth studying in Estonian-language schools (H) and non-Estonians' participation in Estonian cultural life (F).

The evaluations of non-Estonians with and without Estonian citizenship did not differ much. Non-Estonians with citizenship, naturally, more often consider the knowledge of the Estonians language and having Estonian citizenship to be important. Russian citizens favour studying in Estonian schools, as well as the aliens' active participation in political life, more than it was expected. Furthermore, they see non-Estonians as a part of the Estonian state and understand the necessity of a clearly defined integration policy. Thus, it may be claimed that there are many Russian speaking citizens who associate their future with Estonia and are ready to actively take part in public life here.

The largest discrepancies between the Estonians' and non-Estonians' understanding of the integration have to do, on one hand, with learning Estonian, studying in Estonian schools, and being loyal to the country. These factors are valued more by Estonians than by aliens. On the other hand, these discrepancies have to do with the possibilities of participation in political, economic and cultural life and with changes in the law and norms concerning aliens. These factors are considered to be more important by aliens than by Estonians. A growth in mutual tolerance, the formation of an Estonian identity among aliens, and the fact that the need for a clear state integration policy was rendered important both by Estonians and non-Estonians, can be mentioned as positive signs. The fact that Estonians themselves thought it necessary that they should show a readiness for co-operation, is also very important from the point of view of integration.

Figure 2

Answers to the question “Do you consider state support to integration necessary at the moment?” (%)



If both Estonians and non-Estonians wish for a clear state integration policy, then the attitudes towards the state’s financing of the integration process are not so coherent any more (see Figure 2). The majority of non-Estonians favour state support, while only two-thirds of Estonians consider the state support necessary for the integration processes (almost 30% considers it to be unnecessary). In order to clarify things, we will take a look at the connection between how Estonians evaluate the state support for the integration process, and how they rendered certain integration processes important. This will show the proportion of the respondents (in %) who considered state support “very necessary” or “quite necessary” and who, at the same time, believed that this factor is either “very important” or “important” in the integration process.

A Estonian language	62	I Estonians’ readiness	58
B Estonian citizenship	55	J clear integration policy	55
C loyalty towards Estonia	60	K participation in power organs	24
D competitiveness	46	L diminishing differences	45
E participation in political life	37	M changes in laws	37
F participation in cultural life	41	N EU norms will be applies	41
G own-language cultural life	40	O aliens as part of Estonia	58
H children to Estonian school	55	P tolerance will grow	58

We can see for Estonians that state support for integration important. The state support for the integration is associated in Estonians’ minds more often with the aliens’ learning Estonian, their loyalty to Estonia, and also with the understanding that aliens


are a part of Estonia. Estonians also consider a growth in mutual tolerance between Estonians and aliens to be important. It should be noted that the Estonians' readiness for co-operation with aliens is strongly associated with the state support for integration. Also highly valued was the need to increase options in state supported opportunities, such as a growth in the proportion of alien citizens among employees of government organisations (K), a growth in aliens' participation in Estonian political life (E) and the changing of the laws and regulations that concern aliens (M).

2. THE SUCCESS OF INTEGRATION

Asking for people's opinion about the success of integration, we assumed that they would evaluate the integration processes of recent years. The answers to the question about the success of integration in Estonian society are shown in Figure 3. We can see that it was not easy to make judgements about the success of integration, as almost one fifth of the respondents could not answer the question at all.


Only very few considered the course of integration successful so far, according to most respondents it has even been unsuccessful. Among Estonians and aliens who do have Estonian citizenship, there is a certain number who considered the integration successful, the other non-Estonians consider it predominantly unsuccessful. Russian citizens, of whom 23% consider integration in Estonian society so far completely unsuccessful, are the most critical. The success of the integration in individual spheres can be compared in Figure 4, that reflects the respondents' average indicators of evaluation (again compared to Estonians' evaluation).

Figure 3
Answers to the question "How successful has integration in Estonian society been so far?" (%)



In the case of Estonians, these individual spheres may be divided into three parts. According to Estonians, the integration has been the most successful in the improvement of non-Estonian youths' educational possibilities (G) (more than 50% of respondents consider it successful), and in the growth of the number of Estonian citizens. The integration has been moderately successful (40-50% consider it successful) in the following spheres: in guaranteeing aliens equal security and equal chances with Estonians (J), in guaranteeing equal possibilities in the labour market (B), in non-Estonians' increasing participation in public life and politics (C), in non-Estonians' activities in voluntary associations and cultural societies (D) and in the development of a multicultural society in Estonia (I). The integration has been the least successful in Eastern-Virumaa (E), especially in improving the aliens' knowledge of the Estonian language (A) and in the increasing representation of non-Estonians in Estonian government organisations (F) (here, success ratings remain below 40%).

Figure 4
Mean evaluation to the success of integration.
 (scale 4=very successful, 1=completely unsuccessful)



Non-Estonians' ratings of success enable us to divide these individual spheres into two groups. According to aliens, the growth of the number of Estonian citizens (H), the improvement of the knowledge of Estonian (A), the activities of voluntary organisations (D) and the formation of a multicultural society have been relatively more successful (25-35% consider these to be successful). Non-Estonians rendered the integration unsuccessful in the following factors: in the integration in Eastern-Virumaa

(E), in the growth of the representation of aliens in government organisations (F), in more active participation in public life and politics (C), in the creation of equal possibilities in the labour market (B) and in the actions taken in the sphere of security and equal chances (I). In Figure 4 we can see that non-Estonian citizens evaluate the course of integration to be relatively more successful in all spheres than the rest of the aliens, but still less so than Estonians (only with the improvement in the knowledge of Estonian do evaluations coincide with those of Estonians). Russian citizens consider the growth of the number of Estonian citizens (H), and the fact that equal security and possibilities are guaranteed for non-Estonians (J) relatively less successful in comparison with other aliens. Alien youth (in the age group of 15 to 24) consider integration in almost all spheres (except for educational possibilities) more successful than the other age groups. Non-Estonians aged 55 to 64 are the most critical about the success of integration.

The biggest discrepancies between Estonians' and non-Estonians' evaluations emerge in connection with the alien youth's educational possibilities (G), with the creation of equal possibilities (J,B), with the aliens' participation in politics (C) and with the representation in government organisations (F). However, it has to be noticed that despite the fact that Estonians consider integration slightly more successful in these spheres, approximately 30% of Estonians think that integration has been unsuccessful in these cases as well (except for the youths' educational possibilities, which is evaluated as unsuccessful by only 17%). Alien youths' educational possibilities is a problem that seems to be the most urgent when evaluating the success of integration. This problem should be discussed more in Estonian media channels in order to make Estonians and government organisations more conscious of it. On the other hand, new emerging possibilities (for instance the possibility for those who have been accepted to universities to learn Estonian during the first year on state expenses) have to be discussed more in the Russian-language media.

In the following, we will take a look at how the success ratings of the various spheres are reflected in the general evaluation of the success of the integration. For this, we will use the conjunct answers (answers where integration was considered to be either successful or unsuccessful, both generally and in a certain sphere) in proportion percentages.

Tabel 1

PROPORTION OF CONJUNCT ANSWERS (% OF ALL THE RESPONDENTS)	ESTONIANS	NON- ESTONIANS
THE SUCCESS OF THE INTEGRATION IN DIFFERENT SPHERES	GENERAL SUCCESS	GENERAL SUCCESS
A improvement in the knowledge of Estonian	55	59
B equal possibilities in labour market	43	65
C participation in politics and public life	43	63
D activities of voluntary organisations	36	56
E integration in Eastern-Virumaa	41	56
F representation in government organisations	38	59
G the youths' educational possibilities	39	62
H growth in the number of Estonian citizens	40	57
I formation of a multicultural society	34	50
J equal security and equal contriving possibilities	43	60

Non-Estonians' evaluation of the integration in specific spheres is more connected to the general success rating than that of Estonians. A large proportion of Estonians assess the general success of integration proceeding mainly from the improvement in the aliens' knowledge of the Estonian language, which is far from being successful according to Estonians.

The creation of equal possibilities for non-Estonians (B and J) and the aliens' participation in politics and public life (C) also seem to be somewhat more important than other factors when assessing the success or failure of the integration. The assessment of the formation of a multicultural society (I), the representation of aliens in Estonia's government organisations (F) and the improvement of the alien youths' educational possibilities (G) are less connected with the assessment of the general success of integration. Thus, although the creation of educational possibilities for alien youths was considered by Estonians to be one of the most successful factors of the integration, this is not the factor that would shape Estonians' evaluation of the integration on a more general level. However, for the aliens themselves, the youths' educational possibilities is one of the spheres in the assessments are strongly (over 60%) connected to the general negative assessment of the success of the integration in Estonian society. Other more important factors in non-Estonians' evaluation of the success of the integration are equal possibilities (B, J) and participation in politics and public life (C), that were also mentioned (although to a lesser extent) in Estonians' assessment of the success of the integration.

Statistical analysis shows that Estonians' attitude towards the state support of the integration is not connected with their assessment of its success so far. The assessment of the success of the integration in specific spheres is not very much connected with the evaluation of the need for state support either. Hence in the case of the state support, Estonians proceed from the assumption that various sub-processes of the integration are more important in Estonian society, and not from how successful these sub-processes have been so far.


3. INTEGRATION STATEMENTS

Respondents were presented with a number of statements concerning different aspects of the integration and they were asked to indicate their level of consent (see table...in the appendix). The average level of consent of the respondents is depicted in Figure 5. In the case of Estonians, integration statements can be divided into three groups. The first four statements (average consent over 3 points; more than three quarters of the Estonians agree partly or fully) are the following: the aliens should be required to learn Estonian (F) (almost half of the Estonians fully agree to stricter language requirements), Estonians should show a readiness to and a necessity of efforts in the integration (D), good relations and co-operation between different nationalities in the same country are possible (K) and finally comes the statement that ethnic groups with different cultures and languages enrich society (L). Thus, the majority of Estonians is willing to help create a multicultural society in which representatives of different nationalities would get along just fine and co-operate with each other -- assuming that it is all done in Estonian.

Figure 5

Mean agreement with the following statements.

(Mean answers on the scale 4=completely agree, 1=do not agree at all)



The second group of statements includes such statements with which the half or up to two-thirds of the Estonians partly or fully agree. First of all, there is the statement about the inevitability of conflict in a multiethnic society (J) (although only 17% of Estonians fully agree with it, 46% agree partly). Then we have two contradictory statements. According to the first, Estonians and non-Estonians live in different cultural and informational worlds (I) (55% tend to agree), and according to the second, Estonians' and aliens' way of thinking is becoming more similar (G) (almost 60% tend to agree). It is strange that almost 30% of Estonians at least partly agree with both of these statements. Thus, it becomes clear that integration has to do with both of these phenomena, enabling everybody to have a share in the informational and social experience, while preserving ethnic and territorial-cultural diversity. Approximately half of the Estonians consider non-Estonians' cultural and historical heritage protected (C), while more than 30% feel that it is not well protected. Thus, the protection of the cultural heritage of minorities is one of the components of integration in Estonians' opinion as well.

Only 35 to 50% of Estonians agree to the statements of the third group. 35% of Estonians assert that Estonians and aliens are not willing to co-operate and they avoid mutual relations (B). At the same time almost 60% of Estonians believe in co-operation with non-Estonians. The remaining three statements have to do with attitudes towards non-Estonians. 46% of Estonians think (15% fully agree) that it would be beneficial for Estonia if non-Estonians would leave the country (H). Statements that Estonia is non-Estonians' real homeland (A) and that non-Estonians are loyal towards Estonia is supported by 44% and 36% of Estonians, respectively, and not supported by 52% and 45%, respectively.


In comparison with Estonians, non-Estonians support much more (see Figure 5) the statements that the aliens' real homeland is Estonia (A) and that non-Estonians are loyal towards the Estonian state (E) and much less the statements about profitability of non-Estonians' secession (H), the inevitability of conflicts between ethnic groups (J) and the need for stricter requirements concerning the knowledge of the Estonian language (A). Non-Estonians, opinion does not really differ according to whether the aliens do or do not have Estonian citizenship.

4. THOSE WHO DO NOT SUPPORT INTEGRATION

Many Estonians gave a negative answer to the statements described above, i.e. statements A, E and H. In order to find out who are the people that do not support non-Estonians' integration into Estonian society, we will take a look at the reactions of both ethnic groups to the above mentioned statements (Figure 6). 76% of Estonians gave a negative answer to at least one of the proposed statements. Approximately 30% of Estonians answered did not agree with to two of the three statements. 30% think that Estonia is not the aliens' homeland, and this group is not willing to recognise aliens as being loyal to Estonia; 31% think that Estonia is not the aliens' homeland and think that it would be beneficial if they would leave the country; and 27 % are not willing to recognise aliens as being loyal to Estonia, and feel that it would be beneficial if they would leave the country.

Figure 6

The structure of exclusionary attitudes in the answers of Estonian respondents.



21% of Estonians did not agree to either of these three statements. Exactly this group can be viewed as a carrier of a strong exclusionary attitude. This group, one fifth of Estonians, is relatively equally distributed among all age, educational and income

groups. This indicates that repelling attitudes appear among Estonians in “clutches” (in families, territorial or work-related communities etc.).

46% of this exclusionary group considers the state support for the integration unnecessary (only 22% do so among the rest of Estonians). Their conservative and repelling attitude also appears in their answers to some other questions. For example, 36% of this group considers Estonian citizenship policy too mild (while only 16% of the rest of Estonians do so); 46% favours the 1940 criteria of citizenship (24% of the rest of Estonians do so); 71% fully agree that the knowledge of the Estonian language should be demanded more rigidly (40% of the rest do so); 73% agree to the inevitability of conflicts between ethnic groups (61% of the rest do so); 71% think that the existence of non-Estonians has a strong impact on the spread of crime in Estonia (47% of the rest do so).


5. WHAT DOES THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES IN ESTONIA INVOLVE

Figure 7 and the table in the appendix depict monitoring results concerning ten different factors of influence that the presence of non-Estonians in Estonia involves. The factors are listed in the figure according to the what Estonians generally think about the strength of this influence.

Figure 7

To what extent the existence of different nationalities in Estonia conduces to

(Mean answers on the scale 3=to a great degree, 1=not at all)



The first group of factors has to do with deviant behaviour. More than half of the Estonians assess non-Estonians influence on Estonian society as strong. The aliens' influence is considered to be the strongest in connection with the spread of drug-addiction (F) (56% rate the influence as strong) and crime (D) (53%). According to Estonians, aliens also have a great impact on the spread of prostitution (I) (42% sense a strong impact). Despite the fact that Estonians are highly concerned with alien-associated crime, they do not label all non-Estonians as potential deviants, but this view rather shows the acuteness of the issue of crime as such in society.

Estonians consider the aliens' impact on diversifying Estonian culture (A) (this is considered strong by 18%), on the development of East-West business relations (B) (17%) and on other countries' possibilities to interfere in Estonian politics (E) (24%) to be somewhat less important than it was the case with the first group of factors. The impact of the aliens' presence in Estonia on the growth of the population is considered to be less important (G) (46% of Estonians deny any impact), on the enrichment of Estonians' character traits (J) (40% denies), on the improvement of Estonian-Russian relations (H) and on the growth in skilled labour force (C) (28% denies). We can conclude that Estonians tend to overestimate non-Estonians' impact on the spread of deviance in Estonia, and underestimate them as a source of skilled labour force and as an influence on the growth of the population.

Non-Estonians consider the aliens' impact on deviance (F,D,I) and on other countries' possibility to interfere in Estonian politics (E) much less important, and the aliens' influence on other spheres (A,B,C,H,J,G) much more important than Estonians do. Among other things, aliens emphasise especially non-Estonians' impact on the diversification of culture (A) (47% of aliens see a strong impact), on East-West trade (B) (43%) and on the increasing of the skilled labour force (C) (40%). What emerges as positive from these diverging assessments, is the fact that both Estonians and non-Estonians recognise the aliens' diversifying impact on Estonian culture, which indicates that there are good chances for building a multicultural society in Estonia in the future.


6. CONCLUSION

To conclude, let us take a look at the comprehensive list in Figure 8 that consists of 16 indicators made up of all the above mentioned integration spheres, statements, impacts, etc. that show how significant a given problem is for Estonians and non-Estonians. All the indicators are transformed into a comparable 4-point scale and the average answers on this scale constitute the comprehensive list. In the case of Estonians, the problems of integration is (average importance: 3 to 3.5 points) first of all, associated with the following keywords: 'the Estonian language', 'the aliens' deviant behaviour', 'mutual tolerance' and 'Estonians' readiness' to help integration along. Secondly (2.5 to 3 points), Estonians render important keywords like 'non-Estonians' loyalty', 'granting Estonian citizenship', 'multicultural society', 'aliens' accommodation in Estonia' and 'considering external influence on the integration'. The keywords that are of third-rate importance (2 to 2.5 points) include: 'non-Estonians' assimilation', 'non-Estonians' competitiveness', 'exclusion of non-Estonians from the society', 'changes in social norms that concern non-Estonians', 'development of aliens' culture', 'non-Estonians as a potential resource for Estonian society' and lastly, 'aliens' participation in politics and governance'.

Figure 8

Significance of different spheres of integration

(Mean answers on the scale 4=very important, 1=not important)



In the case of non-Estonians, the integration issues can also be divided into three groups depending on their significance. The most important (3 to 3.5 points) are ‘mutual tolerance’, ‘Estonians’ readiness for integration’, ‘aliens’ accommodation in Estonia’, ‘formation of a multicultural society’, ‘changes in laws concerning non-Estonians’ and ‘aliens’ loyalty towards Estonia’. Secondly (2.5 to 3 points), non-Estonians render the following keywords important: ‘acquiring Estonian citizenship’, ‘competitiveness in society’, ‘development of own culture’, ‘participation in politics and governance’, ‘sensing themselves as a potential resource in Estonian society’, ‘considering external influence on integration’ and last in this group ‘Estonian language’. Aliens sympathise the least (average value: up to 2.5 points) with ‘Estonians’ and non-Estonians’ assimilation’, ‘associating deviant behaviour with aliens’ and ‘exclusion of aliens from society’.

And to sum up, here are some general conclusions about how different nationalities in Estonia understand integration:

1. Most Estonians see integration as a process that changes aliens into loyal Estonian citizens. Integration is mainly understood as a process through which non-Estonians master Estonian language, while mutual tolerance between the two ethnic groups grows. This involves an increase in Estonians’ readiness for understanding aliens’ problems and a willingness to co-operate with them. At the same time, in the aliens’ presence in Estonia many Estonians do not sense the potential for the future development of Estonian society.

2. Non-Estonians' loyalty towards Estonia is a problem for a certain number of Estonians. They feel that aliens can prove their loyalty, above all, by learning the Estonian language, but think this is an individual process and thus does not require state support. Persons who fail to prove their loyalty are not considered as belonging in Estonia.
3. Aliens render the need for integration more important and are more critical about how the integration proceeds in general.
4. For the majority of aliens, integration has to do, above all, with changes in current laws and norms that would moderate citizenship and language requirements. Thus, they expect greater state support.
5. It is important that both Estonians and non-Estonians render the formation of a multicultural society important. According to Estonians, such a society can emerge only on the basis of the Estonian language and on the knowledge of Estonian culture.
6. Estonians and non-Estonians are, in general, relatively unified in their viewpoints; there are no major differences between people with different educational and citizenship backgrounds.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: EMPLOYMENT AND INCOMES

Marje Pavelson

For the integration in the Estonian society to become a reality, the subjects of integration are to be provided, among other things, with equal economic opportunities. This paper offers insight into the economic situation of the two ethnic groups, as well as an assessment of this situation, associated with the conjuncture of the labour market and require dedicated study. These aspects will set up the background against which both the differentiation in material wealth and the trends of social mobility in society should be perceived.

The employment of Estonians and non-Estonians has never been the same. Non-Estonians have been, for a considerable period of time, involved mainly in the manufacturing industry. This tradition is reflected in their current employment pattern, at the time when the role of the secondary sector (that of industry, in the first place) has decreased and the need for labour in this sector has respectively diminished. **The fact that industry has a diminishing role in Estonian economic structure is an inevitable result of restructuring of the economy and the winding up of the artificially inflated large industry, which used to thrive on imported labour, rather than being a natural result of technical and economic development.** The employment structure of non-Estonians and their higher unemployment rate, as compared with that of the Estonians, reflects both the degree of their adoption to changes in market economy, and their objective starting point in the new social-political environment.

It is fully plausible to hypothetically assert that the economic development and the related rise in the standard of living are a significant prerequisite for greater tolerance in political stances, while the Estonian society advances towards integration. As long as the limitations in job opportunities and incomes remains a standing source of worries, social confrontations and political dissension will be unavoidable for a large number of people. At the present, these confrontations are interpreted, not infrequently, on the basis of ethnic affiliation. In this respect, the regional inequality of social-economic conditions is evidently endemic in Estonia: there are higher incomes and more job opportunities in Tallinn, both for Estonians and non-Estonians, as opposed to the poverty in the "backyard" of Estonia, particularly in rural districts, where there is a limited number of jobs available. All this aggravates the confrontations. Over 80 % of aliens are residents of towns, the rural population being mostly Estonian. Lower incomes in the countryside offset the poverty in the towns of Eastern-Virumaa, heavily burdening the non-Estonians. On the other hand, life is more costly in the capital, therefore the sustenance in families is not always directly linked to the level of incomes.

1. WORK AND OCCUPATION: STABILITY AND CHANGE

It is the particular affliction of post-socialist societies that the work of a sizeable part of the working community should change overnight. The past 10 years have made the breadwinners change, besides their workplace, also their occupation, profession and place of residence. Table 1. shows the occupational structure prevalent 10 years ago and as it is now, disregarding the respondents who reached the working age in that period, those who lost their job, and those who resigned due to old age.

Table 1
The structure of those having worked in the past 10 years, as per occupations (%)

Sector of economy (occupations)	Estonians		non-Estonians	
	10 years back	now	10 years back	now
Agriculture, forestry, fishery	27	15	9	8
Industry (mining, light industry, heavy industry, energetics, gas and water supply)	14	14	40	29
Building	9	7	9	10
Transport, communications	4	7	10	10
Banking, insurance, real estate	1	3	1	2
Retail- and wholesale, catering, hotels	10	11	5	12
Other business functions	3	10	2	6
Education, R&D	11	12	8	8
Public administration	11	15	11	11
Others	10	6	5	4
Total	100	100	100	100

The fragmentation of collective farming and the privatisation in the countryside affected mainly the employment of Estonians. Similar changes in the industry disturbed non-Estonians, uprooting them and compelling them to look for work. However, a significant part of non-Estonians earlier engaged in industry is still employed in industry. While there were few Estonians in industry ten years ago, and this situation has not changed ever since (cf. Table 2).

Table 2
The occupation of those in employment (%)

Occupation	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Agriculture	11	6
Industry	11	29
Building	6	9
Transport, communication	8	10
Third sector (services)	64	46
incl. education, science	14	8
administration	17	11

The analysis of the movement of workers reveals the following: most of those having changed their occupation, have moved from industry into trade and service (non-

Estonians). Many Estonians who used to work in agriculture have also ended up in these sectors. For Estonians, the stable occupation has been in the field of education and science (82% are still employed in these field). For non-Estonians, the staple occupation has been power engineering (84% are continuing to work there) and mining. Relatively stable has been the employment of Estonians and Russians in public administration (68% and 69%, respectively).

Those employed in industry are three to one in favour of non-Estonians. In service and trade, the Estonians dominate. Consequently, the new employment structure has formed on the basis of the earlier model, the work force having replenished the third sector, that is made up mainly of Estonians. Changes in the employment structure indicate the growth of the number of those engaged in the third sector, as well as a continuing difference in the occupational pattern of Estonians and non-Estonians. There are more skilled workers among working non-Estonians than Estonians (Table 3), while Estonians are more often working as specialists and managers.

Table 3

The occupations of Estonians and non-Estonians (%)


Occupation	Estonians	Non-Estonians
- unskilled worker and labourer	13	14
- skilled worker	22	35
- attendant, helper	14	14
- clerk	7	5
- middle level specialist	10	10
- specialist	17	12
- specialist with subordinates	6	6
- manager	8	3
- others	3	1

The number of labourers and unskilled workers is roughly equal as for working Estonians and non-Estonians (13% and 14%, respectively). However, there are significantly more skilled workers among non-Estonians than among Estonians (22% and 35%, respectively). Estonians are, more often than not, qualified specialists and managers (31% against 21% of non-Estonians), the number of middle-level specialists being equal in both groups.

The offices of specialists and managers are more often filled by Estonians, while workers' jobs and, recently also the jobs of attendants, helpers and caterers being filled by non-Estonians.

A vital factor impacting the structure of occupations is the citizenship of the given worker. Estonian citizens more often occupy the posts of specialists. Non-Estonians' pattern of occupation is reminiscent of that of Estonians, except for the position of managers, where the employers seem to prefer Estonians (Figure1).

Figure 1.
Basic occupation of respondents (%).



The assessment of changes in the occupational structure reveals a shift within the group of Estonian labourers, who have moved to the fields of the service sector. Only half of those who ten years ago worked as labourers have retained their former positions. With non-Estonians, there does not seem to be such a movement – over 80% of those who used to be labourers are continuing so. The occupational status of skilled workers is significantly more stable, particularly in the case of non-Estonians, of whom 76% are continuing in the same occupation (while with Estonians, this figure is 65%). Clerks have moved into other occupations in both groups, especially non-Estonian ones, of whom less than a third are still clerks (with Estonians, this figure is 58%). A typical Estonian clerk would have usually rather retired than opted for another occupation. There has also been a movement from the office towards the position of an attendant or a salesman, non-Estonians being in the lead here. It is the managers who have changed their position most often. Of the managers being at the head of certain institutions or branches 10 years ago, less than 50% are still in office, while in the case of non-Estonians this figure is about 25%. The situation is quite the opposite with qualified specialists with a degree who, after the skilled workers (in particular non-Estonians), constitute the most stable occupational group. Quitting the specialist's position means a movement towards the service sector (Estonians) or to manufacturing (non-Estonians).

The above pertains to those who used to work ten years ago and are still continuing to do so. However, not all have found employment, or else have given up searching for work, for various reasons. Of the respondents, almost half are salaried workers, the number of employed wage-earners and salaried personnel having decreased continually in the past ten years. The employed wage-earners make up 60% of the surveyed Estonians and 57% of the surveyed non-Estonians. A certain difference in the basic occupations results from the somewhat lower entrepreneurial activity among non-Estonians. Employers and solo entrepreneurs (the self-employed people) constitute 7% among Estonians, and 5% among non-Estonians. Non-

Estonians with an Estonian citizenship are more often engaged in entrepreneurial activities (8%).

According to the questionnaire data, the number of the unemployed does not differ to any substantial degree in the two ethnic communities, although both the structure of the customers of labour market agencies and the labour surveys conducted up to this point confirm the fact that non-Estonians have a higher rate of unemployment than Estonians. In the second quarter of the year 1999, the unemployment rate of Estonians was 9.2%, while that of non-Estonians was 16.4% (cf. Estonian Statistical Office, Labour Force, 1999, p. 36). It is mainly the formerly salaried industry workers (more often non-Estonians) and farmers (mainly Estonians) that have found themselves unemployed. The rate of employment and unemployment is similar for both ethnic groups. However, there are dramatic differences as to the fields of occupation, as to the mobility between these fields of occupation, and as to the directions of this movement. It is the concrete working conditions that shape the respondents' assessment of their current job and that of the opportunities stemming from it.

Rapid changes in business and work environment have prompted people to change their workplace and go on the dole from time to time. In the past 10 years, unemployment has affected 39% of Estonians (in the age group from 25 to 34, 53% of the respondents) and 34% of non-Estonians. In both groups, the sporadic unemployment has affected primarily the people with secondary education, and among non-Estonians also those having a higher education. People have been seeking work (and respectively been unemployed) most frequently in Tallinn: 37% of Estonians and 36% of non-Estonians have repeatedly found themselves out of job in the past 10 years. In the past 12 months, temporary unemployment has hit 57% of Estonians and 41% of non-Estonians. Presumably, the non-Estonians in employment do cherish their jobs, well aware of their limited options to choose an alternative. Last year's high rate of unemployment in rural areas and in North-Eastern Estonia (incl. Kohtla-Järve and Jõhvi) signalled the shrinking job opportunities and the wave of downsizing, already at a low ebb in Tallinn. However, last year the number of Estonians on the dole was larger in Tallinn, proving that Estonians have more freedom to change occupation, while non-Estonians have a more restricted scope of choice in the local labour market.

The loss of one's job is more of a threat to non-Estonians and, generally, more to middle-aged people than to the young, who are still fighting to get into the labour market. The danger of losing one's job is considered more serious than the trouble finding a new job. Giving up looking for a new job is characteristic to those over 45. Nevertheless, younger job seekers also have to put up with being refused by their potential employer. Still, the respondents do not consider the possibility of being refused to be as painful as that of being dismissed. Estonians perceive old age and poor health condition (this is considered important by 19%), and low qualification (14%) as the reason why they may lose their job and fail to find a new one. The list of reasons the non-Estonians suggest is longer, ranging from poor command or no command of Estonian (acknowledged by every fifth respondent) to old age and poor health (19%), as well as the lack of Estonian citizenship (15%). Low qualification ends the list (11%).

Neither of the factors mentioned by Estonians (i. e. old age or the lack of skills) underlies the threat of joblessness. From the survey, one gets the impression that Estonians regard the fact of being dismissed as something originating in the

workplace, and as something having little to do with their skills or with other work-related factors. Similarly, non-Estonians do not perceive low qualification as the reason to be dismissed or as a factor impeding the finding of a new job. It is the middle-aged Estonians with a secondary education that (sometimes having no speciality) are worried lest they be sacked. The proficiency of the official language and the possession of the Estonian citizenship are less important among the reasons why one is kept on a job or is given one. Proficiency of Estonian seems to be taken as an asset in Narva and Sillamäe, in some rural districts (primarily in South-Eastern Estonia) and, to a lesser degree, in Tallinn.

Finding a new job is hard both for Estonians and non-Estonians (this is especially so in North-Eastern and South-Eastern Estonia). 44% of Estonians and 30% of non-Estonians think they are able to find a suitable job in their place of residence, the place of residence itself and educational level of the job seeker being of crucial importance. Young and pre-pension-age people find it the hardest to get employed. Of Russian youths (aged 15 to 24) 37% are convinced they would find a job if they need it; with Estonian youths this figure is 50%. Relatively assured of their competitive posture in the labour market are Estonians of 25 to 34 years of age, with a higher education. **Of non-Estonians with a higher education, only 5% are absolutely sure they will find a job, of Estonians – 30% of the respondents.** In Tallinn the opportunities seem to be ampler, but mostly so for Estonians, of whom 64% believe they will find a job, should they need one. Of non-Estonians only 29% of potential job seekers are of the same opinion (cf. Table 4).

Table 4

Comparison of the opportunities of Estonians and non-Estonians to find a new job (scale –100-100)

Opportunity to find a new job	Estonians	Non-Estonians
... near one's residence	4	-28
incl. - with basic education	-12	-37
- with secondary education	0	-21
- with higher education	28	-23
- youths (15-24)	13	-11
incl. in Tallinn	39	-23
... other places in Estonia	24	-15
incl. - youths (15-24)	46	7
... in Russia	-42	-29
incl. - youths (15-24)	-11	-03
... other places abroad	-41	-25
incl. - youths (15-24)	5	0

The data of Table 4 shows that the youngest age group is relatively hopeful about their outlook to find a job. Non-Estonian youths are ready to live in other places in Estonia, provided there is a job available. It is indicative, however, that even the local Russians do not hope to find a suitable job in Russia. The significant gap in the respondents' general assessment of their possibilities of getting a job implies the limitations of the job opportunities of non-Estonians, due to the restricted number of jobs on offer (Eastern-Virumaa), to employer preferences and opaque criteria of selection (Tallinn).

The fear of losing one's job compels the workers to accept lower salary and to put up with poor working conditions, which is also reflected in their assessment of the job. The indicators of being content with one's job work are quite different in the case of non-Estonians and Estonians (cf. Table 5). 79% of Estonians and 59% of non-Estonians are, to a lesser or greater degree, content with their job. In both ethnic groups, the labourers are dissatisfied with their work. This is true to over half of the Russian skilled workers (54% is dissatisfied), while it only applies to every fifth Estonia skilled worker. In both ethnic groups, workers and employees in the service sector are less content with their work than the "white collar" employees. The work of a specialist and, in case of non-Estonians, the work of a manager or an officer is the most esteemed.

Table 5
The percentage of those dissatisfied with their job, and the average indicators of contentedness (scale –100-100) in the various occupational groups

Occupational group	Estonians		Non-Estonians	
	Index of content	Dissatisfied %	Index of content	Dissatisfied %
- nonskilled worker, labourer	9	44	-26	53
- skilled worker	30	21	-12	54
- attendant, helper	20	23	-1	49
- clerical worker	36	20	59	-
- middle-level specialist		46	8	32
24				
- specialist (with higher education)	49	5	35	23
- specialist, having subordinates		59	4	18
35				
- manager of institution or branch	45	3	61	11
Total	33	20	10	40

The non-Estonian salaried workers are often stuck on the lower rungs of the career ladder, but earlier quite a few of them used to work as official or specialist. The earlier job experience usually impacts one's operation in a new capacity. Those who lack the earlier experience or whose earlier experience was related to a job of the same level, find it easier to accommodate in the new environment. This is harder for workers who have had to move from a higher to a lower position, because they feel that they deserve a better job and higher wages. Those who see their present work as compatible with their education, profession and aptitude, are fewer among non-Estonians than among Estonians. As a general rule, respondents think their education and aptitude are clearly higher than what the given job demands (cf. Table 6).

Table 6
Job adequacy (%)

	Estonians	Non-Estonians
... as to aptitude	84	75
... as to education	77	66
... as to profession	64	61

If the job is inadequate for the worker's education, a situation rather common with most of the attendants, caterers and workers, the result is dissatisfaction with the work performed. The reasons to keep the job are mainly pecuniary, because the imminence of unemployment makes one keep a totally unsatisfactory and frustrating job, just to provide for one's family.

2. INCOMES AND SOURCES OF INCOME: DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF LEVEL AND STRUCTURE

On perfunctory overview, the economic situation of the respondents seems to be relatively similar to each other, especially in the cases of families in lower income brackets. The differences are related mainly to the place of residence, and less to ethnic affiliation. Incomes are higher in the capital, to be followed by those in minor towns. There are the smallest incomes per family member (IFM) in the countryside. By assuming 1350 EEK per month to indicate the poverty line, the most critical is the position of those families whose IFM is beneath 1000 EEK per month. A marginal group is made up of those families having 1500 EEK of IFM per month, who find it hard to make both ends meet. These households make up 51% of the population (49 % of Estonians and 56% of non-Estonians). There are more poverty-stricken non-Estonian families, as per their current income, than Estonian families. Nevertheless, it is rather the Estonians in rural settlements that are living in absolute poverty (the income group of up to 1000 EEK per month). Hence the lowest incomes may be found in Järvamaa (44% of the people earning beneath 1000 EEK per month) and in Viljandimaa (38% of the people earning beneath 1000 EEK per month). Non-Estonian town dwellers have the lowest incomes in Eastern-Virumaa, with a third of the families never reaching the IFM of 1000 EEK per month.

Because the purchasing value of money differs in various districts (there is an especially great difference in the amount spent on food by rural and urban dwellers), the comparison of incomes may be interpreted in two or more ways. In Tallinn, where the incomes and expenses are the highest, 29% of Estonians and 45% of non-Estonians fall into the income group of up to 1500 EEK per month. We can divide the income groups into three categories: (1) families in absolute poverty of an IFM of up to 1000 EEK per month; (2) families living in partial partly financial security, with an income ranging between 1001 and 3000 EEK per month (non-Estonians earning predominantly a monthly IFM of up to 2000 EEK); and (3) families living more in financial security, with a monthly IFM surpassing 3000 EEK per month. If we make such a division, the following structure will come to light (cf. Table 7).

Table 7

The structure and level of incomes per family member (%)*

Income	Estonians	Non-Estonians
up to 1000 EEK	24	22
from 1001 - 3000 EEK	60	70
over 3000 EEK	16	8
average IFM (as drawn on data of the questionnaire, in EEK)	1977.-	1784.-

According to the data of the Statistical Office, the average IFM in 1999 was 1890 EEK per month, and at the beginning of 2000 it was 1933 EEK per month. As for the level of incomes, the income group most non-Estonians (33%) belong to, has an IMF of 1001 to 1500 EEK per month. The incomes of Estonians are more disparate, only 25% of families belonging to the above mentioned income group. The discrepancy is the largest in the case of families living more in financial security, featuring twice as many Estonians as non-Estonians.


Besides the area of residence, another important factor differentiating the non-Estonians' incomes is the citizenship. The incomes of the non-Estonians are inherently linked to education and age. The relatively younger and more educated non-Estonians having the Estonian citizenship (21% of them having a higher education) are similar to Estonians, as far as their economic situation is concerned. Former Russian citizens (60% of them are aged 55 and over), and the stateless people of a lower educational level (92% having secondary or higher education) predominantly consider themselves poor (cf. Table 8, Figure 2 and 3).

Table 8

Citizenship and income per family member (IFM,%)


Citizenship	up to 1000 EEK	1001 to 3000 EEK	over 3000 EEK	Total
- Estonians, Estonian citizens	24	60	16	100
- non-Estonians, Estonian citizens	14	72	14	100
- stateless persons, with alien's passport	31	63	6	100
- Russian citizens	23	74	3	100

Figure 2
Average income per one family member by ranking (1=within 500Ekr., 9=over 10,000 Ekr.).



Left out were persons who refused to disclose their incomes or could not determine them. These people make of 29% of the present sample; 27% of them being Estonians and one third non-Estonians.

Figure 3
Income per family member (%)



The purchasing value of money keeps pace with the wages only with certain deviations, depending on the place of residence (whether it is a rural area or a town, the capital or the rest of Estonia).

Table 9

The structure of purchasing value of the wages in the two ethnic groups, per estimate (%)


Limits and possibilities for spending	Estonians	Non-Estonians
- the money is barely enough for food	8	9
- the income covers food, however, it is not enough for clothes	46	46
- the money is not enough for costly goods	28	30
- we can afford some costly goods	16	13
- we can buy everything	1	-
- hard to say	1	2

According to the data in Table 9, the possibilities of the two ethnic groups are rather similar, in spite of the differences in incomes. This is especially true to the covering of the basic needs. Over half of the Estonians and non-Estonians can afford to buy just enough food, however, they cannot afford a lot of other things. Consequently, the 10% difference in the average IMF level of Estonians and non-Estonians is insignificant, because the satisfaction of the primary needs (however much this may vary according to the age group and the level of consumption) differs greatly according to the actual place of residence. In the case of both Estonians and non-

Estonians, the unemployed suffer the most from poverty (35% and 29%, respectively, cannot afford to buy the simplest food), and so do those not working due to disability. They are the people whose incomes are truly minimal. Furthermore, the unemployed Estonians are in a worse situation, as they themselves assert, than are the non-Estonians. The non-working pensioners do cope with procuring food, however, they face problems when satisfying their other daily necessities. In any case, it is certainly the job that determines how one can make end meet.

Still, citizenship too has an impact on the purchasing value of the wages: Russian citizens and stateless people seem to be more needy than Estonian citizens. The non-Estonian citizens of Estonia are reported to be better off than the Estonians (cf. Figure 4).

Figure 4



3. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION: DISCRIMINATION OR SOCIALIZATION-RELATED DIFFICULTIES?

The economic situation of a family can be assessed in many different ways. The assessments by Estonians and non-Estonian citizens of Estonia are relatively positive: 39% of Estonians assess their situation as quite good, and so do 44% of non-Estonian citizens of Estonia. One third of the stateless people are of the same opinion. However, in the case of Russian citizens, the position of one's family is considered to be quite good only by 17% of the respondents, and nobody in this group considers it to be excellent. Assessments depend on the IFM level, in accordance with the pattern of incomes. Of all non-Estonians, 34% of respondents considered the situation of their family to be quite good.

The larger the income earned per family member, the more favourable the assessment of the situation when compared to the income ten years ago (cf. Table 10). Consequently, the change of attitude has been brought about by the current situation – having a suitable job with a decent income and enjoying the perspective for development.

Table 10

Income group and assessment of economic situation (%)

Income group	Assessment of the current situation, as compared to the situation prior to 1991	
	Better	Worse
up to 1000		
- Estonians	8	70
- non-Estonians	18	68
up to 3000		
- Estonians	28	47
- non-Estonians	22	57
over 3000		
- Estonians	56	16
- non-Estonians	67	15

If we compare how Estonians and non-Estonians assess the current economic situation, it becomes clear that most of them (over 90%) perceive the obvious inequality between the rich and the poor. Estonians see the inequality between the rural and the urban population, while non-Estonians see it between the two ethnic groups.

The growth of incomes bring about a dramatic change in non-Estonians' assessment of the present situation, as compared to the earlier one, confirming the hypothesis that the economic situation has a significant role in the integration process. However, non-Estonians still think they do not have enough possibilities to change their situation. It is in the following fields, where they see inequality with Estonians, as regards their possibilities:


Average on the scale (0-	possibilities are equal ... 3 – possibilities are totally different)
- when running for an office in a governmental agency	2,6
- when running for the office of a senior civil servant	2,4
- when moving up the political hierarchy	2,2
- when getting a job, compliant with one's profession	2,1
- when applying for the same job as Estonians	1,8
- when securing one's material well-being	1,7
- when striving for success in business	1,6
- when acquiring higher education	1,5
- when applying for social benefits	1,0

As regards the feeling of social inequality, the citizenship of the respondent or the level of his/her real well-being has no significant impact. Non-Estonians see the problem in the concrete work-and-power context, primarily in the domains they feels rejected (cf. Figure 5).

Figure 5

Do Estonians have it easier to achieve the following.

The average assessments on scale (4=yes, always, 1=it is not easier).



Estonians are much more unperceptive about the different possibilities of ethnic groups: the major domains where they think non-Estonians might be rejected are that of getting a job as a civil servant, and that of aspiring to senior posts and political positions. There are major discrepancies in non-Estonians' assessment of the work and salary opportunities. Having or lacking the Estonian citizenship seems, in general, to have little impact on non-Estonian' assessment.

The economic problems of non-Estonians are related to both the situation of the labour market in Estonia and to the changes in their own status and position. The younger and more educated non-Estonians, often citizens of Estonia, have not had to change their status, nor had they had difficulties when applying for the position they currently hold. The middle-aged and the elderly however, having already developed their behavioural patterns, find it hard to accommodate to the changed situation. Technological and economic developments on the macro level as well as the rise in the quality of education should improve the situation, offering young non-Estonians

better opportunities to effectively compete with Estonians in the future. Social and economic integration can be effected only through education and conscientious career formation, enhanced by general rise in the standard of living.

ESTONIAN INHABITANTS' ATTITUDES IN CONNECTION WITH POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Raivo Vetik

According to viewpoints expressed in Estonian integration policy documents the key questions of a successful integration process are greater openness and tolerance of the political attitudes that dominate in the society. As far as integration is a two-way process, the change in attitudes has to be mutual as well. It is assumed in the integration program of Estonian society that the passive and peculiar attitude that dominates among the non-Estonians has to be replaced, as a result of integration, with an understanding that the possibilities of each individual in Estonian society depend foremost on themselves. Non-Estonians should feel as members of the Estonian society and perceive also their responsibility regarding the well-being of Estonian state. In case of Estonians the repelling attitude towards ethnic minorities should be replaced with recognizing the multicultural model of society, i.e. the attitude "non-Estonians as a problem" should be replaced with "non-Estonians as a developmental potential and participants in promoting Estonia".

Below Estonian inhabitants' political attitudes will be analyzed both in connection with internal and external problems. In internal policy the main focus is on attitudes in relation with having or not having Estonian citizenship and participation in politics; in case of foreign policy attitudes research concentrates on non-Estonians' comparative evaluation of the political regime in Estonia and Russia and non-Estonians' attitude towards NATO and Russia.

1. Attitudes in connection with having or not having Estonian citizenship and participation in politics.

Sociological studies indicate that people's attitudes towards political integration have undergone a significant development during 1990s. While in the initial stage of independence non-Estonians had rather a wait-and-see attitude towards their legal status than at present, according to the data of the integration monitoring, their subjective readiness towards legal-political integration into Estonian society is rather high. In order of significance the answers to the question "why is it important to you personally to have/obtain Estonian citizenship?" looked the following: wish to gain security to live in Estonia (86%), wish to determine one's legal status in Estonia (83%), possibility to get work more easily (77%), wish to secure a better future for one's children in Estonia (70%), possibility to improve one's economic situation (58%), possibility to become successful in political and public life (16%). As a whole the results are presented in figure 1.

Figure 1.

Why is it important for you personally to have/obtain Estonian citizenship?

To feel as part of Estonia	This definitely	18
	This as well	50
Wish to determine one's legal status in Estonia	This definitely	45
	This as well	38

Possibility to get work more easily	This definitely	41
	This as well	37
Wish to secure a better future for one's children in Estonia	This definitely	35
	This as well	34
Wish to gain security to live in Estonia	This definitely	53
	This as well	33
Possibility to travel abroad more easily	This definitely	22
	This as well	31
Wish to obtain franchise at Riigikogu elections	This definitely	11
	This as well	27
Wish to obtain franchise at local elections	This definitely	11
	This as well	29
Possibility to become successful in political and public life	This definitely	7
	This as well	10
Possibility to improve one's economic situation	This definitely	19
	This as well	39
Possibility to get better education for one's children	This definitely	24
	This as well	33
Possibility to get a job in state institution	This definitely	12
	This as well	33
Possibility to serve in army	This definitely	5
	This as well	3

Based on these results it can be claimed that aliens consider holding citizenship significant for both psychological as well as economic and other pragmatic reasons. Much less important for them is the possibility to actively participate in society's political life. Analysis shows that the preferences of aliens are significantly influenced by their educational level – for instance in comparison with the others, those who have higher education consider the importance of the possibility to determine their legal status in Estonia, to be able to elect at parliamentary elections, to become successful in political and public life, to get a job in a state institution or travel abroad much higher. Age turned out to be a significant factor in the following cases: better possibilities to travel abroad, easier to find a job and secure a better future for ones' children in Estonia. The younger the respondent, the more they value these possibilities. Having citizenship increases significantly the extent to which one feels as part of the Estonian state. Those who have citizenship value the possibility to become successful in political and public life and travel abroad more than non-citizens do as well. In comparison with citizens, for non-citizens acquiring or having Estonian citizenship is more connected to the possibility to getting a job more easily and gaining security for living in Estonia.

Lack of interest in participation in politics among non-Estonians as a group is confirmed also by the following figure.

Figure 2.

What describes your desire to participate in politics?

	My opinion would become more influential	I am satisfied with current participation in politics	Those wiser than me will manage in politics	There is no point for a common man to express his opinion	Am not engaged in as politics in unfair	Not interested in political questions
Estonian, Estonian citizen	15	14	25	18	14	10
Non-Estonian, Estonian citizen	12	12	17	15	21	17
Person without citizenship	9	4	18	22	18	24
Russian citizen	15	6	17	23	16	21

In comparison with non-Estonians Estonians are more content with their current participation in politics and are more interested in their opinions becoming more influential. The same can be said when comparing citizens (both Estonians and non-Estonians) and non-citizens. The number of those who are not interested in political questions and consider politics an unfair game is much higher among non-Estonians and non-citizens.

The main reasons why non-citizens do not have Estonian citizenship yet are according to the monitoring the following: cannot learn Estonian language (67%), the requirements of citizenship exam are humiliating (63%), easier to travel to Russia and other CIS states (46%). As a positive indicator it could be mentioned that the reason that was worded as 'Estonia is too small for its citizenship to have value in the world' was last in the mentioned list.

Figure 3.

For what reasons have you personally not obtained Estonian citizenship yet?

Do not feel as belonging in Estonia	This definitely	4
	This as well	9
Wish to avoid military service in Estonian army	This definitely	1
	This as well	7
Cannot learn Estonian language	This definitely	34
	This as well	33
Requirements of citizenship exam are humiliating	This definitely	23
	This as well	40

Easier to travel to Russian and other CIS states	This definitely	15
	This as well	31
It would be of little use to me and my family	This definitely	7
	This as well	19
I am already a citizen of another country	This definitely	19
	This as well	15
Not interested in elections and politics	This definitely	6
	This as well	25
Estonia is too small for its citizenship to have value in the world	This definitely	4
	This as well	12
Lack of citizenship does not hinder living	This definitely	12
	This as well	39

It is interesting to point out that respondents with higher education claimed more often than the others that one of the reasons for not obtaining Estonian citizenship is the desire to be able to travel easier to Russia. Just like it is more often the case with respondents with higher education that they are already citizens of another country. Age turned out to be also important in this case. Older people claimed much more often that the reason for not being citizens is the inability to learn Estonian, being citizens of another country and desire to travel easier to Russia. It can be considered very important that younger respondents claimed much less than the older ones that the main reason for not having citizenship is that the exam requirements are humiliating.

Most of the Estonians also wish that the number of Estonian citizens among the non-Estonians would grow. According to the data of the monitoring only 2% of the ethnic Estonians are against it. Significant conclusions can be drawn from analyzing the question 'in your opinion, who should be Estonian citizens and have franchise at Riigikogu elections?'. Namely, it turned out that the majority of both Estonians and non-Estonians preferences on the suggested scale (1. only those whose family members were Estonian citizens before 1940; 2. Everybody who is born in Estonia; 3. everybody who has lived in Estonia for at least 10 years; 4. everybody who lived in Estonia when it became re-independent; 5. every Soviet Union citizen who now lives in Estonia) are the three middle options. Analysis shows that among both Estonians and non-Estonians approximately one quarter supports the extreme alternatives. This indicates that Estonian inhabitants' attitudes towards citizenship have become somewhat closer in the second half of 1990s and that the more tolerant segments from both sides have relatively similar positions, being against both excessive isolation and citizenship zero-option.

According to the law of Estonian Republic knowledge of Estonian language is a prerequisite for obtaining citizenship, whereat for most Estonians the aliens' knowledge of Estonian language is not only an instrumental ability that enables to be more successful in life, but also an existential category that shows one's principal attitude towards the Estonian state. It was asked in the integration monitoring what

would be the results of granting citizenship without Estonian language exam and answers to this question illustrate the above-said vividly. 60% of Estonians thought that it would be a threat for the survival of the Estonian nation, 68% considered it a threat to the survival of the Estonian language and approximately half considered it a threat also to the survival of the Estonian state. Through history Estonians have connected state identity to language and they do not wish to give such attitudes up in the future either.

A conclusion from the above to the policy-makers is that for most Estonians integration means an internally analyzed, but in its essence still an integral phenomenon the elements of which cannot be rigidly isolated from one another. The emphasis of state integration policy on linguistic integration as the basis of other forms of integration thus corresponds to the dominating understanding in society according to which political integration and linguistic integration presuppose and determine each other.


Despite stressing the role of Estonian language it can be claimed that Estonians are beginning to accept the idea of a multicultural Estonia. 86% of Estonians think that even very different ethnicities can get along very well and cooperate living in one country and approximately three quarters think that different cultures and languages make society richer and more interesting. Differences in culture are seen as directly profitable also from a pragmatic viewpoint – according to most Estonians the existence of different ethnicities contributes towards the growth of qualified labor force, development of East-West business relations, improvement of Estonian-Russian relations and steady growth of Estonian population. Pursuant to the data of the monitoring only a small proportion of Estonians (10%) is directly against the formation of a multicultural society in Estonia. Analysis shows that in this case we are dealing mostly with older people. The results as a whole indicate that ‘the Estonian version of a multicultural society’, expressed in the integration program is not only the desire of the politicians and experts who participated in drawing up the program, but also corresponds to most Estonians’ perception of integration.

2. Evaluations of political regime and foreign policy attitudes

From the standpoint of the perspectives of political integration the monitoring gives interesting information through analysis of political regime which shows that not only Estonians, but also non-Estonians consider the Estonian form of government both now and in five years time much better in comparison with the Russian form of government. This indicates that preconditions to the deepening of their loyalty to the Estonian state are favorable. The following figure reflects non-Estonians’ evaluations.

Figure 4.

How do you evaluate the form of government...?



At the same time it is important from the standpoint of the developmental perspective of political integration to refer to a number of significant differences in the attitudes of Estonians and non-Estonians. For instance there are important differences in Estonians' and non-Estonians' attitudes towards some foreign countries and organizations, primarily towards NATO and Russia, but also the European Union. If according to the monitoring about half of the Estonians are strongly or somewhat in favor of accession to the European Union, then non-Estonians' support totals to approximately two thirds. As for accession to NATO the attitudes are vice versa and much more polar: while 69% of Estonians consider it beneficial only 18% of non-Estonians do so as well. Just as differential are the attitudes towards Russia – if the majority of Estonians think that there is a threat from present-day Russia to Estonia's independence (56%), economic development (62%) and also to the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society (39%), then non-Estonians do not see such threats (corresponding indicators are 8% and 21% and 9%).

Figure 5.

How profitable would be Estonia's accession to NATO?

	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Very profitable	21,4	1,6
Somewhat profitable	47,8	15,9
Not very profitable	10,5	26,6
Not profitable at all	6,3	38
Difficult to say	14	17,9

Figure 6.

Do you see threat from present-day Russia...?

		Estonians	Non-Estonians
To Estonia's independence	To a great extent	11,5	0,4
	To some extent	44,3	8,1
	Rather little	30,8	25,2
	There is no threat	8,9	64,2
	Difficult to say	4,5	2
To Estonia's economic development	To a great extent	13,2	3,5
	To some extent	48,5	17,7
	Rather little	26,9	25,4
	There is no threat	7,5	50,6
	Difficult to say	3,8	2,8
To non-Estonians' integration into Estonian society	To a great extent	7,4	0,8
	To some extent	31,5	8,1
	Rather little	33,2	23
	There is no threat	13,8	63,6
	Difficult to say	14	4,5

The described differences in attitudes towards Russia and NATO refer to a continual split between Estonians' and non-Estonians' self-consciousness and is of a principal meaning to Estonian internal policy. Probably it is one of the main reasons for mutual distrust in Estonian society. The fact that 84% of non-Estonians consider Estonia non-Estonians' real home while only 44% of Estonians do so is a reflection of internal policy distrust. The outcome according to which 79% of non-Estonians consider themselves loyal to the Estonian state and only 36% of Estonians consider non-Estonians loyal can also be placed under the same category. Given numbers reflect on one hand non-Estonians' relatively high subjective readiness for political integration but on the other the remaining fears of Estonians about non-Estonians' probable disloyalty. On the background of the positive attitudes mentioned above it can be claimed that in case of many Estonians we are dealing with a conflict of interest – emotionally they are very attached to their past and fears stemming from it, but pragmatically they look preferably to the future and are rather tolerant.

Given analysis of foreign policy attitudes indicates that the integration taking place in Estonian society is not only a bilateral but actually a trilateral process. It presupposes in addition to non-Estonians' higher activity in public issues and Estonians' overcoming of psychological barriers in attitudes towards non-Estonians also an improvement in Estonian-Russian state relations. The latter inevitably influences the two former processes and without that it is difficult to imagine that the first two processes could be successful.

3. Conclusion

As a whole the analysis of the results of the monitoring show that political integration of the society is inevitably a difficult and contradictory processes that lasts for decades. Real vanishing of ethnic barriers and formation of tolerance can take place only in a situation where all parties feel themselves secure. For Estonians this means above all security about the survival and development of Estonian language and culture that would be a precondition for a more tolerant and open attitude towards other groups. For non-Estonians it means security that the politics of Estonian state is not directed towards their expulsion or assimilation. This knowledge would create basis for their more active participation in the matters of Estonian society. Both processes are strongly influenced by Estonian-Russian state relations that have up to now clearly inhibited the relations of the two groups.

Optimism with respect to the future developments of the integration process is implanted by the fact that in case of many indicators there is a significant generational differentiation between respondents whereat the younger ones are as a rule more tolerant – they have far less mutual fears, they are more open towards communication that crosses state borders and more optimistic about both theirs and Estonian state's future.

CITIZENSHIP – PRECONDITION TO OR RESULT OF INTEGRATION?

Klara Hallik

The aim of the following analysis is to evaluate how Estonians and non-Estonians perceive the most significant expression of political integration – the belonging or not belonging to the society through the institution of citizenship. We were interested in people's evaluations of the citizenship policy, of the possibility of making concessions in granting citizenship and also in internal coherence between citizenship and various rights.

1. PLACE OF BIRTH AND FAMILY THROUGH THE PRISM OF CITIZENSHIP

Although the growth of the number of citizens is limited by non-Estonians' lack of command over the Estonian language, the organic ties of Estonian non-citizens with Estonia are becoming stronger. This is indicated among other things also by growth in the proportion of those non-citizens who were born in Estonia. According to the data of the monitoring, there is a clear correlation between Estonian descent and citizenship (see table 1). One of the backgrounds for opting for Russian citizenship is definitely Russian descent and vice versa, those who were born in Estonia find their way to the Estonian citizenship quicker. In the latter case we are also dealing with younger people than those who are Russian citizens. Of the people without citizenship more than half have been born in Estonia and their ratio keeps on growing.

Table 1.

Estonian aliens' division by place of birth

	Estonian citizens	Without citizenship	Russian citizens
In Estonia	67%	54%	19%
In Russia	24%	35%	63%
Other	10%	11%	18%

As applying for citizenship and obtaining it is an individual act for non-citizens, it follows that in one family one can find people with different citizenship and statuses. The benefits, or, rather the reverse, the limits and problems deriving from citizenship do concern most families, and thus are an important part of the collective experience of the society of non-citizens.

Table 2.

Citizenship of family members of non-Estonians with different legal status and existence of residency permit.*

Among family members (including the respondent) there are...	Among interviewed families with Estonian citizenship	Among interviewed families without citizenship	Among families with Russian citizenship
Only Estonian citizens	70%	-	-
Persons without citizenship	18%	100%	18%
Russian citizens	18%	14%	100%
Owners of permanent residency permits	13%	43%	37%
Owners of temporary residency permits	15%	49%	52%

*As family members have different legal statuses, the sum exceeds 100%

According to the data of the monitoring, non-Estonians are predominantly oriented towards acquiring Estonian citizenship: it is desired by 80% of Estonian citizens' family members without citizenship, 62% of non-citizens' family members and 61% of Russian citizens' family members. Citizenship is above all wished for children, but also for spouses and parents. It is noteworthy that 12% of non-citizens' family members want no citizenship, 16% (the same proportion also of Estonian citizens' family members) have not made their choice yet. One way of interpreting this result is that a certain proportion of aliens have become adapted to the non-citizen status and do not see any particular reason (or perhaps also possibility) to change it. The attitudes of the Russian citizens towards the Estonian citizenship indicate that the given group has not stabilised and has not defined themselves yet. Besides the dominating desire to acquire Estonian citizenship, only every fourth Russian citizen's family member wants to acquire Russian (or some other) citizenship while every eighth has not made up his or her mind yet.

2. EVALUATION OF CITIZENSHIP POLICY

General evaluation of the citizenship policy reflects the different life experiences of Estonians and other ethnic groups. Whereas 71% of aliens consider citizenship policy too harsh, only 6% of Estonians feel the same. 7% of aliens and 56% of Estonians consider Estonian citizenship policy normal and in accordance with international standards. Every fifth Estonian thinks that the citizenship policy is too mild and thus damages Estonian national interests. All distinctive groups of aliens regardless of their citizenship, education or age, are unified by the common understanding that the citizenship requirements are too strict and unfair. Only the group of 15-24-year-olds seems to be better accustomed to the naturalisation

requirements and evaluates them much softer – 58% considers them too harsh while in the age group of 35-44-year olds almost four fifths of the respondents think so.

The evaluations of the citizenship policy are quite expectedly polarised also inside the different citizenship categories. As appears from comparison with research results of 1994 and 1997, half of the citizens who are Estonian consider state's citizenship policy satisfactory and corresponding with the international norms (see table 3).

Table 3
Evaluations of citizenship policy % *

Evaluation	Respondent's citizenship											
	Estonian citizen			Estonian citizen Other nationality			Without citizenship			Russian citizen		
	'94	'97	'00	'94	'97	'00	'94	'97	'00	'94	'97	'00
Too harsh towards non-Estonians, afflicts human rights	7	11	6	64	67	55	86	89	79	64	67	80
Normal, corresponds to international norms	47	52	56	30	26	28	10	3	12	4	3	6
Too mild, damages the interests of Estonian nation	36	24	21	-	1	1	-	-	<1	-	-	1,5
Difficult to say	10	13	17	6	6	16	4	8	8	32	30	12
Do the principles of granting Estonian citizenship correspond to EU norms												
- Yes		40			20			9			9	
- No		16			48			71			69	
- Difficult to say		44			31			20			23	

* Jüri Kruusvall. 1994 – questionnaire dealing with ethnic problems (EAÜI and Saar Poll); 1997 – questionnaire dealing with ethnic problems in the framework of Estonian Ministry of Education project VERA (network of querists of Statistical Office of Estonia)

In comparison with the results five years ago the share of those Estonian citizens who see the expansion of citizenry as a threat to the nation has diminished almost 50%. This is a significant change and it refers to growth in Estonians' sense of security and weakening of ethno-centric attitudes. If this tendency would continue in the future, we could see here an assumption for a split between ethnic and political nationalism in people's notions. Other data of the monitoring also refers to this tendency. Namely, national threats in current citizenship policy are mainly seen by those Estonians (28%) who belong to the older age group (55-64), and only by 7% of Estonians with higher education (among whom there are more young people than on average).

More than half of the Estonian citizens with a non-Estonian background consider citizenship requirements too difficult although we can observe a change of attitudes in this respect as well. In comparison with the data of previous studies the number of those who consider citizenship requirements too harsh has diminished by one fifth. But as a whole, the non-Estonian citizens' evaluation is closer to the evaluation of non-citizens and those with the Russian citizenship, being nonetheless somewhat more flexible and less radical than that of the latter. Aliens' citizenship policy evaluations are probably also influenced by the view that Estonian requirements are in violation with the principles of the European Union. For the majority of Estonians the regulations of the European Union are still "an unknown ground"; they are either considered to be more liberal than general international norms, or it is unclear what to think of them at all.

Summing up evaluations of the citizenship policy shows that:

- Estonians' and non-Estonians' expectations of the citizenship policy continue to be contradictory;
- Approximately half of Estonian citizens who are Estonian are potentially open to citizenship-related dialogue;
- Bringing in EU could give a positive contribution to solving the citizenship issue.

3. TO WHOM CAN CONCESSIONS BE MADE IN GRANTING CITIZENSHIP?

It is important from the perspectives of integration to know whether the Estonians have potential readiness for liberalising citizenship policy. For that purpose we tried to find out to what extent people agree with granting citizenship to certain groups on easier grounds. In total, 16 criteria were listed from which respondents could make unlimited choices. 21% of the respondents chose none of the listed criteria, or answered that concession should not be made at all, 13% agreed to one of the criteria, 48% chose 2-4 criteria and 16% considered it possible to soften the conditions for naturalisation on the basis of 5-9 criteria.

This data points to a contradiction in Estonians' attitudes. Above we could see that on the level of normative attitudes two thirds of the Estonians favour current citizenship policy. If the question is put differently – whether the state should agree to certain concessions – the picture changes significantly. The fact that almost two thirds of Estonians consider it possible to soften the citizenship requirements on the basis of two or more criteria, among these almost one fifth on the basis of five and more criteria, creates favourable preconditions for making corresponding political decisions as well.

In analysing the data of the questionnaire the answers were grouped on the basis of characteristics that were close or congruous in essence. Indexes were formed as follows: 1. Organic continuous connection with Estonia (persons born in Estonia and citizens' family members); 2. Legal connection (owners of permanent residency permits, settling in Estonia after re-independence and youngsters approaching the age when they get their passports); 3. Humanitarian motives (pensioners, invalids, persons with primary education) and 4. Services to the state and outstanding achievements (top sportsmen, top specialists and entrepreneurs-investors).

As a whole the softened preconditions for citizenship according to Estonians' viewpoints rank as follows:

1. *Organic ties with Estonia* – 61% of the respondents favour this motive in granting citizenship on softer grounds (among these 38% would prefer family members of citizens by birth, 35% persons born in Estonia and 27% family members of all Estonian citizens).
2. *For services and achievements* – 30% of the respondents favour simplifying citizenship requirements for this reason (among these 22% to top sportsmen, 16% to top specialists and 12 to entrepreneurs).
3. *For humanitarian reasons* – 23% of the respondents are in favour (17% of the respondents in case of pensioners, 13% in case of invalids and 2% in case of people with primary education).
4. *Legal arguments* – 18% of the respondents would be in favour of granting citizenship on simplified grounds on the basis of at least one of the criteria summarised in the index. As a whole, the non-citizens' 'legality', enacted by the state, meaning the existence of a permanent residency permit, and also settling in Estonia after re-independence, that is on 'legal grounds', and reaching the age of getting a passport, are not considered by Estonians as being sufficient preconditions for acquiring citizenship.

Given attitudes do not preclude each other but are partially congruous. For instance, 82% of the respondents who link the expansion of citizenry with 'organic ties' do not consider it possible to grant citizenship on simplified grounds on the basis of a residency permit or for other reasons listed in the so called legal index, while 15% would consider one of the listed motives.

The majority of Estonians see citizenship foremost as an organic tie with Estonia and as belonging to a nation. At the same time this does not rule out the expansion of citizenry on other grounds in simplified manner. The preferred groups are:

- family members of citizens by birth
- permanent residents who were born in Estonia
- family members of naturalised citizens
- outstanding specialists in their field and persons who increase public welfare
- the elderly

5. THE POSSIBILITY OF LEAVING OUT LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS IN GRANTING CITIZENSHIP

This current study assures us, like many studies before, that both the Estonians and the aliens do not concentrate on citizenship as such, but rather on the requirements of knowledge of the Estonian language. 37% of Estonian and 45% of non-Estonian respondents gave an answer to an open question: "What kind of changes have taken place in citizenship policy in the past two years?" Of the 33 fixed evaluations, 8 had to do with different aspects of language proficiency and these covered 48% of all the given answers.


Just like it is the case with citizenship policy, the Estonians and the aliens comprehend the changes in language requirements in a different or even contradictory way. Here are a few examples: "Estonian language exam has become more difficult" – 12% of Estonians and 44% of aliens agree with that; "Estonian language exam has become easier – 15% of Estonians and 7% of aliens agree with that; "citizenship is

granted more easily” – 20% and 2% agree etc. The only aspect where changes are comprehended equally is the statement “children acquire citizenship more easily” (6-7%).

Attitude towards possible removal of language census was evaluated on the basis of 9 parameters, whereat 6 of them included ‘positive’ outputs (‘fosters’, ‘helps’, ‘alters’) and 3 fixed possible dangers (to nation, language, state); evaluations were measured on a 4-point scale. In calculating mean values definite positive answers were estimated with 4 points and definite negative answers with 1 point. Primary analysis indicates that Estonians’ mean evaluations centre around the value 2 (2,07...2,44) and aliens’ evaluations around value 3 (3,06...3,32). The only exception is a small group of Estonian citizens who consider citizenship policy too harsh. Their evaluation of leaving out language census is 2,96 - very close to the mean evaluation of aliens. At the same time Estonians’ ‘language protection’ is not characterised by general and unanimous exclusion. Although mean evaluations alter only a little, they do so ‘above, not ‘under’ the arithmetic mean point (see figure 1). Aliens’ and Estonians’ attitudes towards language census are clearly polar whereas citizen aliens do not change this general tendency.

Figure 1.

Overall evaluation of the impact of granting Estonian citizenship without Estonian language exam (4=defenitely positive, 1=defenitely negative)



Estonians’ language centrality and the fear that the aliens living in Estonia violate Estonians’ language rights is widely known and finds proof in this monitoring as well. Nevertheless, the status of the Estonian language depends foremost on the spiritual values that are created through it, the quality of Estonian language education

and universality of the language's social functions. Overcoming the language barrier on the basis of Estonian language is foremost the problem of social communication, not protection of the language, or development of the language resource. The task of the monitoring was to find out how the respondents evaluate the impact of decreasing of, or the leaving out of the language requirements from Estonia's integration policy. Answers were grouped into four blocks on the basis of substantive closeness of the meanings: 1. Ethnic integration (softening of language requirements 'helps to decrease conflicts between Estonians and non-Estonians' and 'helps non-Estonians to melt quicker into Estonian society'); 2. State integration ('helps to increase the number of inhabitants who are loyal to the state' and 'makes the society more democratic'); 3. Foreign political integration ('helps to improve relations with Russia' and 'helps Estonia quicker to EU'); 4. Danger to the nation (endangers the survival of the Estonian nation, language or state).

Table 4.
Evaluation of the possible impact of granting citizenship without language exam (%)

Does granting citizenship without language exam...	Estonians N=665			Other nationalities N=487		
	Definitely agree	Partly agree	Do not agree	Definitely agree	Partly agree	Do not agree
... fosters ethnic integration	12	38	50	35	55	10
...fosters state integration	7	36	57	40	50	10
...fosters Estonia's international relations and integration	12	53	35	37	52	11
...endangers Estonian, language, nation and state	22	41	37	<1	8	91

The results show that Estonians and non-Estonians evaluate the language requirement as a precondition for granting citizenship differently, and the societal consequences of giving up language census are viewed even in a contradictory manner. In aliens' opinion everything will become better if language requirements for naturalization would be dropped. Estonians do not share this view. It is not precluded that these attitudes reflect mutual language fetishism, which in case of aliens has to do with real language difficulties and in case of Estonians with widespread stereotypes. The purpose of further analysis is to find out what is the concrete essence of 'danger' for Estonians and on what do the aliens base their super-optimism.

The following conclusions have to do with the attitudes of Estonian respondents.

- almost two thirds of the Estonian respondents see a danger to ethnic and state existence in leaving out naturalisation language requirements
- in Estonians' perceptions ethnic (linguistic) and nation-state integration are closely connected

- non-Estonians sense a contradiction between inner state integration practice and international expectations and principles.

5. CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS

According to earlier studies, Estonians' mass consciousness is characterised by the understanding that keeping aliens away from the citizenry does not represent a danger to statehood and democracy, but instead vice versa. Whereas aliens tend to link their difficulties and failures mainly to the absence of citizenship and see it as the main reason of the alleged violation of human rights. One of the tasks of the current monitoring is to find out with what essence is the citizenship institution 'filled' in people's minds. Gathered information would help to specify how Estonians and non-Estonians understand the connection between citizenship and the whole 'package' of human rights. Secondly, it should show the spreading of egalitarian attitudes in Estonian society.

In the questionnaire it was asked from the respondents to give an answer about 15 rights. These were divided into three different blocks – economic, social and political rights, each of these had five sub-rights*. 'Entitled subjects' were asked to be evaluated on the basis if the right should be possessed by: 1. All Estonian inhabitants, 2. Citizens and permanent residents, 3. Only citizens, 4. Only Estonians. In processing the data both mean and constructed indexes were calculated. In the latter case 'everybody's right' was marked with 0, 'citizens' and only Estonians' right with 1. Thus on the scale of table 5 '0' represents those respondents who consider it necessary to give all rights to everybody regardless of their legal status; possession of all rights only by citizens and Estonians is marked with '5'.

Estonians see a rather big difference in rights between people from different nationalities and with different legal statuses, this includes also spheres in which state policy does not actually make a distinction between citizens and non-citizens. 15% of Estonian and 66% of non-Estonian respondents agreed with giving all rights to all settlers of Estonia. Only 4% of Estonian respondents thought that all of the rights should belong only to Estonians and to the citizens of Estonia. The overall arrangement of answers on the basis of the composed index is shown in table 5.

* Economic rights were comprised of rights to get a bank loan, to buy land, an apartment or a house and the right to start business. Social rights – to receive social aid and state pension in old age, to receive primary education in one's mother tongue, to freely travel abroad and to work in a state office. Political rights – to belong into a political party, to take part in and to run for Riigikogu elections and to take part in and to run for parish/city council elections.

Table 5.

Connection of rights with different legal statuses (Answers to the question: ‘Who in Estonia should have the following rights?)


	ECONOMIC RIGHTS						TOTAL
	00	1	2	3	4	5	
ESTONIANS							
N	274	131	85	45	57	63	655
%	42	20	13	7	9	9	100
OTHER NATIONALITIES							
N	443	20	11	4	9	2	489
%	91	4	2	1	0,4	0,4	100
	SOCIAL RIGHTS						TOTAL
	00	1	2	3	4	5	
ESTONIANS							
N	212	114	114	115	59	41	655
%	33	17	17	18	9	6	100
OTHER NATIONALITIES							
N	430	37	12	4	2	2	487
%	88	8	2	<1	<1	<1	100
	POLITICAL RIGHTS						TOTAL
	00	1	2	3	4	5	
ESTONIANS							
N	146	29	62	50	137	231	655
%	22	4	10	8	21	35	100
OTHER NATIONALITEIS							
N	336	35	46	31	18	21	487
%	69	7	9	6	4	4	100

The data gives cause for the following conclusions:

- Estonians are more open in accepting equal rights in the economic block; 60% of the respondents prefer either ‘everybody’s right’ regardless of citizenship in this sphere or connects economic rights to citizen status only to a very small extent (0+1);
- Half of the Estonians think that social rights belong to everybody or are only a little dependent on citizenship. Thus the majority of Estonians accept the so called social citizenship. It can be claimed that this fact is a good precondition in promoting integration in spheres that have less to do with citizenship;
- Estonians link political rights strongly to citizenship and nationality (56%), only a quarter of the respondents were in favour of giving certain political rights in one form or another to non-citizens as well.

The views of aliens, both citizens and non-citizens, coincide as far as economic and political rights are concerned. On the one hand, these views indicate high expectations of equality, which indirectly shows that the aliens feel a general 'deficit' of rights. On the other hand this view can reflect national solidarity because according to the data of existing studies, the social status and the economic situation of aliens who are Estonian citizens is much better than that of non-citizens. On top of that, as shown above, one third of the citizen families have also members who are either non-citizens or Russian citizens, whose possibilities of enjoying benefits are not equal with those of Estonian citizens. Non-Estonians as a whole, including Estonian citizens, accept those political inequalities that stem from citizenship more than those that stem from social and economic inequalities. In fact, this is the only class of rights that differentiates aliens who are citizens from those who are non-citizens or those who are Russian citizens (see figure 2).

Figure 2
Relationship of support of rights with different legal statuses



LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE AND COMMUNICATIVE CAPABILITIES OF RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA (“RUSSIAN ESTONIANS”)

Ivi Proos

Surveys on interethnic relations held in Estonia have revealed that for the majority of Estonians the concept of integration is related, in the first place, with the proficiency of those to be integrated in the Estonian language. The knowledge of Estonian by aliens, on at least communication level is the criterion by which the integration readiness of non-Estonians residing in Estonia is to be judged. Too, the knowledge of Estonian will help the non-Estonians to feel more at home in Estonia. In the first place, it will give them a better competitive posture in labor market, and more opportunities to apply their educational background, professional skills and capabilities. Surveys have shown that the above are the motives prompting the aliens to tackle the task of learning Estonian.

1. Changes in the knowledge of Estonian by non-Estonians

In what follows, the changes of language skills of non-Estonians, as revealed from the comparison of two surveys, are presented. The aliens assessed their language skills in 1997 and 2000, under a similar technique. Assessments have been presented, basing on different citizenship status of non-Estonians, to yield a structured picture of their linguistic proficiency.

Table 1
Non-Estonians’ knowledge of Estonian (%)

Assessments	Citizens of Estonia		Citizens of Russia		Stateless	
	2000	1997	2000	1997	2000	1997
I understand oral Estonian						
• Well	47	42	7	6	8	11
• So-so	32	28	15	26	29	26
• Just a bit	13	24	39	34	41	41
• Not a thing	8	6	39	34	22	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
I can read in Estonian						
• Well	49	39	7	11	25	7
• So-so	31	23	17	19	22	24
• Just a bit	13	29	30	24	29	40
• Not a thing	7	9	46	46	24	29
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
I can write in Estonian						
• Well	34	29	6	6	12	7
• So-so	31	25	12	20	24	22
• Just a bit	26	33	26	22	31	34
• Not a thing	9	13	56	52	33	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Total						
-------	--	--	--	--	--	--

Assessments	Citizens of Estonia		Citizens of Russia		Stateless	
	2000	1997	2000	1997	2000	1997
I can communicate in Estonian						
• Well	39	38	6	5	4	5
• So-so	33	24	10	18	25	18
• Just a bit	18	23	34	37	37	40
• Not a thing	10	15	50	40	34	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

For known reasons, the knowledge of Estonian by aliens with Estonian citizenship is clearly better than that of stateless aliens and citizens of Russia living in Estonia. That trend was evident also in the results of both 2000 and 1997 surveys. Whatever the progress, nearly one tenth of aliens with Estonian citizenship are still monolingual (cf. the German term *Stockrusse* to denote a monolingual Russian), unable to neither read, nor write, nor understand Estonian. In the past three years, impressive improvement has been witnessed in the linguistic competence of aliens with Estonian citizenship: they are more active than other aliens, they often work together with Estonians and readily communicate in Estonian.

The worst is the competence in Estonian of citizens of Russia. Half of them are absolutely dumb as regards the knowledge of Estonian, only 16 % estimating their skills in Estonian as good or passable. Citizens of Russia are the sole group of non-Estonians, whose level of skills in Estonian has lowered, in the past three years. The primary explanation of the fact may be the specific age structure of citizens of Russia living in Estonia. There are many senior citizens in that stratum of society; they do not communicate too much and tend to forget the little they used to know when in active working age. The second reason is their particular place of residence: a large proportion of citizens of Russia live in the North East Estonian industrial area, in the monolingual (Russian) environment, lacking the opportunities and also the need to exchange thoughts and opinions in Estonian.

It should be pointed out, as a most positive development that the knowledge of Estonian by stateless Russians in Estonia has made tangible progress in the past three years. It is mainly their reading skills that have made a surprising leap. And yet, almost 2/3 of them find it hard to communicate in Estonian (34 % are unable to make themselves understood, 37 % floundering through the act of communication). Scanty linguistic proficiency on the communication level drags heavily on stateless aliens, crippling their competitive posture in the labor market and increasing their fears and apprehensions with respect to future.

Basic differences in non-Estonians' linguistic competence stem from their place of residence. Of Tallinn's aliens nearly half (48 %) can engage in communication in Estonian, either well or passably well. Only 16% of residents of the metropolis are dumb, when it comes to communication. The most monolingual is the Narva - Sillamäe axis. Of non-Estonians residing in those two towns, the Estonian language is still unattainable, as a means of communication, to 66 % of adults. Only 13% of them can communicate in

Estonian, either well or passably well. The knowledge of Estonian by aliens of Kohtla-Järve and Jõhvi is poorer than that of aliens in Tallinn, however better than in Narva – just a bit over one fourth of aliens there (27 %) have good or passable knowledge on the level of communication. 31 % of adults are, to an absolute degree unable to communicate in Estonian.

The non-Estonians' alertness to study Estonian is a manifest evidence to support the guess that many people have, during the years of existence of the newly independent Republic of Estonia, sought to improve their skills in Estonian.

Table 2
Scope of involvement in language studies (%)

Have you improved your skills of Russian (Estonian), after Estonian regained independence?	Estonians	Non-Estonians		
		Citizens of Estonia	Citizens of Russia	Stateless
- No, I am well versed in Estonian	55	26	6	5
- No, although I am not good enough at it	35	24	69	49
- Yes, I studied on my own	7	25	15	29
- Yes, I attended language courses	...	22	13	21
- Yes, I had a private tutor	1	11	1	5
- Yes, I studied at University	3	8	2	2

The sum of columns will top 100 %, because the respondents may have made recourse to several alternatives, to improve on their Estonian.

As compared to other Russians in Estonia, non-Estonians with Estonian citizenship seem to have tackled the Estonian studies in all earnest. Self-study and study at language courses seem to have been an equally important tool of education, among aliens with Estonian citizenship. Every tenth alien with citizenship has had private tutorship in Estonian. The desire among aliens with Russian citizenship to better their Estonian language skills has remained minimal, however. Over 2/3 of citizens of Russia residing in Estonia have not made any effort to improve their linguistic proficiency in Estonian, after independence, although they fully acknowledge the defectiveness of their Estonian. Neither have half of the stateless aliens brushed up the little Estonian they know.

Training courses in Estonian are being offered, for Russians to hammer away at their Estonian. Of those aliens who have studied at courses, 38 % have attended one language course, 34 % have attended two courses and 18 % have attended three courses. Every tenth Russian in Estonia has been at four or more courses of Estonian.

The majority of Estonians never worry about their Russian skills – only every tenth has made an attempt to better them. Over half of Estonians (55 %) are convinced that their Russian proficiency is sufficient and that they have no room for development here. A bit

over one third of adult Estonians (35 %) consider their level of Russian too low, but they have not sought to remedy the situation. To all appearances, there is sheer pragmatism at work, because Estonians have no job related pressure, to achieve more fluency in Russian. Insofar as economic relations between Estonia and Russia remain stagnant, there are no driving forces to effect a sudden change in the situation.

2. Sources of language proficiency

Language proficiency in Estonian, acquired at the comprehensive school is with what the aliens born in Estonia have to go out into the world. We need not delve here into whether it is sufficient for them to cope. Too much depends on what their language environment is like, on where Russians - residents of Estonia live, and also on whether they have any opportunity to actively engage in communication in Estonian during classes, when the school is out, and after graduating. The table hereunder will provide a picture on the respective significance to aliens of different sources of proficiency in Estonian.

Table 3

Major sources of language proficiency in Estonian (%)

Sources of proficiency in Estonian	Where did your present proficiency in Estonian originate?			What is your most important source of proficiency in Estonian?		
	Ec** *	Rc**	S-ss*	Ec** *	Rc**	S-ss*
classes of comprehensive school	56	15	47	19	13	28
everyday communication	48	35	33	7	13	8
communication with friends, acquaintances, neighbors	43	23	19	7	9	6
communication with partners on job	40	27	25	15	14	8
language courses	28	12	22	12	5	8
language studies on one's own	24	16	24	4	5	7
home, relatives, connections	23	2	6	12	1	3
college, professional school	23	4	9	5	2	4
friends from the days of childhood, school mates	21	3	9	4	2	1
reading books	19	5	10	1
otherwise	*	*	*	9	7	9
just picked it up	*	*	*	5	29	18
total	*	*	*	100	100	100

* S-ss – stateless aliens

** Rc - aliens with Russian citizenship

*** Ec - aliens with Estonian citizenship

Respondents assessed their sources of language proficiency in two ways. They first gave their verdict to all sources of language proficiency, which they deemed as important to them (the left-hand side of the Table). Because one was allowed to simultaneously assess several different sources of language proficiency, the aggregate per cent from responses topped 100%. As the second step, all respondents selected one source of their mastery of Estonian, being the most important for them (the right-hand side of the Table). With the selection restricted by only one source, the aggregate assessment in the right hand side of the Table was 100 %.

Dominating in the assessments of all groups was the language proficiency in Estonian acquired at comprehensive school. This is the case particularly with stateless aliens. Follows the communication with partners on job. For citizens of Russia, this seems to be the most important source of mastering Estonian. Quite natural, too because in Estonia, there are few citizens of Russia born and educated here. The Estonian language, gleamed from daily communication was put into prominence by aliens with Russian citizenship and stateless aliens.

3. Knowledge of foreign languages

Besides the proficiency in Estonian, ever more vital is the excellence in foreign languages, because the economic success of this small state of ours depends, to a considerable degree on attraction of foreign capital. Exports-oriented and international-capital-based manufacturing calls for more active international business communications and mastery of foreign languages on job and everyday life.

Table 4

Knowledge of foreign languages by Estonians and non-Estonians (%)

Knowledge of a foreign language, at least on the level necessary to communicate	Estonians	Non-Estonians
- English	41	27
- Finnish	29	2
- German	19	7
- Sweden	2	...
- Other	3	10
- Not one foreign language	39	61

The aggregate of assessments presented in the Table, tops 100 %, because some respondents have mastery of several foreign languages, on the level of communication.

The overall tendency is for Estonians to have better knowledge of foreign languages than for the aliens residing in Estonia. On the level of communication, 39 % of Estonians and 61 % of non-Estonians turned out to speak no foreign languages. As it is, there are valid cultural and psychological reasons accounting for that outcome. The readiness of Estonians, as a small nation to engage in communication in other languages, and their motivation to improve on their language skills is much stronger than the motivation of people who stay

within the Russian language space. For that matter, the Russian language has extensive resources in terms of its mother country and the status of a world language. Neither can one ignore, in this connection the opportunities of visa-free traveling in Europe and overseas, offered to bearers of the Estonian passport and avidly used. Due to visa problems, the traveling is made rather complicated to stateless aliens and citizens of Russia residing in Estonia. Thence the restricted chances of those people to engage in communication in foreign languages.

Non-Estonians with Estonian citizenship, on par with ethnic Estonians as regards the traveling, display better foreign language skills than the remaining groups of aliens. Skills in English on the communication level are possessed by 35 % of aliens with citizenship, skills in German by 10 %, skills in Finnish by 2 % and skills in some other foreign languages by 11%. In the body of aliens with Estonian citizenship, 53 % of respondents have no knowledge of foreign languages. This is by no means to say that the foreign language proficiency of Russians residing in Estonia and enjoying the Estonian citizenship is better, just because they are eligible to visa-free traveling. They can also boast of a higher social status than their counterparts among underprivileged non-Estonians (higher educational level, a lucrative higher paid job etc.).

Among foreign languages, English clearly dominates both with Estonians and aliens. 41 % of Estonians and 27 % of non-Estonians can communicate quite fluently in English. The Estonians' command of English still rates lower than their command of Russian, also to be regarded, for purposes of this survey, as knowledge of a foreign language. 76% of Estonians can carry on in Russian, well or not so well, added 21 % of Estonians, able to communicate just a bit, as assured by themselves.

4. Command of language in everyday life

A significant driver prompting one to acquire Estonian is the necessity to use Estonian on job. Under the data of this survey, that necessity is felt by 61 % of working non-Estonians. The need to use Russian was reported by 86 % and the need to use English by 18 % of non-Estonians. 54% of working Estonians reported the use of Russian in everyday work. 28% reported the use of English and 10% the use of Finnish. The need for German in everyday work was reported by 7 % of Estonians. Hence the prevalence of knowledge of English over knowledge of German.

Table 5.

Communication in working collective (%)

What is the language you usually converse in with your partners on job?	Estonians	Non-Estonians		
		Citizens of Estonia	Citizens of Russia	Stateless
Only in Estonian	53	6
In Estonian more often than in Russian	23	12	2	...
Switching from Estonian into Russian and back, as needed	7	23	3	4
In Russian, rather than in Estonian	3	18	17	12
Only in Russian	1	28	62	67
More often in some other tongues	1	...
Hard to say	13	13	15	17
Total	100	100	100	100

Thence the conclusion, which is supported by other surveys: working in mixed Estonian-Russian collectives is a strong factor compelling the aliens to acquire Estonian. This survey revealed that the aliens with Estonian citizenship hold offices, more often than other non-Estonians, demanding the Estonian-language communication. This helps them preserve and improve their skills in Estonian, enhancing their competitive posture in labor market. Apparently the Estonian citizenship is enjoyed, first and foremost by those aliens residing in Estonia, who are presently working or have worked in the Estonian-language work collectives. Stateless aliens and citizens of Russia are predominantly occupied in collectives where Russian prevails. Their only chance to better their Estonian is using it in social sphere and for random contacts. This opportunity is of little avail, however unless one lives in the Estonian-language environment. As a matter of fact, the job-related needs are a major motive acknowledged by aliens as a motive to master Estonian.

Table 6.

Reasons to acquire command of Estonian

(in %)

Reasons to acquire command of Estonian (estimates provided by non-Estonians)	Imperative	Rather urgent	Can be dispensed with
There are job-related needs	26	18	11
It will help me get a better job, higher salary	22	22	12
Command of Estonian is demanded in workplace	16	15	22
It will help me get Estonian citizenship	15	19	22
Estonian is needed for communication	12	23	21
Every resident of Estonia should have	9	28	18

command of Estonian			
I want to partake in culture of the Estonian people	7	24	25
Estonian is pleasant to the ear	5	18	31
I am keen on everything published in Estonian	4	20	30

The most compelling motive of Russians in Estonia to master Estonian is to cope with their work. They are only too aware that Estonian will be an asset when they are applying for a job. Incidentally, however the employers much too often fail to present rigorous demands to the employees' linguistic competence. It is rarely that the employer runs a check on proficiency in Estonian of his non-Estonian personnel. Only 12 % of respondents intimated that the employer had verified their certificate on examination for the language category or their knowledge of Estonian. The language inspector had checked up on only 8 % of non-Estonian respondents. Conversely, ca. one fifth of working aliens are constantly worrying, harassed by linguistic stress, lest the examination commission, employer or language inspector should turn up to check on their halting Estonian. The remaining 80 % of working aliens were sure of their linguistic competence, unworried about the possible random checks. Of them, 37 % were sufficiently competent in Estonian. 34 % of respondents were laboring on jobs where the employer did not care about their Estonian. 9 % briskly declared that they had little to fear, because nobody had ever been victimized by language inspectors.

Estonians well versed in Russian are tolerant, regarding of what language to use, on the level of individual communication. They easily switch over to Russian, as soon as they notice that their interlocutor is unsure. This is not to say that Estonians are as tolerant regarding Russian on the level of the State of Estonia. If one should arrive, by a conjecture at the conclusion to visualize the possibility of Russian posing as the second official language, complementing the Estonian language, all Estonians would rebuff the idea point blank. The cherished dream of the Russian speakers however is to secure for the Russian language in Estonia the status of the second official state language, besides Estonian. The surveys corroborate the surmise that the Russian speaking community is rather united in that position: citizenship, age, education or other features characteristic of this specific social strata seem to fail to mollify that stubbornly ingrained hostile attitude.

To visualize the situation, it would be good to look at opinions ventured by Estonians and non-Estonians on whether the role of Russian should be increased in those regions of Estonia inhabited predominantly by minorities - permanent residents. The following Table vividly shows that the estimates of Estonians and non-Estonians clearly polarize, when under issue is the strengthening of positions of Russian in the State of Estonia. The idea of giving the Russian language a place of stature is endeared by Russians in Estonia, however repulsive to a great majority of Estonians (even for a hypothetical experiment in regions with non-Estonian dominance).

Table 7.

Estimates on the making of Russian more important (%)


Printed, executed and conducted in the languages of minorities should be...	Estonians	Non-Estonians		
		Citizens of Estonia	Citizens of Russia	Stateless
Documents – blanks, guidelines etc. • Yes • No	29 66	85 12	93 4	88 8
In-office clerical work of governmental agencies • Yes • No	22 70	69 23	81 16	72 20
Street signs, traffic signs, official announcements etc. • Yes • No	19 76	73 22	91 8	76 22
Corporate signs, advertisements, posters etc. • Yes • No	18 74	70 24	90 8	75 22

Uncompromising attitude by Estonians as regards their rigorous linguistic standards, is revealed also when under agenda is the linguistic competence of businessmen and experts coming from the West. 57 % of Estonians hold that the people moving here from the West must be able to speak job-related Estonian on a par with non-Estonian residents of Estonia. To all appearances, this tough approach by Estonians reflects the latent drive for language protection of this midget nation, having preserved their vernacular in the crossroads of history. Hopefully their stance will become less defiant, after the knowledge of foreign languages by all residents of Estonia improves. The attitude of non-Estonians differs here from that of Estonians - nearly 2/3 of them think that the western experts do not need to acquire the command of their job related Estonian, on the same level required of aliens - residents of Estonia.

Table 8. Linguistic standards insisted upon by Estonian people (%)

Requirements of job-related Estonian posed to foreign experts	Estonians	Non-Estonians		
		Citizens of Estonia	Citizens of Russia	Stateless persons
Yes, they should have that command	57	34	20	25
No, they should not have that command	30	55	70	60
It's hard to say	13	11	10	15
Total	100	100	100	100

Figure 1. Understanding of oral Estonian



THE INFORMATIVE AND IDENTITY-BUILDING SIGNIFICANCE OF MEDIA: THE CASE OF ESTONIAN RUSSOPHONES

Triin Vihalemm

Introduction

The chapter gives an overview of the media consumption trends among the Russophone minority in Estonia and compares the role of mass media according to the country of origin – the local media and Russian media. The attitudes of Estonians and Russophones about the role of mass media in the integration process in general and the words used as synonymous to the term “integration” in media texts are discussed here also.

The mass media has a dual role in involving the Russian-speaking population in Estonia in Estonian social life:

- The mass media as an agent for integration – as a channel for the dissemination of information and important institution forming attitudes and thought patterns, together with the educational system and the family
- The mass media as one of the desired objectives of the integration process – i.e. the enlargement of the media consumption repertoire of the Russian-speaking population and the expansion of the influence of the local (Estonian) media among members of the Russian-speaking population who are now predominantly oriented towards Russian and Western satellite channels in their media consumption.

The need to be informed

61 per cent of the 15-40 year old Russophone city dwellers regard themselves (rather) well informed in the questions touching their city/town and 55 per cent regards themselves (rather) well informed about Estonian issues as a whole. 28 per cent of the 15-40 year old Russophone city dwellers regard themselves (rather) poorly informed in the questions concerning their city/town and respectively, 34 per cent regard themselves (rather) poorly informed about Estonia as a whole. 16-18 per cent of the younger Russophone city dwellers report that they do not follow information about their city or Estonia as a whole from mass media (source: *VERA-project, November 1999*).

Thus, one can distinguish two types of problems in Estonian society: one segment of society utilizes its limited access to (high-quality) information; the other segment feels no need to turn to the mass media in order to obtain information.

Television

The media consumption of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia is characterized by a strong orientation towards Russian television channels – average daily viewership of such channels is a stable 80% of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, and average weekly viewership is above 90%. Within the period 1993-1999 the viewership of Russian channels decreased in 1994¹, but increased in the next

¹ The relaying of ORT and the other Russian TV stations was ended as of March 1994, making it necessary to subscribe to satellite or cable TV systems in order to watch the Russian stations

couple of years to the previous share again (*Vihalemm, 1999:48*). One can predict the continuing importance of Russian TV channels in the foreseeable future, considering the fact that the viewership of Russian TV channels is stable in different age groups as well (Table 1).

The viewership of Estonian television channels is considerably more modest among the Russian-speaking population: in April 2000 the average daily viewership among persons aged 12-74 was 25%, and average weekly viewership 46%. Thus, the exposure of local TV channels is much more eclectic. One reason for this is the lack of Russian-language programmes/movies. Only the public television channel Eesti Television and the private channel *Kanal 2*, which aims to strategically differentiate itself from other private television channels, take the existence of the Russian-speaking viewership into consideration. One segment of the Russian-speaking viewership also watches Estonian-language television. According to the results of the *Ethnic relations survey* carried out in March 2000, 43% of the Russian-speaking population never watches Estonian-language television programmes and 16% never watch Russian-language (translated) programmes/movies (*Ethnic relations survey, March 2000*).

The exposure of local TV-channels among Estonian Russophones has decreased, especially among the youngest age group (table 1). Thus local TV channels might lose the share of viewers further on.

Connection with satellite and cable systems in order to watch Russian channels enlivened the consumption of Western television channels by the Russian-speaking population – the amount of consumption of Western television channels viewed through both satellite and cable has increased in the past six or seven years. The number of viewers of satellite channels is greatest among the younger generation. (table 1).

Judging by TV viewership, Russia clearly dominates the scene. The western satellite channels are also important. On the contrary, the majority of Estonians generally increasingly watch Estonian television channels. A greater and better selection of Russian-language programmes on Estonian television channels would to a certain extent strengthen the role of local television programming in the television consumption repertoire of the Russian-speaking audience, although considering the present eclectic and irregular nature of the consumption model, one should presumably not expect rapid changes in this area. The orientation should be on the younger generation.

Table 1. Average daily viewership per day and week in April 2000. The weekly viewership is given in brackets after the figure of the daily viewership. The proportion shows the percentage of the entire Russian-speaking population of Estonia aged 12-74.

	Entire Russophone population aged 12-74	12- 25years	30- 49years	50- 74years
<i>Estonian TV channels</i>	25 (46)	15 (36)	21.5 (42)	42 (62)
<i>Russian TV channels</i>	80 (91.5)	78 (94)	82.5 (92)	80 (88)
<i>Other satellite and cable channels and Finnish TV</i>	14 (38)	19 (47)	12 (33.5)	13 (33)
<i>Video</i>	9 (26)	16 (42.5)	8 (24)	2 (6)

Source: Diary Study of Television and Radio Audiences by BMF Gallup Media 29.03.-02.05.2000.

Radio

In contrast to television viewing, the radio-listening habits of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia are mainly centred on local stations. As opposed to television programmes, radio stations have managed to create a more or less regular audience – according to the results of the *Ethnic relations survey*, only 8% of the Russian-speaking population never listen to the Russian-language broadcasts of Estonian radio stations, and only 27% never listen to Estonian-language radio broadcasts (*Table 2*).

Table 2. Average share of listeners per day in 1993 and 1999. The proportion shown is in percent of the entire Russian-speaking population of Estonia aged 15-74. The criteria were listening of at least one channel belonging to the group during the day.

	1993	1999
<i>Estonian (national) channels daily audience</i>	59	43
<i>Local (city/town) channels daily audience</i>	25	48
<i>Russian channels daily audience</i>	23,5	7
<i>Western channels daily audience</i>	18,5	6

Source: National Media Survey, BMF Gallup Media, spring, 1999

Print media

The print media consumption habits of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia are of a generally eclectic and irregular nature in terms of both buying and reading. It is not very common to subscribe newspapers to home. The average number of people (both casually and regularly) who read newspapers among the Russian-speaking population varied between 3.9 in 1993 to 4.2 in 1999, whereas the same variation was between 8.7 and 7.0 for Estonians (*National Media Survey, BMF Gallup Media, spring 1993 and 1999, see also Lauristin and P. Vihalemm, 1998: 33*). The local Russophone weeklies are more popular than dailies. The share of occasional readers is relatively big (*Table 3*).

The share of readers of national newspapers has been rather stable from 1993 to 1999, the share of readers of local newspapers has increased a bit (*Vihalemm, 1999:48*).

The share of readers of dailies is a bit lower in Estonia when compared to Latvia (the per cent are 56 and 66 respectively), but higher when compared to Lithuania (the per cent are 56 and 40 respectively); the share of readers of weeklies is approximately the same in all three Baltic countries (*Baltic Media Book, 2000:59*).

As in the case of radio, the local publications dominate in the print media and Russian and Western publications do not play a very important role. However, 13.5 per cent from Estonian Russophones have read some newspaper or magazine published in some Western country and 39 per cent have read some newspaper or magazine published in Russia during the first half of 1999 (*Vihalemm, 1999:48*).

The media consumption repertoire of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia is generally characterized by Russia-dominated television viewing and local-dominated radio and print media consumption, and this consumption pattern is becoming increasingly focused on electronic channels, whereas consumption in the area of print media is becoming more eclectic and less regular.

Internet

Although in recent years the number of Internet users has also increased quite rapidly in the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, if one considers the proportions of the two largest national-linguistic communities in Estonia, there are, however, relatively fewer Internet users in the Russian-speaking population than among Estonians (*e-survey, Emor Ltd, Tallinn, 1 quarter 1999*).

At the beginning of 2000, 21% of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia possessed some knowledge of use of the Internet, 15% had used the Internet in the past 6 months and 10% could be considered moderately frequent (1 to 4 days out of 7) or frequent (5 to 7 days out of 7) users of the Internet.

Thus the potential readership of the information communicated through the Internet is at present still quite small among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. This direction must certainly be developed, yet at the present stage it is important to communicate information through as many diverse channels as possible.

Media consumption orientations and motives

On the basis of the country of (geo-political) origin one may distinguish the following groups of media orientations within the Russian-speaking population in Estonia:²

1. The Russia-oriented group – follows Russian media channels with a higher than average frequency, as the only foreign channels apart from the local (Russian-language) media³. This group comprises roughly **59%** of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia between the ages of 15 and 74;
2. The Heterogeneous group with an open media consumption orientation – follows Western satellite and cable television news and subject channels with a higher than average frequency and/or uses the Internet and/or reads foreign magazines, as well as Russian television and radio stations and the local (Russian-language) media⁴. This group represents roughly **31%** of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia between the ages of 15 and 74;
3. The Locally oriented group - a higher-than-average frequency of local radio listening, as well as reading city and county newspapers⁵. This group represents roughly **20%** of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia between the ages of 15 and 74;

² The groups are constructed on the basis of the single channels followed by Russophones in 1999 and are not all mutually exclusive. The groups 1 and 3 do overlap a great deal (the membership of group 1 and 3 coincides a great deal), so do the groups 2 and 3. The groups 1,2 and 4 are mutually exclusively constructed.

³ The frequency criteria: watched/ listened yesterday at least one Russian TV channel or radio station; reads regularly a Russian newspaper or magazine.

⁴ The frequency criteria: watched/ listened yesterday at least one Russian /Western TV channel / radio station or reads regularly a Western/Russian newspaper or magazine or has used Internet within the last two weeks.

⁵ The frequency criteria: has listened yesterday a local radio station or has read at least one issue out of the last six issues of the local (city/county) newspaper

4. The mainly Estonia-centred group⁶ - follows nation-wide (Russian-language) media channels on a more or less regular basis and channels outside Estonia, as well as local, city channels. This group represents roughly 6% of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia between the ages of 15 and 74.

(source: *National Media Surveys of BMF Gallup Media, see also Vihalemm, 1999:45-53*).

The Russia-orientation media consumption group is thus the group covering with the largest proportion of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, and this has not decreased in the period 1993-1999 (*Vihalemm, 1999:45-53*).

The data from the media surveys reveal that the reason for turning to the Russian media is not the low credibility of local media in the eyes of Estonian Russophones. Table 4 reveals that although the Russian television channels are in high esteem, the credibility of Estonian TV and radio channels is even a little higher among the group of most frequent followers of Russian channels. Also, the national radio channels and local newspapers have a relatively high credibility.

Table 4. Trust towards different media channels available in Estonia among the whole adult population and the groups with a more frequent exposure to Western and Russian media channels in 1999. The average means of ratings are given on a 5-point scale (5=very trustworthy, 1= not trustworthy at all). The numbers presented in the Table are average means of single ratings given to several separate channels belonging to the particular group. The data includes the answers of only those respondents who follow the particular channels.

Total population of Estonia aged 15-74 yrs (n=1 103)		Russia-oriented group (n=278)	
<i>National TV (Estonian TV)</i>	3.90	<i>National TV (Estonian TV)</i>	3.81
<i>Estonian commercial channels (average)</i>	3.50	<i>National Russian-language radio stations (average)</i>	3.41
<i>Local city or county newspaper</i>	3.43	<i>Russian TV channels (average)</i>	3.36
<i>Women's and home magazines (average)</i>	3.12	<i>Local city or county newspaper</i>	3.35
<i>Estonian-language national dailies (average)</i>	3.09	<i>Estonian commercial TV channels (average)</i>	3.30
<i>CNN; BBC, etc.</i>	3.04	<i>Russian-language national dailies (average)</i>	3.11
<i>Estonian-language national radio stations (average)</i>	3.02	<i>Estonian-language national radio stations (average)</i>	3.10
<i>Russian TV channels (average)</i>	2.96	<i>CNN, BBC, etc..</i>	2.98
<i>Russian-language national radio stations (average)</i>	2.83	<i>Women's and home magazines (average)</i>	2.38
<i>Russian-language national dailies (average)</i>	2.55	<i>Estonian-language national dailies (average)</i>	2.35

Source: *BMF Gallup Media: Estonian Media Research. Spring 1999.*

The existence of such a stable media consumption enclave can partly be explained by the absence of restrictions based on language proficiency for functioning in an Estonian(-language) communicative context, for instance – whereas in other

⁶ In parallel to the foreign channels as well as local newspaper-radio, at least one national channel – either TV, radio or the printed media – is usually followed in other media orientation groups as well. The share of the consumers varies, depending on the different groups, between 95% (the Russia-oriented group) and 100% (the locally-oriented group). The mainly Estonia-centred group represents these people, for whom the national media channel(s) are the main/regular source of information and who are more passive / irregular in their watching of local or foreign media channels.

media consumption groups roughly 60-70% of persons are, in their own opinion, competent enough in the Estonian language to read the newspaper or listen to / watch the news, in the Russia-oriented group the proportion of persons possessing such a degree of competence in the Estonian language is only 24%.

From 1993-1999 the proportion of those within the Russian-speaking population who followed both Western and Russian channels in parallel, as foreign channels, as well as the local media, has increased (*Vihalemm, 1999:45-53*). Thus the media repertoire of (mainly younger) Estonian Russophones has become more heterogeneous in the last six years: although the share of people who follow the Russian (TV) channels their only foreign channels has been stable, as has the share of those who follow in parallel both Russian and Western channels and local media as well.

Media consumption, which is oriented to programmes outside Estonia, definitely “deepens the separation of a large share of the non-Estonians from Estonia’s affairs, preventing their integration into Estonian society“ (*Lauristin, & P.Vihalemm, 1998: 37*). On the other hand, this model of media consumption also possesses a specific cultural significance.

On the basis of the personal significance of the local and Russian media, we may distinguish three main dimensions of signification / use of the media:

- informative/evaluative dimension
- utilitarian/evaluative dimension
- emotional and social (hypothetical identity-building) dimension⁷

Table 5 presents the general comparative data about the significance of the Estonian (Russophone) media and the Russia media (mainly TV). For the local Russian-speaking audience the Estonian and Russian media both have a relatively high value as providers of information. In addition, the Russian media possesses a strong entertainment-offering and identity-forming importance for the Russian-speaking population in Estonia (Table 5). The media of the country of origin has been considered by various researchers as one of the most significant factors for preserving one’s exclusive cultural identity even in the absence of a representative and/or participatory framework joining the members of the community (*Milikowski & Ogan, 1997; Sampedro, 1998, Schopflin, 1999*). Thus in analysing the habits and motivation of Estonian Russophones and offering new channels/outlets to them, it would be reasonable to keep in mind both the informative and identity-building significance of media.

Table 5. The significance of Estonian and Russian media in 1999. The single variables were grouped according to dimensions revealed from the factor analysis. The average means for individual factors and the whole dimensions were calculated for analysis. The question asked was: *Which things would you miss most if you could not follow the relevant media channel for a longer period.* The average means are calculated on the basis of a 5-point scale: 1 – would definitely miss (if the

⁷ The dimensions correspond to the factors comprised on the basis of answers to the question: *which is the most important aspect in Estonian/Russian TV, radio, or newspaper that you would miss for sure (when the relevant media would not be available)?* The 12-14 single variables were given to this question. Four factors were extracted in the factor analysis as different dimensions of significance of the local (Russo phone) media and three factors were extracted as different dimensions of Russian media (in the case of local (Russophone) media there were two different factors both describing informative dimension).

newspapers/TV/radio were unavailable) to 5 – would definitely not miss. Thus the significance of a single variable is bigger if the numerical value of the average mean is smaller.

Average mean scores	Local (Russophone) media	Russian media
Informative / evaluative dimension:	1,95	1,93
single variables:		
<i>information about what is happening in my city / town</i>	1.69	-
<i>information about what is happening in Estonia</i>	1.82	-
<i>commentaries about what is happening in my city / town</i>	1.89	
<i>commentaries about what is happening in Estonia</i>	1.95	1.99
<i>information / commentaries about what is happening in the world</i>	2.11	1.90
<i>information / commentaries about what is happening in Russia</i>	2.25	1.91
emotional and social (identity-building) dimension:	2.13	1.93
<i>possibility to talk about what is read, seen, and heard with acquaintances</i>	1.82	1.82
<i>the feeling that other people also follow the same things, that we share a common culture and way of understanding</i>	2.10	1.98
<i>suitable entertainment and relaxation for me</i>	2.42	1.85
<i>just a pastime, habit</i>	2.17	2.06
utilitarian dimension (practical information of everyday life (Estonian media) / information concerning health, education)	2.28	2.46

Source: VERA-project: survey among 15-40 years Russian-speakers in cities in 1999.

The local press and the integration process

Estonia's Russian-language media is generally regarded as the best institution for the protection and representation of the interests of non-Estonians. On average one third of the Russian-speaking population thinks that the Estonian-language media, the Estonian Government, *Riigikogu* (Parliament), President, and local governments uphold the interests of non-Estonians to at least a satisfactory level. In contrast, the role of Estonia's Russian-language media in representing and protecting the interests of non-Estonians is recognized by a little over half (58%) of the Russian-speaking population (*Ethnic relations survey, March 2000*).

Both Estonians and the Russian-speaking population assess similarly the role of the press in their respective languages as a factor supporting the integration process – 69% and 73% respectively find that the press in their respective language supports the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society to at least some extent (*Ethnic relations survey, March 2000*).

Assessments of the Estonian-language press are, however, somewhat more critical – the role of the Estonian-language press in the integration process divides the Russian-speaking population in Estonia into three groups. One third finds that it contributes somewhat to achieving integration, 36% find that it does not help at all, and 31% lack an opinion on the subject (*Ethnic relations survey, March 2000*).

The different attitudes held by the Russian-speaking population in Estonia toward the Estonian and Russian-language press may be the result of the different viewpoints of the two media in the treatment of topics involving ethnic relations and integration (*The Report of the media monitoring project "The reflection of the integration process in the press in 1999"*).

Also the term “integration” does not carry the same meaning in the media texts. The synonyms used instead of the term are a good example here: in the Otophone press the terms *coming closer, an outside force bringing people together, individuals bringing each other closer, togetherness, melting, being united, crossing the barriers, increasing the social connectedness connectivity, coherence, adjusting, conformation, accommodation adjustment*; The local Russophone press used the term: *harmonizing, but also fusing, and forced connection*.

The integration is not seen as a process at the grassroots level, but as an activity from the side of the state – the non-Estonians will be *integrated* (Kõuts, 2000). The Russophone TV broadcasts on national TV and on the private channel *Kanal 2* are different from that of the print media concerning integration by giving the voice to people who have integrated into Estonian society in one or another way (Trapido, 2000). However, the exposure of those broadcasts is not very big among Estonian Russophones.

Conclusion

The media consumption of the Russian-speaking population is mainly based on electronic channels. As concerns the print media, the consumption habits of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia are eclectic and irregular in terms of both buying and reading.

Russian television stations retain an important position. A larger and better selection of Russian-language programmes on Estonian television channels would to a certain extent strengthen the role of local television production in the Russian-language community, yet considering the eclectic nature and irregularity of the present pattern of consumption, there is clearly no point in expecting rapid change. Instead one should target the young, although at present the main consumers are members of the older generation.

One potential media channel is radio - in contrast to TV the local radio stations have been able to create a more or less regular audience for themselves.

The media consumption repertoire of part of the Russian-speaking population (mostly the young) has become more diverse in the past six years: although the proportion of persons watching Russian channels as the only foreign channels has remained practically unchanged, the proportion of those who follow both Western and Russian channels as foreign channels has increased, as has the consumption of local media.

In analyzing the habits and patterns of the media consumption of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and the offering of new channels-outlets to them, it would be expedient to be guided by both an approach based on the interests and expectations of the media audience and of its subculture thus taking an identity-building approach, since in addition to its informative role, the opportunities for entertainment, nostalgia and self-identification offered by the Russian media are very important to the Russian-speaking population.

This is a niche that the Estonian media has so far been unable to fill with any great success.

The more frequent examination of ethnic topics and integration issues in the media achieved in 1999 is a positive development, and in 2000 and beyond increasing attention should be devoted to stimulating the formation of a so-called common element between the Estonian and Russian-language media (communication between

journalists, etc.). The introduction into the media discourse in both languages of many words, apart from the concept of *integration*, that are more concrete, more clearly connected with people's daily lives and more unambiguous, should also be set as an objective.

Although the information and communication fields of the two national-linguistic entities are polarized, the media repertoires of Estonians and the Russian-speaking population are now far from homogenous within their respective communities. There are also prerequisites for the creation of solidarity and conceptual "lines of contact" between different groups on the level of both media consumption and also through new channels of communication (Internet, videos, etc.). The cultural and information flows of different levels should develop a dynamic environment suitable for the (re) production of both new and existing social and cultural identities.

References

Baltic Media Book 2000, Tallinn-Vilnius-Riia: BMF Gallup Media, 59

Ethnic Relations Survey (2000). Manuscript, Tallinn: Integration Foundation – Tallinn Pedagogical University – Saar Poll, March 2000

E-survey, I quarter 1999, Report, Tallinn: Emor Ltd, Tallinn

Lauristin, M. & Vihalemm, P. (1998). Media usage and social changes in Estonia, *Estonian Human Development Report*, Tallinn: UNDP, 31-37

Kõuts, R. (2000). Reflection of the integration of non-Estonians in the press in 1999, *unpublished BA thesis*, Tartu: University of Tartu, Department of Sociology

Milikowski, M. & Ogan, C. (1997). Zapping between Dutch and Turkish: Satellite television and Amsterdam Turkish migrants, *2nd International Conference Crossroads of Cultural Studies, Tampere, June 28-July 1, 1998*, see also Abstracts of Crossroads of Cultural Studies, Series B: 39, Department of Sociology and Social

Sampedro, V. (1998). Grounding the Displaced: Local Media Reception in a Transnational Context, *Journal of Communication, Spring issue*

Schopflin, G. (1999). Estonians need the Russian elite, an interview taken by E. Simpson Luup, 16(99), 16-17

Trapido, D. (2000). Fine people and cool state, *Postimees*, June 12th, pp 13

Vihalemm, T. (1999). Local and global orientations of media consumption, *Estonian Human Development Report*, Tallinn: UNDP, 45-53

MEDIA AS THE OPEN FORUM OF INTEGRATION

Külliki Korts


Ragne Kõuts

If somebody asked an ordinary Estonian what he or she meant by integration, he or she would most probably answer that the Russians would have to learn to speak Estonian. A Russian-speaking citizen would definitely give a different answer. But the exact meaning of integration is unclear and not only to ordinary people. The Estonian press tends also to be inconsistent on this matter.

The notion of integration

The Estonian- and Russian-speaking press share only a few common aspects related to integration. In both, the statements supporting the integration process are dominating. They agree that the integration process is in the interest of the whole society, and that it is a bilateral process, etc. At the same time, the evaluation of the present integration politics and its effectiveness tends to be negative. Integration is considered essential but it has not been successful.

Figure 1. Statements about the integration politics in the Estonian- and Russian-speaking press¹ (%).




In spite of the fact that both the Russian-speaking and the Estonian-speaking press have accepted the necessity of the integration process and its bilateral nature, there are differences both in formulating its content and in emphasising different related problems.

The first major difference appears in defining the notion of integration, i.e. what processes in which spheres of life are considered to indicate developments in the integration process (see fig 2).

¹ In figures 1, 3 and 4 are presented frequencies of a statements (for better understanding are opposite statements given on the negative scale)

Figure 2. Definitions of integration in the Estonian- and Russian-speaking press (%).



As presented in figure 2, the Estonian press contains mostly two definitions of integration: political (i.e. the growing loyalty of non-Estonians, thus the increasing number of Estonian citizens) and cultural (learning the Estonian language, participating in the Estonian cultural life). In the Russian-speaking press the integration process is also frequently described in the terms of linguistic/cultural adaptation but more often it is referred to as the process of growing tolerance and understanding between the two language communities. The survey on the attitudes related to integration among the Estonians and non-Estonians showed that the actual expectations of the people towards integration follow the same patterns².

The main axis of the integration process is considered by the Estonian press as the relationship between non-Estonians and the state, in the Russian press, on the other hand, it is the relationship between the two communities.

The qualitative analysis of the newspapers showed also that the press tends to give a normative connotation to the notion of integration. It is primarily described as the concern and activity of the state and its institutions.

“The European Union wants us to speed up the integration of the Russian minority. Giving citizenship to the children served this purpose. Changes in the language legislation serve the same purpose, while the EU promotes lingual integration.”
(*Eesti Päevaleht* 08.04.99)

² See in current brochure “*Integration in People’s Mind*” by J.Kruusvall

“(…) the Round Table is not fulfilling its task in the integration process of non-Estonians into the Estonian society.” (*Sõnumileht* 20.02.99)

In the Estonian-speaking newspapers the prevailing opinion seems to be that integration belongs primarily to the competence of the state and it should not concern the ordinary Estonian people too much. There are not too many statements that refer to the important role of the whole of Estonian community in the integration process; this opinion is more common in the Russian press.

“When the Estonians and the state finally come to the understanding, the integration process will become more painful.” (*Eesti Päevaleht* 18.08.99).

“(…) integration - it is the concern of the Estonians as well. (*Molodjozh Estonii* 07.12.99)

“Integration does not mean only that the Russians enter the Estonian culture. If the Russian pupils are learning "Estica", the Estonian pupils should be learning "Russica".” (*Den za Dnjom* 24.12.99)

The evaluation of the notion of integration in both presses varies on a very large scale from the ultimate negative to the ultimate positive. The distrust of the readers towards integration is supported by one fifth of the statements with a negative connotation. In Sweden, for example, the word "integration" is used as a synonym to "assimilation" (Sander 1996)³. The same can happen in Estonia; in the Russian press these words are already frequently used simultaneously, and also the Estonian press is producing a sceptical attitude towards the process.

“We are always gushing about integration.” (*Postimees* 12.04.99)

“(…) the integration of the Russian-speakers is nothing else than assimilation with the intention to get some fresh blood into the dying organism of the Estonians.” (*Den za Dnjom* 17.12.99)

“Estonian people are dying out. /.../ But that means that all people living in Estonia should be integrated to the end.” (*Estonija* 05.01.99)

Besides negative statements, the Russian press also contains extremely positive ones, which indicates even more variation in the usage of the notion. As none of the definitions is predominant, it is difficult to estimate whether, in general, the integration is considered something worth aiming at or the opposite, something to avoid and condemn.

The Estonian- and Russian-speaking press give different connotations to the notion of integration. It is frequently perceived negatively and it is exposed on different axes: the Estonian press sees the goal of integration process in the growing co-operation between Estonian state and non-Estonians, while the Russians press expects the growth of understanding between two communities.


Problems related to Integration

³ Sander, Å. (1996) Integration and multiculturalism. Knudsen, J. K. (Red.) *Likeverdighet og utestengning – forskningsmessige utfordringer*. Nordisk Ministerråd, temaNord 1996:634. 102-116.

The Estonian and Russian printed media tend to give different pictures of the actual situation, i.e. of the main problems related to the integration process. As the survey indicated, the Estonians are suspicious about the loyalty of non-Estonians⁴. The Estonian-speaking media shares a similar distrust (see fig. 3).

On the other hand, the Russian-speaking media presents no distrust towards the Estonian State but it is very sceptical about the intentions of the Estonian politicians.

Figure 3. Statements about relationship between the non-Estonians and the Estonian State (%).



In short, the general opinion of the Russian-speaking press could be summarised in the following: the incompetent actions of the state and the laws it provides do not promote integration but produce political instability.

“Certain politicians tend to emphasise the tragic past of the Estonian people and set forth ethnic, not national views in the political propaganda.” (*Estonija* 30.01.99)

Another key issue in the integration process is the fate of the Russian schools. The educational system should provide the children with the basis for a successful life in the Estonian society. The Estonian-speaking media gives a rather negative evaluation about the processes in the Russian schools, stating that the graduates of the Russians schools are not ready for the competition on the labour market, and that they have not learnt to speak Estonian, etc.

“Recent surveys by the Open Society Institute show that only one fourth of non-Estonians are provided with education that guarantees the career-possibilities.” (*Sõnumileht* 30.04.99)


This must have direct influence on the attitudes of the Estonian readers, who as a rule do not have any personal contacts with Russian schools. At the same time, the opinions about the problems concerning teaching and learning Estonian language have become more similar due to the long-held debate. The changes are more obvious in the Estonian press, which encourages the will of non-Estonians to learn the language much more willingly than before and frequently calls on the state to intensify the process.

⁴ See in current brochure “*Integration in People’s Mind*” by J.Kruusvall.

“The whole language-learning arrangement (in kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools, vocational educational institutions, higher education institutions, as well as in adult education) is neither uniform nor systematised. The continuity of programs and teaching materials is lacking. And all this is happening despite the huge amounts of foreign aid, also, there is no general picture of the use of that money.” (*Eesti Päevaleht* 20.03.99)

Although there is a consensus about the essentiality of integration and the viewpoints in the two presses are becoming more similar to each other, e.g. in the language question, there are enormous differences in certain principal issues. The agreement seems to be unreachable in the issues concerning the legal-political sphere (see figure 4). The most obvious examples of this in the Estonian press are the issue of the legal status of non-Estonians (whether non-Estonians should be considered a national minority with all the deriving rights or the predecessors of the occupants), as well as the aforementioned question of loyalty. In both cases, one can find opinions from one extreme to another. At the same time, in regard to practical politics the conviction is growing that among non-Estonians, the number of those with Estonian citizenship should increase and means should be adopted to speed up this process.

Figure 4. Statements about the citizenship politics and the rights of non-Estonians (%).



201 The Soviet immigrants can be treated as a national minority and are entitled to all the proceeding rights.
 202 The Soviet immigrants cannot be treated as a national minority but as the heritage of forced occupation.
 203 Estonian citizenship politics is benign, is in accordance with international norms, is not discriminating.
 204 Estonian citizenship politics is too rigid, is not in accordance with international norms, it creates violence, it should be made more liberal.
 207 It is in the interests of Estonia to increase the number of citizens.
 208 It is dangerous for Estonia to increase the number of citizens.
 211 Non-Estonians are interested in acquiring the citizenship.
 212 Non-Estonians are not interested in acquiring the citizenship.

The pragmatic discourse emerging in the Estonian press recognises the rigidity of the citizenship policy and considers the huge number of persons with no citizenship a threat to the security of the Estonian State.


“The fact that the Estonian policy toward non-Estonians has been thus far sometimes too rigid and needs to be changed, is also supported by the fact that the Citizenship and Migration Board estimates the presence of about 30.000 Russian-

speaking people who have not been counted as either Estonian or Russian inhabitants after the collapse of the Soviet Union.” (*Eesti Päevaleht* 29.04.99)

While the Estonian printed press shows some changes in the issues concerning non-Estonians and among other things a pragmatic approach has appeared, the Russian-speaking media continues to present a rather one-sided argumentation, focusing on the problems from the legal-political sphere (see figure 5).

A number of questions are represented in the Russian-speaking media through the so-called "discrimination-prism", emphasising the fears and distrust of the people involved in the integration (such as the fear that the extreme nationalists would come to power, there will be an economic crisis, and that there is a plan to assimilate non-Estonians, the Russian orthodox church will be abolished, etc.).

Fig 5. Integration problems in the Russian-speaking media in three spheres



On the other hand, the fact that four of the most frequently mentioned problems originate from the legal-political sphere indicates the need to adjust the laws to the actual situation to alleviate the tensions and the discontent of the non-Estonian community.

The Estonian-speaking media focuses on the problems concerning the teaching and learning of the Estonian language, at the same time, in the Russian-speaking press, legal-political problems are predominant. In both media-systems the social-economic integration is underrepresented.

On the one hand, the issue under observation itself can cause the differences between the two presses. For non-Estonians the integration process means facing a number of concrete problems, while the Estonian press is arguing on a more abstract and principal level. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the views about the smaller issues that have been on the agenda for a long period of time or are of a more concrete nature (e.g. the language issue) have become more similar. On the other hand, this can partly be caused by the specific character of the Russian-speaking press, where the journalists mediate almost all of the information that reaches the reader. This results in a more one-sided approach. Whereas the Estonian-speaking press seems to present more contrasting viewpoints on this matter and leaves more room for discussion.

The one-sidedness of the Russian press is also apparent in the presentation of the problems related to integration. One can find quite a strong consensus as to who are the victims, what are the sources of the problems and who is responsible for

solving them. While the Estonian-speaking media does present the opinions and statements of non-Estonians, the Russian-speaking media is not very eager to present the “opponent’s” viewpoints.

There are similarities between the two media-systems as far as the presentation of the sources and the solutions of the problems are concerned. In both cases, the problems related to integration are mostly connected with the state: they are caused by the government, so it is responsible for finding the solutions for them. This is not in accordance with the official viewpoint on integration. The state programme "Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007" declares: “(...) integration into society is the result of the free choice of the individual, not a decision dictated from «above». An individual’s attitudes and understandings change, above all, on his own initiative, and the state’s task is to create conditions favouring this change.”

While the problems are presented more one-sidedly in the Russian press, the Estonian press features more contrasting viewpoints, having better makings of a pragmatic discussion on integration.

The analysis has thus far focused on the general trends in the integration discourse in the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking press. A more detailed analysis of the statements that is achieved by Latent Class Analysis allows a distinction of different discourses within the two press-systems.⁵ This analysis includes statements that characterise the evaluation of the ethnic relations by the Estonian and the Russian media, as well as the attitudes towards the other language community, and the attitudes of non-Estonians towards the Estonian State.⁶ This allows us to make suppositions about the readiness for integration “offered” by both press-systems.

It is possible to distinguish three different discourses in the Estonian-speaking press (see fig 6). The first sees the attitudes of non-Estonians towards the Estonian State and towards Estonians as rather ambivalent. The relations of the two language-

⁵ Latent Class Analysis (LCA) brings to the surface latent relations and structures of argumentation in the text that are not uncovered in the content analysis. The method analyses patterns of co-appearing variables within one thematic aspect. The so-called pattern is a combination of variables within one article. The combinations are combined into a small number of classes that can be viewed as the different discourses on the subject under observation.

This analysis includes the articles that contain at least one of the statements under observation. Thus the Estonian model contains 40% (132) articles and the Russian about 30% (79) articles. Although this analyses does not embrace the whole discourse on integration it should cover the whole discourse on this specific matter.

⁶ The analysis includes the following statements:




- 117 The relations between Estonians and Russians are normal/stable, there is a co-operation.
- 118 The relations between Estonians and Russians are avoided; there is no will for co-operation.
- 125 There are xenophobic attitudes and there is an enmity towards non-Estonians among Estonians.
- 126 There are no xenophobic attitudes and there is no enmity towards non-Estonians among Estonians.
- 127 There are xenophobic attitudes and there is an enmity towards other nations among Russians.
- 128 There are no xenophobic attitudes and there is no enmity towards other nations among Russians.
- 205 Non-Estonians are loyal to Estonia.
- 206 Non-Estonians are not loyal to Estonia.
- 501 Non-Estonians trust Estonian politicians.
- 502 Non-Estonians do not trust Estonian politicians.

communities are described as positive (statement 117), also the attitude of non-Estonians towards Estonian politicians is mostly depicted as positive though it includes strong doubts (statements 205 and 501).

The other, rather infrequent discourse can be labelled “the worried discourse”. This gives positive value to the attitude of non-Estonians towards Estonians and the Estonian State (statements 501, 205 and 128), but is worried about the general willingness for co-operation on the Estonian side and about the normal development of society (statement 118).

The third discourse is dominated by statements representing negative attitudes. The relationship between Estonians and non-Estonians is considered rather bad, (statement 118), as is the attitude of non-Estonians towards Estonians and other nationalities (statement 127). The loyalty of non-Estonians towards the state is predominantly described as weak (statement 206).

Fig 6. Discourses in Estonian-speaking press



To sum up, the content of the three different discourses could be depicted in the following scheme:


		Inter-ethnic relations		loyalty	
1. ambivalent	Estonians	+	Non-Estonians	+/-	The State
2. worried	Estonians	-	Non-Estonians	+	The State
3. negative	Estonians	-	Non-Estonians	-	The State

From the perspective of the readiness for integration, almost one third of the Estonian press is filled with a discourse that does not present direct opposition to integration but attributes a low value to the willingness of non-Estonians to adapt to the Estonian social and political organisation. One tenth claims that the Estonians have an attitude for hindering the integration process. The rest generally contains a positive attitude towards integration but is not certain about its political grounds.

The Russian press is dominated by the negative opinions (fig. 7) concerning the ethnic relations and the readiness of Estonians for integration (statement 125). The Estonian politicians are also appraised negatively, (statement 502), although loyalty for the Estonian State is clearly expressed (statement 205).

The other discourse presents a more positive picture of the integration process. Although the attitude of Estonians towards other nations is frequently considered hostile (statement 125), it is dominated by positive opinions (statement 126). The inter-ethnic relations are described as good (statement 117), and loyalty to the Estonian State is expressed (statement 205).

Fig 7. Discourses in the Russian-speaking press



These discourses could be added to a similar scheme:

		Inter-ethnic relations		loyalty	
1. negative	Estonians	-	Non-Estonians	+	The State
2. positive	Estonians	+/-	Non-Estonians	+	The State

The first discourse matches well with “the worried discourse” of the Estonian press, only here the perspective is that of non-Estonians. The willingness of non-Estonians to participate in the integration process is described as being high. The cause of the problems seems to be that there is repulsion on the Estonian side. The other Russian discourse gives high value to both sides’ willingness to participate in the integration process.

The Russian-speaking press tends to value the willingness of non-Estonians higher than the Estonian press. The differences emerge mostly from the opinion about the readiness of the Estonian side to take part in the integration process. Predominant is the negative evaluation that sees the attitude of the Estonians as the biggest obstacle to the process. One third gives high credit to the willingness of both sides. The most important issue for the Russian press, the increase in tolerance and understanding between the two communities, is starting to have a counterpart in the Estonian press,

where the bilateral nature of the integration process is more frequently stressed and claims for a change of attitude from the Estonian part are expressed.

Conclusion

The analysis enables us to make the following conclusions:

- Although the need for integration is not questioned any more in either the Estonian- or the Russian-speaking press, they tend to give different meanings to the notion of integration itself. The Estonian press predominantly sees the output of the process in the increase of politically loyal citizens who are able to communicate in Estonian. The Russian press emphasises the growth of tolerance and understanding between communities.
- In certain principal questions (such as the language requirements and the historical-legal status of non-Estonians), the gap between Estonian and Russian media seems impossible to overcome. At the same time, the Estonian press is not against the decisions that promote integration (for instance, there are claims for liberalising the citizenship policy, in spite of the principle of legal continuity).
- There are differences also in the reports of the actual situation. The reason for this might be connected to the distance of the Estonian press from certain problems non-Estonians face, and this can lead to misinterpretations. On the other hand, this can also be caused by the journalistic traditions of the Russian-speaking press.
- Comparing the two presses as the two public forums, it is characteristic of the Estonian press that it presents contrasting viewpoints in many matters under discussion, while the Russian press presents the problems more one-sidedly. The reason for this may be that the non-Estonian press seeks for solutions to many concrete problems, while the Estonian press is disputing on a much more abstract and principal level. On the other hand, this can also be caused by the peculiarities of the Russian press where most of the information is mediated by the journalists.
- The discussion is still open, within either of the two press-systems, as well as between them. There is consensus on the principal issue, namely that the integration process is necessary. The differences of opinion lie in the evaluations of the efficacy of the present policy and in the question as to who or what are the main obstacles of the integration: the Estonians, the non-Estonians or the Estonian State. The Russian press is confident in the readiness of non-Estonians but is disputing about the attitudes of the Estonians. At the same time, the negative attitude of the Estonian press is caused by the rather frequently expressed opinion that the willingness of non-Estonians is weak. The main problems seem to be the ungrounded prejudices that could be changed with stronger co-operation between the two presses.

THE TREATMENT OF EVENTS, SUBJECTS AND INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO INTEGRATION IN THE ESTONIAN AND THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING PRESS

Piia Tammpuu

With the analysis of events, subjects and institutions related to the subject of integration we are trying, on the one hand, to answer the question: whose "voices" dominate in the integration process and whose opinions have been taken into account by the press in this question. On the other hand, through which events and undertakings the image of integration is created in the public. To answer these questions, the following aspects were analysed in the framework of the 1999 media monitoring of integration processes: the ethnicity and status of the authors writing on the subject of integration and ethnic issues, that of the persons interviewed in these questions, the opinion- and information-sources referred to in the texts, the reflection of the events and projects related to integration, and the evaluative treatment of the institutions and organisations involved in the integration processes.

Authors and Information Sources

Differentiating the authors who write on the subject of integration by nationality and status enables to gauge the general openness of the Estonian and Russian-speaking media spaces and the plurality of positions in reflecting integration processes and ethnic issues. The analysis of authors reveals which ethnic and status groups have access to the Estonian and Russian-speaking printed media and due to this, have the possibility to form the opinions, images and attitudes of the public in this question.

The analysis of authors revealed that in the Estonian- as well as in the Russian-speaking press the authors writing on the subject of integration are predominantly representatives of the same ethnic community. In the integration debate proceeding in the two separate press-systems, Estonian authors in the Russian-speaking press and non-Estonian authors in the Estonian press occur rather rarely (**Table 1**).

Table 1. Authors according to ethnicity in the Estonian and Russian-speaking press

Ethnicity of author	Estonian press		Russian press	
	N	%	N	%
Estonian	233	93	18	9
Non-Estonian from Estonia	15	6	179	90
Russian from Russia	1	0,5	1	0,5
Other foreigner	1	0,5	1	0,5
Total	250	100%	199	100%

This fact leads to the conclusion that communication between the two media spaces, the Estonian and Russian-speaking press, is yet insufficient. This also indicates that the opinions and statements of representatives of the other community appear in the Estonian as well as in the Russian-speaking press rather in a mediated form, which increases the possibility that a certain statement or message may lose its authenticity and meaning and may reach the audience with distorted connotations or out of context.

From the position of authority and credibility of the information delivered by the press it is important to take into account the status of the authors as well. In this aspect, one could find

more differences between the Estonian and the Russian-speaking press. Besides professional journalists, the proportion of the other status groups that published materials on the subject of integration was bigger in the Estonian press. Compared to the Russian-speaking press, in the Estonian press there were more articles by experts and intellectuals, and also by readers. While in the Russian-speaking press, there were more statements by politicians (**Table 2**).

Table 2. Authors according to status in the Estonian and Russian-speaking press

Status of author	Estonian press		Russian press	
	N	%	N	%
Journalist	155	63	158	79
Politician	16	6	19	10
Official	12	5	7	4
Expert	41	16	5	3
Ordinary citizen	26	10	10	5
Total	250	100%	199	100%

In relation to the reflection of the issues concerning integration and inter-ethnic relations, the Estonian press can be characterised by a wider spectrum of direct opinions and statements. Also, one could find, in the form of expert-articles, more credible and authoritative information in the Estonian than in the Russian-speaking press.

In addition to the personal writings and statements, the spectrum of opinions can be evaluated according to the persons being interviewed in this question and according to information sources referred to in the texts. The genre of interview was used more actively by the Russian-speaking press, where there were mostly Estonians among the persons being interviewed (**Table 3**).

Table 3. Ethnicity of the persons being interviewed in the Estonian- and Russian-speaking press

Ethnicity of persons	Estonian press (N)	Russian press (N)
Estonian	4	20
Non-Estonian from Estonia	5	15
Russian from Russia	1	5
Other foreigner	1	2
Total	11	42

According to status, there were more politicians among the persons interviewed in both the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking press, and in addition, in the Russian language press there were more officials and experts/ intellectuals (**Table 4**).

Table 4. Status of persons being interviewed in the Estonian and Russian-speaking press

Status of person interviewed	Estonian press (N)	Russian press (N)
Politician	7	20
Official	0	9
Expert	3	8
Journalist	0	2

Ordinary citizen	1	3
Total	11	42

The use of an interview in the integration debate seems to satisfy, foremost, the function of the representation of the formal-political position. Also, the analysis of sources revealed that politicians and officials have been mostly used as information- or opinion-sources in the articles concerning the subject of integration by both presses. In the Estonian press, statements by experts were also often represented, including references to the data of different researches. Furthermore, the groups related to educational establishments, mostly teachers, pupils and headmasters of the Russian-speaking schools in Estonia, are distinguished as opinion sources. The public protests being induced by the military conflicts in Kosovo and Chechnya, brought the Russian youngsters and their statements to the columns of the Estonian press. In the Russian-speaking press in Estonia, more attention was paid to the statements of Russian nationalists and political activists. Also, the references to various legal documents were more frequent in the Russian-speaking press. Whereas at the level of authors, the communication between the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking media can be estimated as almost absent, then the analysis of sources revealed that there is an interest towards the materials published in the other press. In both the Estonian- and in the Russian-speaking press there were often references to the texts published in the other press. This indicates that the integration debate does not occur only within the closed and linguistically limited media systems, but more frequently also between them. This is undoubtedly a positive phenomenon.

Increasing the representation of the authors of different ethnicity and of the persons being interviewed in the questions concerning integration, the role of both the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking press as the mediator of different opinions and that of information between the two communities could be more efficient. The parallel publishing of the articles by the Estonian and non-Estonian authors in the Russian and Estonian-speaking press respectively marks an important step towards this.

Reflection of the Events and Projects Related to Integration

Last year there were several events that caught the attention of the media and induced discussions about integration, as a result of which, the subject of integration reached the public much better through the press.

The event that was most reflected in the Estonian press during the year was the making of amendments in language and election law by which the use of the national language was regulated in the public and private sphere, as well as the protests brought about by the amendments. Opposition was also demonstrated by another event, mostly reflected and mentioned in the Estonian press: the protest demonstrations against NATO by the Russian youngsters in front of the Embassy of the USA in Tallinn. Although this event was not directly related to the integration process and was neither caused by it, it became the second most reflected event in the press. The event brought about public discussion over the influence of different media channels on the Estonian integration process, over the perspectives of the Russian youngsters in Estonian society and over the political views and the loyalty of non-Estonians towards the state of Estonia in general. Among the events frequently reflected in the Estonian press, there were also inspection raids to the Russian-speaking schools in Estonia by the Language Inspection, the transmission of the Russian-speaking schools in Estonia to the Estonian-speaking studies by the year 2007, the proposals to enable military service for non-citizens as well, the protest against the action of OSCE mission in Estonia by the Estonian politicians and citizens, and enforcement of the amendments by which the children of non-citizens can apply for Estonian citizenship on the basis of simplified regulations. The reflections

of all these events in the press, with the exception of the last one, revealed numerous disagreements and interest conflicts.

In the Russian-speaking press the same events received attention in general, but they were often reflected in a more emotional manner. For example, an event that the Estonian press did not pay much attention to, but which was repeatedly reflected in the Russian-speaking press, was the arrest and hunger strike of Oleg Morozov. Compared to the Estonian press the Russian-speaking press reflected much more frequently the conferences, seminars and round table meetings related to integration. The Estonian press often paid only briefly touched upon such events, or the information about the events of this kind did not reach the audience at all. Still, non-Estonians should not be considered to be the only target group of such events.

The events related to the linguistic-communicative sphere of integration (such as the enforcement of language requirements, the arrangement of language acquisition, the events related to the Russian-speaking school and education in Estonia, conferences and seminars on the subject of integration, the activities of the culture-related associations of minorities, the events related to the Russian-speaking media etc.) comprised the most of the integration-related coverage in the Estonian as well as in the Russian-speaking press last year, followed by the events related to the legal-political sphere of integration (amendments in citizenship and foreigners' law, proposals to simplify the requirements for Estonian citizenship, political activities of non-Estonians etc.). At the same time, the press-reflections of the events concerning the social-economical aspects of integration were really rare in the Estonian- as well as in the Russian-speaking press. The reason for this phenomenon may be that the social-economical aspects of integration have remained in the background, or that the press itself has little interest in this field of the integration.

The division of integration projects according to the main spheres of integration lead to a similar conclusion: the projects reflected in the press belong predominantly to the lingual-communicative sphere of integration (e.g. language-acquisition projects, the hosting of the Russian-speaking youngsters in Estonian families, seminars on the subject of integration, media projects, educational projects etc.) Only few projects reflected in the press supported the social-economical and legal-political processes of integration (**Table 5**).

Table 5. The projects reflected in the press according to the main spheres of integration

Sphere of project	Estonian dailies (N)	Russian dailies (N)
Lingual-communicative	13	13
Legal-political	3	3
Social-economical	2	2
Other	3	1
Total	21	19

The target group of the integration projects reflected in the press was most frequently the Russian-speaking youngsters and children. This fact supports the principle insisted on in the fundamentals of the national integration policy: integration should be directed foremost at children and youngsters.

Among the integration projects the family and the so-called language-farm projects were brought forth in a positive manner in both the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking press, where not as much the quality and effectiveness as the contacts and the formation of the good relations between the representatives of the two ethnic communities have been mentioned. In the language-acquisition projects implemented by private initiative, the integration has found a certain result in the population.

The image of integration presented through the events and projects in the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking press reveals that the integration processes do not proceed with an equal tempo and extent in different spheres. Although the national integration strategy for the years 2000-2008 insists on the primacy of the lingual-communicative integration, in reality this means unproportional attention to the social-economical and legal-political aspects of integration.

The treatment of the Institutions, Organisations and Offices Related to Integration

Analysing the press-activities of the organisations and offices related to the integration, it becomes clear which institutional subjects have been involved in the integration process according to the press, and whether the treatment of the roles of different institutions responds to their real functions and course of action.

In theoretical discussions it has been insisted upon that integration cannot be a chain of centrally directed activities.¹ Still, the Estonian as well as the Russian-speaking press have implied the opposite, paying the most attention to state institutions and to the activities of government offices. Among the state institutions, The Riigikogu (i.e. the Parliament) and the Government were mentioned the most in the Estonian as well as in the Russian-speaking press, which implies that the course of integration process has been reduced mostly to political decisions and to the activities of the executive power in the press. Among other state institutions, the activities of the Ministry of Education and that of the Language Inspection under its administration, that of the Citizenship and Migration Office, of the Round Table of Ethnic Minorities acting at the President Chancellor, and that of the Bureau of the Minister of Population were discussed the most in the Estonian and Russian-speaking press.

Among the political parties of Estonia the more "extreme" or opposing parties, i.e. the Pro Patria (Isamaaliit), a party having a more national-conservative image, and the Central Party (Keskerakond), depicted as more Russian-friendly, were paid special attention. The polarization of evaluations may also be noticed in the attitude towards the Russian Party in Estonia (Vene Erakond Eestis), which was treated rather in a negative connotation by both the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking press, as well as towards the United People's Party (Ühendatud Eesti Rahvapartei) and the electoral union People's Trust (Rahva Usaldus) created on the basis of the latter, which two, in turn, received more positive evaluations.

Among the foreign institutions and international organisations, the OSCE may clearly be distinguished as to how frequently it was mentioned in the press. There were very critical or negative evaluations on the OSCE in the Estonian press, while the Russian-speaking press treated this organisation continuously positively.

The non-profit sector, which should be the main "actor" in the field of integration, appears often only as a financial source that has supported various integration projects. Besides the funds and foundations (Integration Foundation, EU PHARE Fund, Open Estonia Fund), the activities of other non-profit associations remained mostly uncovered by the press. Among the cultural associations of ethnic minorities, for example, only the action of the association "Lyra" in drafting the national Integration Program was reflected in the Russian press, and that even in a critical manner.

Compared to the Estonian press, the Russian press still paid more attention to the third sector associations, treating them often more positively. This is comprehensible, since for the Russian-speaking audience the funds, for example, play a very essential role in everyday life, financing, among other projects, the opportunity to learn the Estonian language. The Estonian

¹ *"Third Sector Fosters the Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society"*
<http://www.ngonet.ee/integration>

press, on the other hand, discussed more the role of educational establishments and media channels in the integration (**Table 6**). These institutions attracted the attention of the Estonian press. Some events that were repeatedly covered are: the inspection raids to Russian-speaking schools in Estonia with an aim to examine the rate of the knowledge of the national language among teachers and headmasters, the protests against NATO by the Russian youngsters, which induced discussions about the influence of the different media systems on integration; and the difficulties that emerged in relation to the financing of the Russian-speaking media channels of the public law in Estonia.

Table 6. Some institutions according to how frequently they were mentioned in the Estonian and the Russian-speaking press²

Institution	Estonian dailies (N)	Estonian dailies (%)	Russian dailies (N)	Russian dailies (%)
State institutions of Estonia	126	39%	106	46%
Foreign institutions	49	15%	41	18%
Political parties	62	20%	33	14%
Funds	14	4%	18	8%
Third sector	5	2%	10	4%
Educational establishments	27	9%	9	4%
Local governments	6	2%	7	3%
Media	25	8%	8	3%
Other	3	1%	1	0%
Total	317	100%	233	100%

According to the general categories of institutions, the activities of the state institutions of Estonia and of the Government offices, but also the role of political parties, were evaluated more critically in both the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking press. **The state has been seen responsible for the effectiveness or, in fact, for the lack of effectiveness both in the Estonian as well in the Russian-speaking press.** Positive evaluations, in general, were common to the categories, which included foreign institutions and international organisations, local funds and third sector associations, educational establishments and local governments. At the same time, the attitudes towards the role of media channels in the integration process turned out to be contrary to each other in the Estonian and Russian-speaking press. The critical evaluations by the Estonian press were directed towards the Russian printed press in Estonia and towards Russia's media channels, while the Russian press in Estonia considers itself to be representing and to be standing for the interests of non-Estonians.

Although the Estonian- and Russian-speaking press' evaluation of certain offices and organisations do not differ too much, there are still institutions which, according to one media system, support the integration process, but according to the other, rather hinder it.

Summary

Three basic conclusions can be drawn:

² The table does not include the financiers and implementers of projects fixed under the block of integration projects.

Both in the Estonian- and the Russian-speaking press there is an institutional-central approach towards integration, insisting on the importance of political institutions. This is implied by the opinion and information sources used in the texts as well as by how frequently certain institutions are referred to in the press.

- Both in the Estonian and in the Russian-speaking press, the information delivered concerns primarily the lingual-communicative sphere of integration, while the social-economical processes of integration remain almost uncovered.
- Among the events that have been covered by the press, the events that refer to disagreements and conflicts are predominant. Positive messages in connection with the events of integration are more rare.

It is essential that the debate on the subject of integration in the press should not proceed within separate, linguistically limited and closed media systems. Integration must also occur at the level of mass media, increasing the communication between the media systems of both languages, as well as the discussion between authors and different viewpoints, at the same time lessening the differences in content, which as yet appear when discussing the different aspects and events of integration.

THE REFLECTION OF THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION IN THE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE PRESS AND USING THE PRESS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INTEGRATION

Jelena Iljina, Valeria Jakobson

From 1986 to 1993 in Estonia, tendencies of segregation and confrontation were predominant in interethnic relations. In the sphere of communication this had such consequences as:

- the division of informational space on the basis of language and the further division of different 'language' spaces.
- the decrease of the circle of media sources and users
- the lack of feedback from media users (here 'feedback' means publicly expressed responses to published materials and to socially important events).
- the decline of old semantic space and the emerging of the necessity in forming a new one.

All this caused an informational deficit. One particular aspect of this problem is the fact that the different ethnic groups did not get to know much about each other. However, these ethnic groups realised the need for such information and wanted to get it. One could put forward a hypothesis that this situation promoted the rise of a mutual interest between representatives of different ethnic communities. This interest, together with other factors, in turn promoted a widening and strengthening of the process of the integration in the society. The lack of common semantic space and ignoring of Russian-language media as a tool of regulating social processes by newly forming Estonian institutions conditioned the spontaneous and unregulated nature of the integration process. A number of studies carried out between 1996 and 2000 (Kruusvall, J., 1997¹, etc.) reported that the two language communities are becoming more tolerant. The results of the monitoring say that the Estonian-language press also reflects these processes.

At the same time, various studies report that representatives of the two different communities continue to understand the starting points of the integration differently. For Estonians it means that non-Estonians should learn the Estonian language. For non-Estonians, however, who mostly recognise the necessity of learning the Estonian language, it means the equality of citizen's rights and the acceptance by Estonians, as well as the inclusion into Estonian society. Here the role of press could be especially important. Nevertheless, according to the monitoring in general, the Russian-language press reflects mostly negative estimations of national relations in Estonia, especially on the axis 'the Estonian state vs. the Russian-speaking population'. The contradiction is in the fact that despite the growth of tolerance in society, the Russian-language press mostly reflects negative tendencies in interethnic relations, especially between the Russian population and the Estonian state and Estonian politicians.


As the formal quantitative LCA-analysis, used for working on the data of monitoring, did not make it possible to analyse this contradiction, we made an additional content-analysis within the framework of monitoring and put forward the following local tasks: 1) to reveal

and analyse different visions of models of integrated society, proposed in the press by different groups of its users (this term here includes sources of information and audience); 2) to define the measure of the activity of the users; 3) to estimate the effectiveness of the influence of the Russian press on its audience.

In order to solve the problem of the selection of the texts, we relied on the data of the monitoring. It turned out that the tendencies in national relations get the fullest and widest reflection in the media just before the national and local parliament elections: from January till March 1999 (National parliament elections) and from September till October 1999 (local parliaments elections). So we made a pilot content-analysis of all the articles from the newspapers “Estonia” and “Molodjozh Estonii” for the period from 11.10.1999 till 18.10.1999 (a total of 458 texts, excluding ads and weather forecast). For the analysis we also used the data of the general monitoring and as well as statistics covering the results of the elections.

Generally, the visions of integrated society presented in the Russian-language press could be divided into four main models (see Draw 1). These are two overt models, conditionally called “pink scenario” and “black scenario” and two latent models, conditionally called “grey scenario” and “spontaneous scenario”. In turn, these models could be divided into “planned” and “unplanned” groups. The overt models are selected on the basis of promises and declarations of intentions in media texts, while the latent models are based on the analysis of the ways of achieving the overt models, on the availability of these ways and on the expected results of using these ways in practice.

Draw 1. Share of models in the Russian press texts (N=458)



1. The planned overt model («pink scenario»)

This model is featured in 56% of the texts and these texts have one common feature: integrated society should provide high life standards to its members.

Variant 1.1. contains further specific aspects, regarding the political, the legal and the cultural spheres: legal equality of Russians and Estonians (citizenship for all permanent residents without any pre-conditions), the Russian language should get the status of the second state language, Russian culture should be preserved and supported by the state, the Russian political parties should be proportionally represented in governmental and municipal bodies. There should be carried out co-operation with Russia in both the economic and the social spheres. These descriptions are often quite vague. To achieve this, the state needs Russian voters who support Russian politicians. For example: “*Russophones do not trust Estonian deputies to solve their problems. They seek support from the Russian Party and have the right to be represented in legislative bodies of the town and country...*” (I.Raudsepp, *N.Maspanov is Russian candidate*, Molodjozh Estonii, 13.10.1999). This variant is proposed by Russian politicians and by journalists who support them.

Variant 1.2. contains further aspects, regarding the political, the legal and the cultural spheres: the Estonian Republic is a member of the EU and NATO, the total population of

Estonia speaks Estonian and follows the Estonian media. To achieve this, The whole of the population should support the Estonian political parties (only the Party of Centre openly declared in the Russian press that parties should be ethnically mixed, and that one should not vote for the party's nationality, but for its programme). This variant is declared by those few Estonian politicians, who speak in the Russian press as well as by the Estonian officials. The only way to achieve these aims is patient waiting and the obedience of the population.

Variante 1.3. supposes equal possibilities for economic rivalry as well as an improvement of the economic relations with the EU and Russia. This variant may be achieved through law amendments and negotiations with the EU. This variant is supported by businessmen.

2. The unplanned overt model («black scenario»)

This model is featured in 14,2 % of the texts. The plot of this model is frightening its audience by the negative consequences which are inevitable if their political rivals come to power. The main enemies are “the bad Russian parties and politicians” and “the Estonian parties and politicians”. The description of this model is quite vague and contains a lot of unconfirmed information. One often comes across such expressions as “rumours are circulating”, “people say”, as well as expressions such as the mystical “they” or “Estonian politicians”, who have negative intentions towards Russians. Neither the sources nor the plot of these intentions is clarified. This attitude was earlier typical of Estonian politicians and journalists. According to the data of the media monitoring, this way of constructing the enemy was less frequent in 1999. This variant is proposed only by Russian politicians and those journalists who support them. Until the end of the 1990'ies, this attitude was also typical of Estonian politicians and journalists, however, according to monitoring data, it was less expressed in Estonian press in 1999.

3. The planned latent model («grey scenario»)

This model is featured in 38% of the texts.

Variante 3.1. Let us analyse the ideal integrated person as described in the Russian press. The Russian press supposes that following this example should help the others to become integrated too. The integrated non-Estonian is highly educated, speaks foreign languages (i. e. Estonian), is well-off, industrious, honest, aggressive (whether latently or overtly), and is intolerant. Nevertheless, analysing the availability of these qualities, we have come to the following conclusions. In the sphere of education, the Russians are offered higher education in newly established private high schools, where the language of teaching is Russian. Here we should consider that the majority of these schools have no license from the Ministry of Education, and the teaching of the Estonian language is quite poor, i.e. this education allows non-Estonians to find a job only in a private (and evidently Russian) business. In order to learn the Estonian language, they are supposed to attend language courses or to rely on self-teaching. According to research data, neither of these methods provides sufficient possibility to learn a foreign language (see Kruusvall, J., 2000²). The advice to be industrious makes sense if one has a job, however, one can only be well-off if one's income is stable and covers the basic needs. As far as honesty is concerned, one should note that, for example, Russian politicians “privatise” all the achievements of the Tallinn town government, as well as all municipal institutions, including the providing of transportation, as well as the preservation and renewing of Russian-language schools (although these are not renewed on the basis of the language of instruction). For example: “*Not a single school was closed and none will be closed until we influence the town government*” (M. Petrov, *Our for ours*, Molodjzh Estonii,

12.10.1999). Nevertheless, from 1998 till 1999, besides small Estonian schools, an elementary school as well as a Russian-language evening school were closed in Tallinn. The politicians talk about integration, tolerance, and co-operation with Estonians, but at the same time, present them as sources of evil, assimilators, etc. Those who do practice the co-operation with Estonians are labelled “*the traitors of Russian people*”, “*so-called Russian-speaking actors*” etc. So, the proposed model of an “integrated” Russian is actually an intolerant person, not open to other cultures. Such a model supposes that the presently low standard of living of the Russian speakers is preserved, or even gets worse, as the degree of the isolation of the non-Estonians grows. This variant actually is featured in texts of Russian politicians and by the journalists who support them.

Variant 3.2. means the support of a big and ethnically mixed political party. This is a way to partition the “Russian” parties and to absorb part of their members and potential voters. This is a model propagated in the Russian press by the Party of Centre, who attracted this way a significant part of the Russian politicians and voters. The main way to achieve variants 3.1 and 3.2 is to vote for the particular party or politician.

Variant 3.3. actually means patient waiting and the preservation of the present situation. It is described with expressions such as “*the solving of these problems takes time*”, “*many circumstances should be considered*”, “*one should be patient*”, “*the power could not make happy everyone at once*” etc. This strategy aims to inhibit the social processes. It involves a passive expectation of a mystical force which will solve the problems, as well as a refusal to take the responsibility for one's own failures. This variant is proposed by administrators and businessmen.

One may suppose that the underlying motive of this model is to preserve or improve own status of the sources of opinions, to transfer the responsibility to the others, to attract or keep the Russian-speaking voters, and to use the Russians as a cheap labour force.

4. The unplanned latent model («spontaneous scenario»)

This model seems to be the most interesting of all and is featured in 11,8% of all the texts. As the representatives of the population do not declare any ideals about society in general, their model remains latent. Nevertheless, we could reveal some of the elements of this model. These are: civic equality, stable legal status (permanent residence permit or joining citizenship through one's children), and financial stability. Searching for ways of reaching this model, people seldom apply to the media and prefer alternative sources of information (rumours, information obtained on an interpersonal level – Jakobson 1996³, Pettai 2000⁴). Applying to the press, in 1999 people mostly asked the questions *where* to go or *where* to get additional information for solving the problem, but not *how* to solve the problem. People rely only on themselves, almost never ask for help, and they do not complain (there are complains only in 11% of the readers' letters, and these too all concern legal and social cases).

The model of journalists often remains latent too: they do not express a personal point of view, and avoid estimations and analysis.

In both cases we can see a distrust as to the effectiveness of the press. In many articles we come across expressions such as “*no sense*”, “*nothing will change*”, “*nothing could be done*” etc. Readers avoid counting on the press. The difference is that while the journalists passively expect what will happen in the future, the readers actively look for ways to solve their problems on a personal level. It is but a hypothesis, but maybe this


kind of behaviour on the journalists' side is connected to a fear for their status. (To control this thoroughly, it is necessary to interview journalists and analyse the dynamics of changes in the job vacancies in the Russian-speaking press in Estonia.) The activity of the readers may be connected to their, mostly low, standard of living, as well as to their need to take action in order to change the situation.

The **sources** of the models described above may be divided into further main groups (see Draw 2). These are: news agencies (49,8%), journalists (13,2%), officials (11%, one third of them are representatives of police; mostly officials are quoted in the news), and Russian politicians (10,5%). The latter mostly speak in the press at their own initiative, and directly call to the audience (45% of them calls to the audience), and their articles are largest in volume.

The other sources are weakly represented. These are: "population" (5%) and specialists & experts (4,6%). The views of the latter are so different that they may not be seen as a single group proposing certain models. The fact that specialists and experts are underrepresented in the press means that the newspapers avoid representing a wide spectrum of alternative opinions. Businessmen (3,9% of the sources) are better represented in the newspaper "Estonia" and act as a group with clearly unified positions. Looking at Estonian politicians we have to admit that only the Party of Centre uses the Russian-language press for a dialogue with the Russian population (1,2% of the sources). Representatives of other parties remain cautious – there are very few materials about them. This strategy may be caused by a fear of losing the Estonian electorate and the inertia of the first part of the 1990'ies, when certain Estonian politicians open to a dialogue with the Russians were immediately labelled "the traitors of the nation".

Thus, according to a combination of the frequency, the volume and the nature of the materials, we may conclude that the Russian-language press is basically used by Russian politicians as their own tool.

Draw 2. The division of the sources of information in the Russian-language press




The content-analysis of how the sources appealed to the audience in the press (direct appeals such as *You, We, readers*, as well as descriptions of the audience were taken into consideration) gives ground to the conclusion that journalists and politicians have a **vague idea about the audience** of the press. Only 14% of the texts contain some image of the audience (see Draw 3). There are dominating definitions, connected to various forms of deprivation (43,7% of all the appeals), including moral and intellectual deprivation (*passive, frightened, distressed, uninformed, unconscious, offended,*

disassociated – 33,6%), economic deprivation (*poor, deprived* – 7%), and legal deprivation (*non-citizens, discriminated* – 3,1%). There are articles addressed to non-citizens, about obtaining an alien's passport and residence permit. These articles describe legislation in this sphere and the mechanism of obtaining a passport, they analyse problems, they present generalisations and personal examples, as well as dialogues between the journalists, the audience and the administrators. In 25,8 % of the cases, the audience is described as 'voters', in 15,6 % of the cases as 'Russians' or 'Russophones'. 5,6 % of the appeals are addressed to youngsters, who are mostly characterised by some form of deviance (drug-addicts, criminals, drunkards, poor). Also, journalists try to attract youngsters by using slang expressions, but these expressions originate in their own youth and have nothing in common with modern slang. 2,3 % of the appeals are addressed to women. There are articles addressed to women on «eternal» feminine topics, as well as on their newly forming role in politics. It is said that women will enter politics, bringing peace only due to the fact that they are women, and as such, feminine. 4,7 % of the appeals are addressed to an undefined audience (*you, readers*). Only 2,3 % of the appeals are addressed to the “active” audience (house dwellers).

Thus, the audience is mostly described as 'poor Russian voters, having no citizenship', and this group is only differentiated on the basis of age and sex, while it remains undefined on the basis of social status, occupation, education and interests.

Draw 3. Description of the audience of the Russian-language press



It should also be noted that the **practical effectiveness** of the politicians', the journalists' and administrators' usage of the press is quite low. This is evidently clear from the following data:

- In spite of aggressive campaigns, more than 50 % of non-Estonians did not attend municipal elections and over 1/3 of the participants voted for “Estonian” parties.
- The explanations of the existing problems offered in the press by officials and administrators do not convince the audience. The data of the 2000 Kruusvall poll shows that for non-Estonians, the “bad Estonian” is basically an Estonian official.
- Biased and poor quality information, lack of analysis and constructive proposals promote a further rejection of the press by the audience, as well as a preference of alternative sources of information (mostly based on interpersonal communication)

The analysis has shown that in the Russian-speaking press we were dealing mostly with a model of the society that was proposed by Russian politicians. This model is strongly based upon elements of national segregation. The visions of other subjects were less

represented, and the models of the population remained latent. This does not mean that these politicians are capable of provoking the growth of national tensions in society, since the press has little influence. Neither does it mean that the tension could not grow any further. Some elements of the latent model pointed out that there is still a potential for the growth of the social tensions in society. The importance of the problems concerning the legal status of non-citizens means that national tensions, which have radically decreased by now, may re-appear.

The question is why is the range of visions and opinions in the Russian press so narrow. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Estonian state institutions and politicians have practically refused to use the Russian-language press (using it only for a dialogue with the population, for providing information, for explaining their position, etc.), and declared that those Russians, who remain in Estonia, should follow the Estonian media. The privatised press started searching for new sources of finances and information. Both of these were financed by so-called "Russian" businesses and politicians. As a matter of fact, after this, the Russian-speaking press started providing biased information. This caused a decrease in the number of readers. However, these readers did not start following the Estonian media, but turned to alternative sources of information. As a result, the state and society have lost the Russian press as a tool for the regulation of the social processes in Estonia.

According to the monitoring, an integration process took place in society, that was reflected by the Russian-language press in the following ways:

- Although among authors of the texts, representatives of the given language community prevail, among interviewees we could observe the opposite tendency.
- Although these are mostly representatives of "Russian" parties, who took the floor during the pre-election period, there were also some texts the sources of which are "Estonian" politicians.
- The majority of sources agree that all the population of Estonia should speak the Estonian language.
- Representatives of different political parties, officials, scientists, etc. say that the different communities should preserve their cultural uniqueness, while at the same time should acquire a feeling of unity and a semantic space common to all of them.
- During non-election periods, there was an interest for the representatives of the other ethnic community, especially by youngsters and their parents.
- The attitudes towards state institutions of the Estonian Republic, reflected by Russian-language press, are mostly loyal.

Nevertheless, in general the potential of Russian-language press as of a tool in the integration process remained unused.

Notes

¹ Kruusvall, J. (1997) Rahvusprobleemid rahva pilgu läbi 1994 . In: Järve, P. *Vene noored Eestis: sotsioloogiline mosaiik*, Tallinn: Avita, p.117-130.

² Kruusvall J, Terpimost nachinaetsa s ponimanija. In: *Gosudarstvo I obshestvo*, ed. Pavelson M, 2000, TTÜ Kirjastus

³ Jakobson V., *Role and functions of Russophone press in Estonian Republic in 1991/1996*, M.A. thesis, Tartu 1996.

⁴ Pettai I., *Infoizolatsija ne-estontsev*, Molodjozh Estonii 18.09.1999

THE ROLE OF RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE PROGRAMS OF ESTONIAN TELEVISION CHANNELS IN REFLECTING AND SHAPING THE INTEGRATION PROCESS COMPARED TO PRINTED MEDIA

Denis Trapido

The task of the current chapter is to compare the roles that electronic and printed media perform in the process of integration of the Estonian society and to examine their ability to cope with different challenges of integration. The analysis is based upon two sources: the data of the integrational monitoring of printed media and that of the pilot study of Russian-language programs at Estonian television channels.

The Landscape of Russian-Language Programs at Estonian Television Channels

The Russian-language TV programmes which are available to audiences all around Estonia are produced by the only public channel of the country (ETV) and by a privately owned channel "Kanal 2". The total time of the air allotted to Russian-language programs did not exceed the average of one hour a day at the end of 1999. None of the programmes appeared more often than once a week (with the exception of news). The data of the pilot study consists of all programmes in the Russian-language shown on ETV during the period between the 1st of November and the 16th of December 1999 and the documentary series "Russians in Estonia" (Kanal 2) shown during the same period.

Programmes "K svedeniyu" ("For You to Know") and "Subyektiv" focus mainly on socio-political issues. The main problems touched upon in these programmes are topical both for the Estonian and the non-Estonian community, e.g. social security and unemployment.

Mostly cultural subjects are developed in the series "Atelye" ("The Atelier"), "Mozaika" ("The Mosaic"), and "Istoriya i kul'tura estonskogo naroda" ("The History and Culture of the Estonian People"). These series do in many aspects promote the objective defined in the State integration programme as "learning different cultures". The Estonian program "Trepp" ("Staircase"), which is translated into Russian, introduces features and techniques of construction and design characteristic of Estonian homes. This series has not originally been addressed to the Russian audience, but its translated version assumes additional cultural connotations.

The third group that can be distinguished among Russian-language programmes concentrates specifically on the non-Estonian minority and its changing identity. It comprises programs like "Russkiye v Estonii" ("Russians in Estonia"), "Sud'by" ("Destinies"), and "Moi korni" ("My Roots"). Series "You" and "Pokoleniye 2000" ("Generation 2000") are oriented mainly towards non-Estonian youth and reflect the *Weltanschauung* of this specific generation.

The programme "Subboteya" of Kanal 2 has not been directly studied in the pilot stage of the project. However, it deserves being mentioned separately due to its extraordinary popularity both among the Estonian and the non-Estonian audiences. "Subboteya" combines elements of documentary journalism and entertainment.

We can conclude that the landscape of the Russian-language programmes on Estonian television channels is quite multifarious and reaches from information to entertainment. Unfortunately some promising projects have been suspended (e.g. "Generation 2000"), or their future is unclear (series "You") because of financing difficulties.

The Potential of Television as an Agent of Identity Construction

The main objective of the conducted pilot study was to test and modify research methods, so that they would enable us to study the specific role and meaning of the Russian-language television programs in the process of integration. This issue becomes especially relevant considering the fact that the majority of the printed media of Estonia appears to be comparatively less effective as a promoter of the integration process. The results of the study suggest that the local Russian television has a huge but until now poorly used potential of becoming an arena for dialogue between Estonians, non-Estonians and the Estonian state. However, the alarming fact is that the majority of non-Estonians are generally not interested in local Russian television programmes. This raises an important question of how to make the programmes attractive for the local Russian-speaking audience.

Considering the fact that approximately 75 per cent of local non-Estonians watch exclusively the television channels of the Russian Federation, the following number deserves attention. Namely, about 73 per cent of the non-Estonians believe that the Russian-language programs of Estonian television channels do contribute to integration of the society to a lesser or greater extent (Saar Poll, monitoring, March 2000). These results, as well as some expert opinions, suggest that television has all the preconditions for developing into a communication medium, which would facilitate the emergence of a common information space and consolidate the society without destroying its cultural heterogeneity.

Television as a Constructing Agent of a New Identity of Non-Estonians

The impact of local Russian television upon the identity of non-Estonians apparently remains modest because its audience is limited, rather than because of the absence of identity-constructing elements. A number of typical identity constructs has been detected during the current pilot study.

One of the "many good people" has become a typical hero of the Russian-language television journalism. This happened long before posters of the integration advertising campaign called "There are many good people" appeared in the streets of Estonian cities. A "good man" or a "good woman" of Russian-language television programmes is either an Estonian somehow connected with the Russian language and culture or an integrated local Russian. The word "integrated" characterises a person who has found harmony between him/herself and the Estonian society through his/her work, family, friends, or in any other way. This person is presented to the audience as an attractive example. He or she masters the Estonian language and considers Estonia his or her homeland. Consequently, he or she has become a sympathetic and successful "good" man or woman. The series "Russians in Estonia" proved to be the most evident carrier of this message, followed by the youth program "You".

A very typical claim of the Russian-Language television is to represent Estonians and non-Estonians as partners. When two officials from the Department of citizenship and migration, an Estonian and a non-Estonian, are invited into the studio, a common job is what unites them. It may be common political views as well, when two partners of the power coalition in the city of Tallinn

explain their positions to the audience. Very often these are bonds of friendship or mixed marriages, and the fact that the partners are of different nationalities is emphasised.

One of the programs from the project "Generation 2000" was dedicated to the problems of history. It demonstrated that local non-Estonians, youth included, still perceive Estonia as a part of the historical and political area of the former USSR. The audience in the studio often failed to distinguish between the historical problems of Estonia and those of the Soviet Union (Russia). This was expressed, for example in the suggestion to erect a monument in Estonia for Russian soldiers fallen in Chechnya. This the background on which several Russian-language programmes **systematically introduce to their audience a new relation to history**. In general, rethinking political developments of the recent past is very characteristic of local Russian television. The motif of absurdity and ridiculing of the Soviet everyday life wanders from one "Subboteya" to another. The series "Oli Kord ENSV" ("Once Upon a Time There Was an ESSR*"), which is shown in Russian, reinforces the idea that the Soviet epoch has remained in the past forever.

A new usage of language also supports new political and historical constructions. For instance, the concept of "Estonia" is almost exclusively expressed by the words "our country" in the program "Generation 2000". Even in the middle of the 90s such a relation between these two terms would hardly be possible in the Russian language. Creation of a new we-feeling at the level of communities (not individuals) is a very typical conscious or unconscious claim of several television programmes and it functions chiefly by means of the language.

The Russian-language programmes of Estonian television channels try to distance their audiences from the political identity connected with Russia. At the same time they attempt to preserve the cultural connection with the country of their origin. The series "My Roots", which is dedicated especially to the reproduction of the Russian identity, is the best example here.

* Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

TOLERANCE AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE ESTONIAN PRESS

Piia Tammpuu

Introduction

In the document passed by the Government of Estonia on the 2nd of March, 1999 “The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: the Government's Action Plan”, among the integrational objectives related to the field of public opinion, media and public relations, the formation of mutual tolerance and attitudes open to intercultural communication in society have been mentioned as one task. Therefore, the subject of tolerance was analysed in the Estonian press within the framework of the media monitoring of integration processes. The aim of the study was to analyse what attitudes have been expressed in the Estonian press towards non-Estonians, to examine ethnic issues on the whole, to find out how the relations between the Estonian and Russian-speaking population have been reflected, in which aspects of integration and inter-ethnic relations one can observe a shift towards tolerance and recognition and conversely, in which aspects the attitudes have remained more repelling.


Analysing tolerance within the context of the media, two levels must be differentiated: on the one hand, what the texts are written about, i.e. the treatment of the problem of tolerance and intolerance itself, but on the other hand, how something is written, i.e. which words, references, evaluations or connotations have been used in the texts. Thus, in the media as well as in society in general, intolerance may not necessarily be openly expressed, but it can still exist in a more latent form.

This paper focuses on the general picture of the interethnic relations formed in the Estonian press through the prism of tolerance, based on the data of the block of statements of the current media research and illustrating them by appropriate text examples.

Estonians, Non-Estonians and the State of Estonia

The interethnic relations currently existent in Estonian society can be analysed by a three-level model featuring the relations between Estonians and non-Estonians and the relation of both ethnic communities with the state of Estonia.

Figure 1. The current model of the inter-ethnic relations



This model describes the situation where there are two separate societies within one political entity. The model of tolerance constructed for the Estonian society¹ provides means to

¹ See the brochure "*Mutual Tolerance of Estonians and Non-Estonians*" by I.Pettai

decrease the distance between the two ethnic communities and in the future perspective the society would no longer be split on the grounds of ethnic origin. The development of tolerance in Estonian society, therefore, refers foremost to diminishing the distance and to enhancing openness between Estonians and non-Estonians.

In addition to data gathered in sociological researches among population, the dimension of distance and proximity between the ethnic groups can be estimated according to materials from the press.

From the materials published in the Estonian printed press in 1999, one could find numerous pieces of evidence which reveal that the opposition between Estonians and non-Estonians has diminished to a certain extent. With the acceptance of the two-sided nature of integration, the attitude towards the role of the state of Estonia and that of Estonians in fostering the integration process has turned more critical. The action of the parliament and government offices in giving a legal framework to the integration process and in executing integration policy, are a source of discontent in the current situation of interethnic relations. The expectations and critique of the integration process have been often directed to the address of the state in the media texts. In some respects, this tendency is misleading, since in reality the integration process does not proceed by the top-down direction of the state, but occurs rather at the level of relations between people and according to individual willingness.

Although one could find several positive examples about the development of good relations and co-operation between the two ethnic groups, these developments were confined to certain integration projects (e.g. teaching the Estonian language to the Russian-speaking children and youngsters in the Estonian-speaking families; language camps based on private initiative, the exchange of the Russian-speaking pupils to the Estonian-speaking schools etc.) and did not refute the fact that the distance between Estonians and non-Estonians persists. An issue that the press has been insisting upon and which is supported by popular opinion² is that Estonians and non-Estonians do live in different cultural or informational spaces, and the communication between the two is either lacking or is insufficient.

Of the barriers separating Estonians and non-Estonians, two were mostly insisted upon in the Estonian press. These are, on the one hand, political disagreements and the question of (dis)loyalty, and on the other hand, the incompetence of non-Estonians in the mastering of the national language. Against the background of the events of the previous year, especially the first factor came forth in the Estonian press.

Political Disagreements and the Question of Loyalty

The local reverberations of the military conflicts in the Balkan region brought forth two politically opposing parties in the media, and these parties were distinguished on the basis of their ethnic background. These parties are, on the one hand, the local Russian-speaking youngsters who, protesting publicly against the involvement of the NATO in the Kosovo conflict, joined the formal statement of Russia in this question, and on the other hand, the Estonians, who supported predominantly the positions of the state of Estonia and of the Western world. Referring to the political disagreements, it can be stated that the distance between the two communities grew, arousing scepticism and negative attitudes towards the realisation of the integration scenario. This can be clearly seen in the following newspaper quotations: *"Such are then those 'solidary' people, who are to be integrated at any price"* (PM 16.04.99)³; *"Is it still possible to integrate the Russians into Estonian society? Is it possible to raise a new generation, a generation without*

² See the brochure *"Integration in People's Mind"* by J.Kruusvall

³ The abbreviations in brackets refer to following dailies: "PM" for "Postimees", "EPL" for "Eesti Päevaleht" and "SL" for "Sõnumileht";

national hatred, if one nation, it seems, has heard nothing about the paradigm of humanism?" (PM 03.04.99). The language used to describe non-Estonians in relation to these events showed a condemnation towards the conduct of the non-Estonian youngsters, and they were depicted as representatives of a strange culture or civilisation. This can be seen in the following quotations:

"«A leopard can never change its spots», one may still evaluate the conduct of the local Russians, who have shared all the achievements of a rapidly westernising society of the newly independent Estonia. But now they are not keeping to the USA or the most influential Western states, the most important foreign-policy partners of Estonia, but to Serbia, the little brother of Russia." (EPL 03.04.99)

Another example is the expression *"this chaotic, noisy and half-drunken behaviour"*. On the other hand, in relation to these protests and to the possible enabling of military service for non-citizens as well, the loyalty of non-Estonians towards the state of Estonia on the whole was handled with suspicion by the press. But according to the sociological monitoring carried out at the same time, the formation of loyalty is considered by Estonians to be one of the most important processes among the many sub-processes of integration.⁴ Writing about *"such hostile"* and *"disloyal Russian-speaking «co-citizens»"*, the press created, in fact, a favourable ground for the spreading of Russophobia and distrust in society.

"Many people calling to the night-time talk-show of radio "Kuku" have been actually afraid (...) One of them was convinced that the so-called fifth column or the local Russians are hatching a plot under the baton of Moscow to re-occupy Estonia (...) The fear of this person was crowned by the attitude of the local Russians towards the war in Kosovo, that was for the most part contrary to the one of Estonians." (PM14.04.99).

It cannot be said that the statements concerning the loyalty of non-Estonians would have remained only one-sided, but sceptical tones continued to be predominant in the press, undermining in this way even the frail faith of loyalty of Estonians towards non-Estonians.

Integration and the question of language

Besides the political questions, the role of the linguistic differences as a factor separating the two ethnic groups is still an issue in the Estonian press. Nevertheless, one can notice significant shifts in the attitude towards the question of the knowledge of the national language. The lack or insufficiency of the knowledge of the national language has been associated not as much with the unwillingness of non-Estonians to learn the Estonian language, as with the inability of the state to guarantee enough opportunities for the acquisition of the language, as well as with the quality of the teaching.

"In praise of the people speaking another language it must be said that the absolute majority wants to overcome the language barrier and considers this to be essential in case of their children as well. The matter is that of the arrangement of an organised language acquisition project." (PM 02.03.99);

"Practical integration must not proceed over the stocks and stones. The mastering of the national language must not look like the penetration of a grey stone for those eager to learn." (PM 10.07.99). The efforts made by non-Estonians to learn the Estonian language have been

⁴ See in current brochure *"Integration in People's Mind"* by J.Kruusvall

quite appreciated and, at the same time, the willingness of Estonians to help them in this process has been demonstrated. Among the more frequent examples of the positive attitude of the Estonians and the non-Estonians in the Estonian press were the hosting of the Russian youngsters in the Estonian families and the visits of the Russian youngsters to the Estonian-speaking schools with the aim of language teaching and that of introducing the culture, as well as the language camps organised by private initiative. At the same time, despite the problems related to the language acquisition of adults, non-Estonians continues to be labelled "non-speakers".

Although in the opinion of Estonians, the requirement to master the Estonian language has maintained its primacy among the various sub-processes of integration⁵. Judging by at least the press statements, people have started to understand that approaching the question of language with the threat of sanctions does not bring about any results, and that the integration must proceed in a balanced way in the legal-political and socio-economic spheres as well.

"In discussions about the ethnic problems people usually focus only on language. Of course, it is an important factor. But the other relations also have their importance. These make up the everyday lives of people and, consequently, shape the face of society and its development." (PM 14.12.99)

Thus, in the articles concerning the language acquisition process, journalists have started to increasingly emphasise the importance of contacts between Estonians and non-Estonians. Besides the problem of language acquisition, people are increasingly realising the need to create an "Estonian consciousness" among non-Estonians, especially in relation to the political disagreements and the question of (dis)loyalty discussed earlier.

Occupant versus ethnic minority

Although in the Estonian press there has been a shift towards rational and critical debate as compared to earlier periods, and although readers can perceive a growing willingness for integration from the Estonians' side, there has remained a viewpoint that was characteristic of the Estonian press in the first half of the 1990s. This viewpoint draws together the arguments related to the negative historical experience and is strongly exclusive in its orientation. According to the central argument of this viewpoint, non-Estonians of a Russian origin should not be treated as a (historical) ethnic minority, but as a legacy of the soviet occupation, to whom the rights of minorities cannot be applied. These statements have been withdrawn from formal enunciations and appear mainly in readers' letters, that may often be characterised by a repelling and sceptical attitude towards non-Estonians and their endeavours to adapt to Estonian society. Some examples: *"A war in protection to the rather uncertain independence of Estonia is not a guinea pig to see, if the training of the loyalty of the hostile element and its integrating into the environment of Estonia has succeeded or not."* (PM 19.04.99);

"Why has commissar van der Stoel not made it clear to the Russian expatriates living in Estonia and Latvia that wishing to live on in these countries, they have to be loyal to the state, have to know the national language correctly, and have to follow all the laws of this state, and only after that can they start to apply the rights to themselves, as is the case in the rest of the world?" (EPL 12.01.99)

The suppression of non-Estonians into the role of occupants and their association with the injustice brought about by the soviet occupation has, according to sociologists, created the so-

⁵ Ibid

called occupant-complex among non-Estonians. This term refers to the lack of recognition and to the uncertainty conditioned by this kind of attitude.

"The occupant-complex, that many Estonian-Russians are suffering from, sets up voluntary barriers to Russians for many undertakings in the state of Estonia. Being an occupant or being responsible for the crimes of the Soviet Union has been forced on the Russians living in Estonia since the new fight for freedom, and even when the independent statehood of Estonia was restored." (PM 07.04.99).

By now, people have more or less quit using the names "occupant", "colonist" and some others that refer to the negative legacy of history or that confront non-Estonians with the state of Estonia, and more neutral names, that rather refer to Estonia, have been used by the Estonian press.

The Myth of the Estonians' Tolerance

That the argumentation appealing to people's emotions and to a national-central ideology has been substituted by a rational and critical discussion, is proved by the fact that some national myths have started to dismantle in relation with the integration and the reinterpretation of the relations between the minorities and the majority. Among these national myths, there is one about the tolerance of the Estonians. To assert the tolerance of the Estonians, people have brought up the fact that the Estonians have never started a public hostility campaign against an ethnic group and that ethnic conflicts could be avoided in society. But tolerance is not simply identical with the lack of public intolerance and hatred, but it can be defined more broadly – with the terms openness, recognition and respect.

The problematics of the Estonians' tolerance has been reflected in the media at different levels. On the one hand, one could find a more self-critical approach to the attitude of Estonians towards non-Estonians and their perspectives in Estonian society.

"It seems that in the column on the local elections in the July 30th edition of "Postimees", the usual journalistic objectiveness and sober analysis has been suddenly replaced by a national hysteria. (...) Because how else to interpret the final sentence of the column, namely that it would be sad as well as shameful if Tallinn would have a non-Estonian mayor? How long are we going to instigate such a hostility?" (PM 03.08.99)

" It would have been a hard piece for the Estonians to accept if Jevgeni Kogan, as the keyperson of the Intermovement, had become a member of the municipal council of Tallinn. Without Kogan it is easier, at least now, when the tolerant attitude towards people with different views is yet weakly developed in society. " (PM 02.11.99)

According to the evaluations written by non-Estonians, Estonians often have a disdainful or superior attitude towards non-Estonians. *"And then doctor Shvarova reminds us of a great Esto-phobia.";* *"Earlier our doctors and patients were afraid to go to Tallinn and Tartu. They thought that they would be reviled for being a Russian" (EPL 13.11.99);* *"According to Maksim Golovko, the integration into society must start from outside, from Estonians.";* *"The attitude of Estonians is still such that North-eastern Estonia is a peculiar place where different people live. We are looked at «Aha, why you are from there...»." (SL 11.12.99).*

The attitude of non-Estonians, especially that of the younger generation, however, seems to be more positive and open-minded. *"The young Russians admit that Estonians consider the Russians*

to be criminals and alcoholics. In spite of this stereotype, they consider Estonians to be helpful and friendly". (PM 11.12.99).

Although mutual tolerance and open-mindedness has been partly related to the question of generations, supposing that younger generations are more open to contacts and communication, one could also find warning examples in the press that assert the contrary:

"The younger Estonians gathered at the Beach Party, unlikely the local Russians, do not probably go to integration seminars of ethnic minorities very often. The Russians that came sincerely from the North- Estonia to the south to a party with an English name got ruthlessly beaten by Estonians. For being Russian. The Estonians, used to get beaten by the Russians in Tallinn, got their national satisfaction at the glory lake of the followers of the Taara faith." (SL 07.06.99).⁶

It is clear from the previous paragraphs that, in reality, besides the real cases or experiences of intolerance, imaginary pictures of the other nation make up a great share. Here the press may operate in two ways: it may refute the negative myths and images, or it may create them.

Summary

How then to achieve the interethnic relations which could be described with the terms recognition, respect and co-operation? One solution may be the pragmatic approach. The pragmatic approach regards the problems of integration and ethnic relations from the position of society as a whole and considers their settling to be important from the point of view of the interests of stability and from that of the development of society.

In the current research, we regarded the following arguments as examples of the pragmatic approach: the involvement of non-Estonians into state administration and the growth of citizenry is in the interests of the state of Estonia, and non-Estonians as human capital are a resource for the development of the state of Estonia:

- *"The division of Russian parties into two competing lists may mean the complete exclusion of the Russians from the parliament, and this would certainly be an event with negative impacts. The Russian politicians sitting in the parliament may not please the Estonians, but their presence there is necessary for Estonia both in the interest of inner stability as well as in that of foreign policy." (PM 19.01.99);*
- *"Due to this, the integration of the Estonian society, its social stability and perspective of democracy depends to a great extent on how quickly the statelessness and the uncertainty conditioned by it will disappear." (PM 02.03.99);*
- *"By now, most of the parties have started to make more cautious statements about immigration as the cornerstone of population policy. This gives hope that against the background of the evident and long-time deterioration of the demographic situation in Estonia, people would learn to appreciate human capital not only through the ethnic prism." (PM 02.03.99).*

From the results of the 1999 media monitoring it is essential to emphasise the fact that the images of different communities have been balanced in the press: the negative characteristics have been no longer attributed to non-Estonians, but also ones Estonians have started to assess their own ethnic group from a critical position. Besides the generalised and community-centred approaches towards non-Estonians, numerous positive portrait-stories and features have appeared about concrete persons. It is typical that writing about non-Estonians in an impersonal and generalised manner, the evaluations have been much more critical, if not directly disdainful,

⁶ Beach Party is a popular music festival that takes place at the lake Pühajärve in southern Estonia.

while in the case of the people, a more humane and supportive approach has been used. There has been a feature story about Dmitri, a youngster from Narva, who is working in a farm in Tartu county during the school vacations in order to see other places in Estonia than his hometown and to improve his knowledge of the Estonian language. Another feature story tells about the pupils of the Pähklikimäe high school in Narva who are eager to learn; or yet another one about the teachers of the Estonian language in Sillamäe primary school who, as "public enemies", do not allow the little children of Sillamäe to learn the Estonian language. Such feature stories carry a strong message about tolerance, and insist on the need for understanding and recognition.

Therefore, it is extremely important that besides the press-debate about the perspectives and choices of the integration process, the papers should write about individuals, about their fears and efforts, their desires and thoughts, supporting in this way the principle of individuality characteristic of the Estonian model of integration. Thus, it may happen that *"unexpectedly even to ourselves, we learn that many Russians are not the non-speaking Vasjas whom Estonians often consider them to be."* (SL 06.05.99).

From the feature stories that I have quoted above, I can still remember one paragraph clearly: *"I stood in the empty class-room, putting my things together after the last class. Suddenly a little girl came up to me and, glancing at me with her great eyes, addressed me very seriously: «Now that you saw that the Russians are not bad people, go and tell it to the other Estonians as well»"* (EPL 17.04.99). If such messages could be really delivered to the Estonians through the press, an essential contribution could be made to the integration process.

Conclusion

Raivo Vetik

The goal of this monitoring of integration of the Estonian society was to find out, in greater detail about the actual progress of integration processes, and to contribute to the formation of the respective state policy, underpinned by objective information. In this volume, the results of monitoring are analyzed as per main domains of integration, laying emphasis on both the positive tendencies and problems. To generalize, the second half of 90s revealed a noticeable improvement in the Estonian society, the reciprocating isolation gradually giving way to mutual acceptance and toleration of each other.

Manifestly expressing the positive shift is the fact that integration has become an object of open discussion in media, and more widely in the whole community. Results of the monitoring have evoked lively repercussions ever since they became known, before they were published between these covers. Among others, there were heated discussions about the allegation that 46% of Estonians perceive the mass exodus of non-Estonians as something this country would much benefit from. The above figure has been root source of prolific mythology, marked by abundant inventiveness and traveling from one piece of writing to another, acquiring ramifications and occult implications. Therefore this research team deems it necessary to comment on the said figure.

It is true that 46% of respondents-Estonians answered in the affirmative to the given question. The said group divided into two subgroups: 15% strongly supported the opinion of the allegedly benevolent impact of re-emigration of aliens, 31% supporting the said opinion conditionally, to some extent. Deplorably, the said figures were too often treated in the press isolated from the actual context and interpreted in the way the sociologists can not agree with. The analysis of the given figures, against the background of the whole survey suggests that only 20% of Estonians whose opinion was polled can be referred to as ethnocentric, regarding one's own ethnic group as superior, and actually rejecting the aliens. Regarding this figure, the following need be said: as compared with the situation in the beginning 90s, when re-emigration of non-Estonians was part of the official policy, in evidence now is a quantum leap towards enhanced tolerance.

And yet, 20% is a figure to be sad about. In the first place, it is indicative of a laborious transitional process, in the people's psyche. One is emotionally trapped in one's bygone grievances, although rational thinking goads one ahead, to the future. Apparently the task of the state will be to tilt the balance, in this connection. The integration process is to be perceived in this context. The integration program of the Estonian society unequivocally stipulates that 'integration is a serious challenge also to Estonians, expecting them to proceed on a presumption that the nation state of Estonia is to be determined on political and not on an ethnic basis'.

A wider historic backdrop to such attitudes would not be out of place. In the European cultural space, there are two mutually exclusive patterns of nation state – political-territorial and ethnic-cultural. The first is typical to Western Europe, the second to Eastern Europe. In the West, the nations were generated, as a rule inside the existent states. Underlying their identity were political principles evolved in the modern era,

whereby the democratization of the social order was effected. Subjects to the king became a sovereign state. The state was conceived as an aggregate of citizens endowed with equal rights and residing in the given territory.

In East Europe, the nations sprung into being in the conditions of imported, hostile empires, not within the boundaries of own state. The carriers of nationalism were language and culture. They became tools to shape the new identity and to help people stand up against the foreign power. The right to self-determination of nations was construed as the right of nations defined in ethnic-cultural conceptions, to have their own state. This was how it came to realize, by and large, after WWI. After WWII, however it became increasingly hard to associate the state with one culture only, in view of mass migration, whereby the majority of world countries have become multicultural, by composition of their populations. For instance, among UN member states only 10% are ethnically homogenous. In one third of countries of the world no single ethnic group accounts for 50% of the total population.

As an East-European people, Estonians have embraced the concept of state, proceeding from culture. When this nation was rising in the past century, it was not the political ideas that determined the developments. As opposed to the pressure from Russian Empire, highlighted were the promotion of the own-language culture, collection of cultural heritage and creation of new nationalist traditions. In the Soviet period, too the cultural resistance movement was a natural strategy of the Estonian man, to withstand the deleterious communist ideology. Evidently, this time honored tradition still affects the modern attitudes, although both the internal development of the society and the external European environment make it imperative the premises of nation-statehood of Estonia be reconsidered with a view to change, revision, or revocation.

The outcome of the monitoring makes us entitled to assert that the said reconsideration is underway. The Estonian society is tearing itself loose from the constraints of ethnically conceived nation state, heading for the nation state on political foundations. This shall be a state, where the public sphere will operate in the Estonian language and lean upon Western political values and cultural stereotypes; where in the private sphere there will be guarantees securing the conditions for preservation of culture, language and traditions of the minorities. In view of Estonia's history, geopolitical position and other factors, this development will by no means be easy or straightforward, as suggested by the notorious figure of 46%. However, visualized in dynamics and in a wider context, it can be safely asserted that the majority of Estonian people will have no alternative to integration.

The basic conclusions, as formulated by the research group, on the basis of outcome of the monitoring, are as follows:

1. In evidence in Estonia is a change in conscience and attitude of residents; there is more reciprocal tolerance and openness. *The integration policy is not a sham of the empty pageant.* The process has been set going.
2. Yet, the integration is a rough and uneven going. There are many aspects to it. It progresses at multiple speed on several planes, along different axes, sometimes at variance. Apparently there is no way to contain the media and

prevent it from generating a fuzzy and partly controversial picture about the process.

3. Heretofore, the integration related activities have focused on the language-cultural aspect, where the changes are easy to see. A host of language instruction projects launched and dedicated to non-Estonians have caught the public awareness and have won much support. Furthermore, they have unified the attitudes of both communities, in recognition of the necessity to have intimate knowledge of the official language.
4. The developments concerning the status and rights of non-Estonians are less noticeable, however they are felt. Monitoring brought to the highlight the increased tolerance of Estonians, in respect of citizenship issues. The alacrity of the population to have the juridical issues resolved is actually higher than hitherto thought, however the political forces have not been able to make use of that potential, for a number of reasons. Evidently the catch now is how to create a *discursus* (discourse) wherein the political decisions concerning the community of aliens should not be seen on the axis 'concessions and appeasement *versus* stiff-necked rejection'.
5. Integration is at its greatest disadvantage in the social-economical sphere. Henceforward, that area should be tackled in all earnest. Self-governments have great leverage for action, in this connection. It is not so much the money that is at issue here, rather it is the skill to perceive the problems and to solve them.
6. Besides proceeding on different axes and planes, the integration also rolls on socially at different velocities – it involves certain groups leaving the others in the backwater. The dropouts Russian-speaking youths, yet gone unintegrated will carry the seeds of discontent and present a significant risk for the state of Estonia. The next stage of the integration process must be targeted to involve them, too – meaning that a focus should be on marginal groups.
7. Integration is a trilateral process – it affects not only Estonians and non-Estonians, however operates under tacit assumption that the relations of Estonia with Russia are to be improved. When assessing the perils and risks of the integration, the Russian factor needs to be taken into account, because the local community of aliens has remained, to a great extent, in Russia's communication sphere.
8. Estonian printed media has failed to establish the favorable soil for the integration. Because the media in Russian amplifies the voice of journalists, mainly, it generates a more biased vision than that in the Estonian language media. Media in Russian does not pave the road to the integration; the most peddled model in that media generates conflict, evoking as it does acclaim among the audience.
9. Both the Estonian language and the Russian language media amplify the position whereby the integration is construed as a "governmental facility". Should the state of Estonia fail to supply it, one would appeal to international organizations and foreign countries. This attitude is prevalent among the Russian audience. A dialog on different communication levels would enable one to leave the plane where integration projects are regarded as meant for idle consumers, wherein the community of aliens is posing as an inane subject, to be waited on by the state.